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Abstract 
The Twentieth Century’s hotel industry saw a shift from independently managed 
grand hotels to the increasing influence of multinational hotel companies whilst 
processes of globalisation contributed to the international movement of people, ideas 
and practices. The London Hilton was the first subsidiary of this American branded 
chain to open in Britain undergoing, at the time, cultural and social changes 
associated with the ‘Swinging Sixties’.  
The history of grand hotels has been thoroughly documented however there is lack 
of business history research into the expansion process of modern multinational 
hotel companies. The aim of this study is to explore the process of 
internationalisation of Hilton Hotels through the transference of knowledge between 
the parent company and the London subsidiary. International business theory is 
investigated in pursuit of establishing relationships between the concepts of 
transference of knowledge, multiple-embeddedness and negotiation of legitimacy, 
collectively forming a conceptual framework driving this research.  
A single embedded case study is adopted to comprehend the nuanced relationships 
and pressures resulting from the multiple-embeddedness of the case. An extensive 
range of archival material is collected to construct an in-depth case study of the 
London Hilton embedded in the contexts of its parent company as well as home and 
host countries. The case is synthesised with the theory using interpretive research 
methods and employing a three-stage coding process.  
The London Hilton appears to be representative of a case of effective knowledge 
transference which avoided the pressure for homogenisation from the host 
environment. It is an example of an organisation whose foreignness served as a 
differentiating, rather than restraining factor. These findings contradict the traditional 
institutional assertion of the necessity for adaptation to local settings and confirm the 
notion that legitimacy can be negotiated. The appearance of the Hilton hotel on the 
1960’s London hotel market can be perceived as an emblem of the wider historical 
changes in the globalising world.  
The main contribution of this research is adding a new dimension to the paradigms 
of institutionalism and the resource-based view by illuminating the complex 
associations between these concepts underpinning international business theories. 
The study also extends the existing theory of foreignness and contributes to the body 
of business history research in the field of hotel management. It recommends the 
application of oral history and network analysis for further exploration of these 
concepts.  
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Part 1 – Background to and need for the study  
This thesis is divided into three distinctive parts. The aim of Part 1 is to set the scene 
of the research by discussing its background, positioning and aim. It critically reviews 
previous research and discusses the methodology adopted. Part 1 situates the 
research before proceeding to the construction and analysis of the case.  
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background to the study  
The Twentieth Century saw a tremendous and rapid shift in the hotel-keeping 
industry. Historical events, social changes and technological developments have all 
contributed to the fact that travellers today can stay in their chosen brand of hotel 
wherever they travel in the world and that the latter in particular has enabled the 
development of more professional, standardised and strategic hotel-keeping. This 
study explores Hilton Hotels as an example of an organisation which developed from 
a single property in Texas to becoming one of the largest hotel companies worldwide 
boasting a portfolio of brands and operating hotels on every continent.  
The focus of this research developed from an initial interest in the history of London 
grand hotels, the umbrella term for the iconic hotels such as the Savoy, the Langham 
and Claridge’s, and the impact of globalisation and the expansion of multinational 
hotel companies upon them. Exploring this topic inevitably drew the researcher’s 
attention to the history of American hotel-keeping which proved to be fascinating 
mainly because of its rapid development and its role in American society throughout 
the decades. Hilton Hotels was a company representative of the swift changes in the 
American hotel scene. It evolved from the tradition of grand hotels and the legacy of 
its founder Conrad Hilton to become a multinational company associated with 
standardised service.  
The interest in the history of grand hotels stemmed from the fact that these 
properties are believed to have shaped people’s imagination of hotels in general 
(Berger 2011). Hotels such as the Tremont House in Boston, the Waldorf-Astoria in 
New York or the Savoy in London were the first to set standards which were 
subsequently developed and re-invented by modern hotels. Both Slattery (2009) and 
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Berger (2011) agree that it is the most luxurious hotels which are considered 
benchmarks for others. Slattery (2009: 36) states: “all other hotels were lesser 
versions of the grand hotels” and this applies equally to the price they charged for 
their services as to the style of services they provided and the physical environment 
in which they were set. Studying grand hotels can, thus, provide understanding of 
practices applied in modern multinational hotel companies.  
The early Twentieth Century’s grand hotel market was dominated by properties 
owned by wealthy individuals and managed by skilled hoteliers. Names such as 
Cesar Ritz, Auguste Escoffier and Rosa Lewis are still considered to be legends in 
the field of hospitality. However, today even the most renowned hotels including the 
Savoy, Claridge’s and Waldorf-Astoria in New York are managed by multinational 
hotel companies. This shift has been greatly facilitated by the process of 
globalisation. The increasing movement of people, capital and information enabled 
by technological advancements have all contributed to the opening of new markets 
and have eased entry to the diversified hotel trade. Particularly the developments in 
communication and transportation technologies allowed companies to offer their 
products and services abroad (King 1997). This, in turn, led to the increased 
standardisation of business practices (Geppert and Williams 2006). On the other 
hand, there are scholars who assert that globalisation has not actually led to 
homogenisation of business practices, but that practices in companies around the 
world have been Westernised (Scholte 2005). The American influence in particular is 
believed to have contributed to the way many multinational firms, including hotel 
companies, are run. Amatori and Colli (2011: 84) suggest that Nineteenth Century’s 
America was “about to become the first nation of mass consumption”. As the mass 
consumption spread across the world, so has the American style of hotel-keeping 
and management. The trend towards Americanisation of Europe was even more 
evident in the decades following the Second World War, when American businesses 
were actively involved in the economic aid provided by the Marshall Plan.  
The 1960s is a particular time in London’s history when conservative society began 
shifting towards what became known as ‘swinging London’ (Sandbrook 2006b). This 
decade saw not only the influx of American companies, but also the increasing 
receptiveness to American lifestyle by the public in both London and Europe at large 
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(Kroes 2007, Bonin and de Goey 2009, Gassert 2012). This stemmed mainly from 
the economic differences between Europe, recovering from the impacts of the 
Second World War, and America which was affected by the War to a much lesser 
extent. In light of these social and economic changes The London Hilton was the first 
branded American hotel chain to open in London, symbolising the new era of 
modernity and ‘brand culture’ (Schroeder and Salzer-Mörling 2006). There is an 
argument that hospitality service providers, whether in domestic or the commercial 
domain, possess a certain level of control and the power to exercise their own rules 
over guests (Lashley and Lynch 2013). Bearing this in mind, the concept that Hilton 
brought with it modern American ways of hotel keeping and enforced them on guests 
and the local hotel market appears noteworthy. This study aims to discuss the 
significance of this company’s entry into London’s 1960s hotel market.  
There is a wealth of research on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’ grand 
hotels with scholars analysing historical developments of these hotels (see: White 
1968, Borer 1972, Taylor and Bush 1974, Sheppardson 1991, Groth 1994, Taylor 
2003, Dolkart 2005, Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011) and biographies of their 
managers and founders (see: Miller 1968, Nickson 1997, Turkel 2009). Bowie (2015) 
raises the issue of public debate as to the standard and price of English hotels in the 
Nineteenth Century which highlights the service gap between English and American 
hotels at the time. The history of modern hotel-keeping, however, is rather 
fragmented and the rapid expansion of hotel multinationals is not yet entirely 
comprehended. Quek (2007) studied mergers and acquisitions amongst hotel 
multinationals and Wharton (2001) explored Hilton’s internationalisation from an 
architectural and design perspective. Other studies have focused on strategic 
decisions as to internationalisation (Roper 2015) but with little application of an 
historical perspective. Books have been commissioned by hotel multinationals 
including Intercontinental and Hilton Worldwide (Potter 1996 and Augustin 2013, 
respectively) but these tend to provide a general historical overview and celebrate 
these companies’ heritage rather than engage in conceptual discourse about 
internationalisation. Table 1-1 presents the focus of these previous historical studies.  
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Author Focus Type of 
publication 
Miller (1968) Biography of Ellsworth Milton Statler  Biography 
White (1968) Sociological overview of the history of the hotel industry  Book (sociology and 
history) 
Borer (1972) Overview of different types of accommodation beginning 
from early inns to grand hotels  
Book 
Taylor and Bush 
(1974) 
The history of British hotel industry from early inns to the 
1970s with focus on key events and prominent hoteliers  
Book 
Sheppardson 
(1991) 
The state of the luxury hotel market in London in 1991  Book 
Groth (1994) The history of residential hotels in the United States Book 
Potter (1996) The history of Intercontinental Hotels Commemorative 
book 
Nickson (1997) Review of autobiographies and biographies of four hotel 
entrepreneurs (Forte, Hilton, Marriott and Wilson) and their 
role in hospitality research 
Journal article 
Wharton (2001) The political and social role of Hilton’s expansion from the 
perspective of architecture  
Book (architecture 
and design) 
Taylor (2003) Extended history of British hotel market continued from the 
co-authored book from 1974  
Book 
Dolkart (2005) The history of American luxury apartment hotels  Journal article 
(design and décor) 
Quek (2007) The role of mergers and acquisitions in the development 
of four hotel companies (Forte, Ladbroke, Bass and 
Whitbread) 
PhD Thesis 
Sandoval-
Strausz (2007) 
Social history of the US through the perspective of hotels 
development 
Book (sociology and 
history) 
Turkel (2009) Biographies of prominent American hotel entrepreneurs  Biography (coffee-
table book style) 
Berger (2011) The history of American luxury hotel market between 1829 
and 1929 
Book (sociology, 
urban development) 
Augustin (2013) The history of the London Hilton on Park Lane 
(commemorative book) 
Commemorative 
book 
Bowie (2015) The role of the hotel charges debate published by the 
Times in 1853 in disseminating management innovations  
Journal article 
(business history) 
Table 1-1. Historical studies of luxury/grand hotel industry between 1968 and 2015 
Source: Author’s review of previous literature 
 
 
In the light of previous research, there is a need for historical research into the early 
expansion of modern hotel companies. There is also lack of business history 
research seeking to explore the growth of a company from the perspective of its 
subsidiary. Such a specific angle provides an opportunity for the study of multiple 
contexts affecting the subsidiary, ranging from its parent company to the external 
environment of its host location. This approach also sets the case in a very specific 
historical context which allows in-depth analysis of its influence.  
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1.2. Positioning of the study  
This research project is a business history study. Buckley (2009) asserts that it is the 
unique logic of an historical approach that influences the organisation of corporate 
knowledge and, consequently, the methods of formulating problems, presenting 
arguments and drawing conclusions. This is strengthened by the fact that 
international business decisions should be made with thorough understanding and 
evaluation of circumstances, including a company’s historical context. Business 
history can, therefore, provide an integrated conceptual structure for corporate 
decision-making (Buckley 2009; LSE 2015). The increased importance of corporate 
history is also recognised by the leading academic and research institutions which 
closely cooperate with companies on developing economic and business history 
research. The University of Oxford, London School of Economics, as well as Harvard 
Business School are all committed to studying historical developments of various 
industries. These institutions’ research has been used by international agencies 
including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and by businesses such 
as WH Smith and Marks and Spencer.  
Geoffrey Jones (2015) of Harvard Business School states:  
“The current era of globalization, shifting economic power, and 
financial shocks have many echoes in past events, from which lessons 
can and should be learned. Business history provides rich and 
nuanced evidence on the key issues faced by the world today, 
including the drivers and consequences of globalization, the sources 
of innovation and entrepreneurship, the role of business in political 
systems, and the responsibilities of business to creating a more 
sustainable world”.  
Indeed, there is growing body of evidence to suggest that economic and business 
historians have been able to predict major events, including the economic crisis in 
2008, thanks to the comparison of market observations with historical events 
(Eichengreen 2012).  
The Business History Review journal has published two special editions dedicated to 
the history of multinationals, one in 1974 and the other one in 2015. The significant 
difference between these two issues was the application of theory (Wilkins 2015). 
While none of the 1974 articles dealt with theory, those published in 2015 
contributed to joining history with theory, for example, in the context of 
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internationalisation (Verbeke and Kano 2015). This highlights the changing approach 
to business history and the fact that it now finds application in the wider international 
business studies. In the light of these changes in academic focus, this research 
explores the concepts of internationalisation and knowledge transference employed 
in a single embedded case study of the London Hilton.  
This research applies theoretical concepts concerned with international business (IB) 
to investigate the process of internationalisation of one of the first hotel 
multinationals. It approaches the enquiry from the institutional perspective which is, 
so far, lacking in research into multinational hotel companies. It seems clear that in 
the light of globalisation and its impact on the development of this industry the 
influence of the external environment on these organisations should be considered.  
Furthermore, this study applies the institutionalism paradigm to explore the specific 
historical context surrounding the opening of the London Hilton. It explores the role 
of transference of knowledge in the process of the company’s internationalisation 
and the negotiation of legitimacy in host locations. Previous research has explored 
elements of these concepts individually (see Table 1-2), but has failed to investigate 
the relationships between them, which this research seeks to accomplish.  
Author Focus 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) The stage process of internationalisation 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) Adaptation to local practices as an element of negotiating 
legitimacy  
Kogut and Zander (1993) Knowledge of a firm as one of its resources  
Szulanski (1996) Impediments to the transfer of best practice in international firms 
Kostova (1999) Transference of practices in international companies  
Kostova and Zaheer (1999)  The issue of legitimacy of foreign multinationals  
Argote and Ingram (2000) Knowledge transference as a source of competitive advantage  
Kostova and Roth (2002)  Transference of practices from headquarters to international 
subsidiaries  
Dhanaraj et al. (2004) Tacit and explicit type of knowledge in companies  
Geppert and Williams (2006) Transference of practices in multinational companies  
Dunning and Lundan (2008) Internationalisation of companies, the role of knowledge from the 
resource-based view perspective  
Kostova et al. (2008) The role of isomorphism in negotiation of legitimacy  
Meyer et al. (2011) Opportunities and challenges of MNCs’ multiple-embeddedness  
Ferraris (2014) The role of multiple-embeddedness in internationalisation of firms  
Khojastehpour and Johns (2014) The role of knowledge in expertise in international hotel 
companies  
Joardar et al. (2014) The notion of foreignness as a corporate asset  
Almodóvar and Rugman (2015) Updated discussion on the stage process of internationalisation  
Table 1-2. Selection of studies concerned with international business adopted in this research 
Source: Author’s review of previous literature 
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Much research into multinational companies adopts a positivist approach to enquiry. 
However, Lynch, Lugosi and Morrison (2009) criticise academic institutions for 
encouraging students to follow only positivist precepts which consequently leads to 
the weakening of critical thinking skills. There is an argument that qualitative 
research methods offer an opportunity for alternative explanations of ideas which are 
often taken for granted (Sarantankos 2005). Some of the qualitative methodologies 
currently applied in hospitality research involve critical management studies (Lynch 
at al. 2009), comparative historical analysis (Quek 2007) and sociological 
impressionism (Lynch 2005). These are methods especially used in studies where 
authors rely heavily on their own impressions and construction of knowledge. They 
follow constructivist and interpretivist assumptions which also underpin this research. 
Such methods allow for engagement with a broad range of disciplines which, 
according to Lynch et al. (2009: 1474) can “help to develop moral and intellectual 
capabilities as well as applicable business techniques and practical competencies” in 
the field of hospitality.  The study, concerned with a range of theoretical concepts, 
clearly lends itself to such interpretivist research methods. 
 
1.3. Aim and objectives 
In summary, the reasons for choosing this topic are as follows: 
 The lack of research focusing on individual subsidiaries of multinational 
companies and hotel multinational companies in particular. 
 The considerable lack of business history research into multinational hotel 
companies. 
 The gap in the literature exploring the relationship between the concepts of 
internationalisation, knowledge transference, multiple-embeddedness and 
negotiation of legitimacy. 
Given the reasons for this study, its overall aim is: 
To explore the role of knowledge transference in the process of 
internationalisation of Hilton Hotels, using the case of the London Hilton.  
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In order to achieve this aim, which is concerned with a particular company in a 
particular time period, the following objectives have been set: 
1. To review literature concerned with the internationalisation of multinational 
companies and to construct a framework of relevant concepts as a theoretical 
underpinning.  
2. To construct a case study exploring the development and early operations of 
the London Hilton within the context of its parent company and the socio-
economic and competitive environment of London in the 1960s.  
3. To analyse the process of Hilton’s internationalisation from the perspective of 
knowledge transference.  
4. To assess the role of multiple-embeddedness in the development of the 
London Hilton.  
5. To contribute to the body of knowledge by evaluating the role played by 
knowledge transference in the process of MNC’s negotiation of legitimacy in 
the host environment. 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into three distinctive parts. Part 1 sets the scene of the study by 
discussing its background, reviewing previous literature and discussing the 
methodology. Part 2 comprises the four elements of the case study and Part 3 offers 
discussion of findings and conclusions. This thesis is driven by the multiple-
embeddedness of the London Hilton subsidiary which is depicted in Figure 1-1. This 
model guides not only the data collection and analysis but also its structure. It is 
repeated in the individual chapters to serve as a conceptual map.  
19 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Multiple-embeddedness driving the structure of the thesis 
Source: Author’s visualisation 
 
Having discussed the background and positioning of this study, Chapter Two reviews 
previous research on theories concerned with the internationalisation of businesses 
and introduces the institutionalism paradigm as the underpinning theoretical 
perspective of this study. As discussed in this chapter, the underlying assumption of 
institutionalism is that the wider context affects individuals and businesses in their 
decisions, strategies and actions. Individuals and businesses, consequently, are 
required to navigate through a network of institutions which can be favourable or 
which might pose challenges in the planned undertakings. The reason for introducing 
the paradigm in the beginning of this study is that it acts as the wider conceptual 
umbrella, underpinning other theories asserted and analysed in this study. 
Institutionalists claim that this paradigm should not be considered a piece of theory, 
but it is rather a particular way of thinking and of viewing the world. Institutionalism 
is, therefore, introduced in the beginning, so that its assumptions can be recognised 
in the following sections of the study. Chapter Two further reviews previous research 
on MNCs, their internationalisation and the key concepts connected with them, 
including the transference of knowledge, legitimacy and multiple-embeddedness. 
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This chapter constructs the theoretical framework of this study by analysing the key 
theoretical concepts. It, therefore, separates itself from the case study of Hilton and 
focuses only on previous research concerned with the theoretical side of the 
research. Findings from this review are later applied in the Discussion in Chapter 
Eight to serve as the framework for the analysis of the case study findings.  
Chapter Three focuses on the research method chosen for this study. Firstly, it 
introduces business history as a discipline. It is deemed important to discuss the key 
characteristics of this field of study which does not seem to always have a place in 
mainstream academic research. Business history is somewhat overshadowed by 
international business and economic history, therefore, some of its key 
characteristics are not widely known. Further, this chapter discusses the 
philosophical approach which drives the research as well as the embedded case 
study method which is, typically for business history, chosen as the research 
method. It presents the data collection process and methods of analysis of the 
collected material. Finally, this chapter discusses the measures used to ensure 
validity and reliability of this research as well as ethical considerations concerned 
with it.  
The fourth chapter focuses on the historical development of hotels in Britain and 
America, and particularly on grand hotels. It sets the case of the London Hilton 
temporally and provides knowledge on the differences in approach to hotel-keeping 
in these two countries. Additionally, drawing from the institutionalist underpinning, it 
is believed that the historical context is just as essential as the cultural or economic 
context. This is the nature of historical study to explain how certain phenomena 
came to be.  
Chapters Five and Six directly address objective two, namely to construct a case 
study on the London Hilton in the context of its parent company and its host 
environment. The case first focuses on the parent company, starting from its founder 
Conrad Hilton. It discusses the historical development of this company and its 
subsequent entrance onto the international hotel market. The second section of the 
case study shifts its focus onto the London Hilton. It evaluates the process of 
development of the hotel, the HR strategies adopted, technological advancements 
and the marketing methods utilised. The case study is not presented in strict 
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chronological order but it groups information in conceptual ‘clusters’. It is believed 
that this method is the most effective one in presenting the multiple-embeddedness 
of this company and discussing its development in the many contexts which 
surround it. The case is concluded with Chapter Seven which serves as an epilogue. 
It is not the aim of this research to discuss the transition of the company into Hilton 
Worldwide but this chapter merely attempts to ‘close’ the story of this company as of 
2016. The case study does not finish at any particular point in time as it is relevant to 
outline the way that the company has developed since the London property opened. 
Such an approach also highlights the fact that the London Hilton is still managed by 
the same company, despite the changes in its corporate structure over the years. 
Chapter Eight presents the discussion of the findings from the case study in the light 
of the previously devised theoretical framework. Following the objectives, it aims to 
analyse the case from the perspectives of knowledge transference and multiple-
embeddedness as important elements of internationalisation. This is not to say that 
these are the only two concepts involved. In the process of review of previous 
research, many underpinning concepts are identified and these are also adopted in 
the discussion. This chapter, therefore, follows the theoretical framework constructed 
through the review of previous research in order to fully exhaust knowledge gained 
from previous studies. Such a structure also allows for a more focused and robust 
analysis. The discussion gains from the case study using it as a narrative and a 
source on its own. This is an approach typical for business history where 
researchers build narratives in order to later refer to and learn from them.   
The final Chapter Nine is the one which concludes this study. It directly addresses all 
the set objectives and discusses contributions to knowledge made by this research. 
It reflects on the research process in terms of the development of knowledge and 
discusses limitations of this research. Some scholars analyse limitations in 
methodology chapters, but it is strongly believed that one can only reflect on 
limitations of certain methods, having attempted to use and apply them. For this 
reason, the limitations are discussed as one of the last elements in this work. Finally, 
recommendations for further research are forwarded based on the scope for 
methodological development as well as on theoretical areas which lend themselves 
for further, in-depth study.  
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2. A review of key international business concepts   
2.1. Introduction  
This research studies the internationalisation of Hilton as a multinational company in 
the context of its multiple-embeddedness. Such focus makes it imperative that two 
key theoretical paradigms are adopted in this research, namely institutionalism and 
the resource-based view of the firm. Applying institutionalism in discussion on the 
contexts in which Hilton is set gives this study a wide range of tools in analysing 
various factors affecting the company. The resource-based view, on the other hand, 
focuses on resources and on a company’s ability to manage these. It asserts that the 
competitive advantage of a firm lies primarily in the application of tangible or 
intangible resources at the firm's disposal (Penrose 1959). Such resources range 
from tangibles such as capital and raw materials to intangible assets including 
expertise or innovative culture. Kogut and Zander (1997) state that the knowledge 
base of a firm leads to a set of capabilities that enhance the chances for its growth 
and survival. As such, this view allows for an in-depth study of knowledge 
transference within the company.  
This chapter plays a twofold role; firstly, it reviews the previous research on concepts 
associated with multinational companies (MNCs) and their internationalisation and 
secondly, it creates a theoretical framework for analysis of the case study. It, 
therefore, begins with an introduction to the paradigms of institutionalism and the 
resource-based view and discusses how they underpin this study. It later moves on 
to reviewing the literature on multinational corporations and the concepts concerned 
with their internationalisation, including knowledge transference, multiple-
embeddedness and legitimacy.  
 
2.2. The Institutional paradigm 
There are numerous definitions of the term ‘institution’ in the literature and 
Institutionalists often disagree as to what this most basic assumption of their 
paradigm involves. Hodgson (1998) states that Institutionalists do not aim to create 
specific models or theories. What is key in their work is a particular, historically 
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located approach to analysis. Institutionalism is, therefore, more a way of 
approaching a study rather than a tool for conducting it; a way of looking at the 
development of hotels, rather than an exact explanation as to why they developed in 
a certain way. Back in 1971 Davis and North proposed that institutions are:  
“The set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that 
establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution” (Davis 
and North 1971: 6) 
Later on, in 1990 North coined the following definition which states that institutions 
are:  
“The rules of the game in a society or, more formally, humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990: 3)  
This definition already pays more attention to the ‘human’, cognitive side than the 
previous one in which institutions are seen as external to actors. Edwards, Colling 
and Ferner (2007: 203) state that institutions are: “rules, norms, and assumptions 
that shape economic activity” and that they “structure choices of organisational 
actors” which instantly adds a business angle to the definition.  In 1995 Scott divided 
institutions into three types of structures which give stability and reason to social 
behaviour: cognitive, normative and regulatory. Scott (1995) describes these pillars 
as follows:  
 Regulatory pillar – reflects the coercive power of governments and largely 
corresponds to formal institutions;  
 Normative pillar - refers to how the norms, values, beliefs and actions of other 
relevant players influence the behaviour of focal individuals and firms;  
 Cognitive pillar – refers to the internalised, taken for granted assumptions of 
how the world works that (usually unconsciously) guide individual and firm 
behaviour.  
Scott’s concept of three pillars covers all the areas of knowledge which is present 
and is transferred within an MNC, including tacit knowledge and explicit practices.  
Ingram and Silverman (2002: 6), who represent so-called neo-institutionalists, 
embark on defining the assertions of institutionalism from a different perspective and 
start from the statement that: “actors pursue their interests by making choices within 
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institutional constraints”. Their focus, therefore, rests on individual actors rather than 
on institutions themselves. The authors further explain that such actors might involve 
individuals, organisations or even states which have certain interests and undertake 
actions to achieve those interests. The same actors who pursue their interest within 
various environmental constraints simultaneously create constraints for other actors 
(state for organisations, organisations for individuals and vice-versa) and this is how 
institutions are developed.  
Institutions are simply rules which influence organisations and individuals working in 
a given environment (North 1991, Scott 2005). The literature divides these rules into 
formal and informal ones, and agrees that their characteristics depend on the 
country where the organisation operates and include legal, political, religious, 
language and other aspects (Peng and Meyer 2011). North (1991) stresses that 
institutions play a crucial role in reducing uncertainty of exchanges between 
companies and in regulating various transaction costs between them.  
This is where the concept of transaction costs needs to be defined. One of the key 
decisions that every company makes is whether to undertake certain activities within 
the firm or whether to enter in a transaction with an external party. This decision is 
based on the cost of such transactions (Douma and Schreuder 2012). If the cost of 
performing a certain activity within the firm is lower, the company will internalize it, 
which means that it will use its own resources to perform it. Otherwise, it will enter 
into a transaction with another company (Commons 1931, Coase 1937). Such 
transaction can take the form of a wide range of types from purchasing individual 
goods to establishing joint ventures. Transaction costs include anything from search 
and information costs to policing and enforcement costs. Well-established institutions 
can minimise the latter and, effectively, make it more efficient for companies to enter 
economic exchanges (i.e. transactions).  
Forms of transactions have developed throughout the centuries. From the earliest 
times people entered into transactions by exchanging goods and/or money (North 
1991). The more advanced trading forms, the more complicated transactions 
become. Simple face-to-face transactions became gradually replaced with more 
complex ones where a number of actors and agents were involved, up to the modern 
days where individuals, international organisations and nation states are all involved 
25 
 
in transactions. The more complex transactions are, North (1991)  argues, the 
greater the risk, and the potential cost of failure. 
Institutionalists believe that institutions are the basic determinants of the 
performance of an economy (Peng and Meyer 2011). Institutions provide a secure 
framework for the organisation of firms, because they set formal and informal 
regulations which contribute to the feeling of security of investment. These include 
the availability of entering contracts, legal rights and responsibilities all of which are 
essential when companies want to invest in other countries. A clear institutional 
framework plays a crucial role in the process of gaining legitimacy by a foreign 
company, which means being accepted by the local environment. Institutional 
framework gives guidance as to what is accepted and pursued and what companies 
need to adapt to in order to be accepted. The issue of legitimacy will be discussed 
further later in this chapter.  
 
2.2.1. Development of the institutional paradigm within management studies  
The theory of institutionalism has been developing throughout the years. It has its 
roots back in the early twentieth century when scholars started discussing issues of 
productivity, industrialization and later, management (Scott 2004). In the 1930s and 
1940s academics started focusing on organisations as primary units of analysis and 
in the 1950s they began shifting more towards the social side of the subject. ‘Old’ 
Institutionalists included Thorsten Veblen, John Commons and Wesley Mitchell and 
this movement was particularly dominant in American universities after the First 
World War (Hodgson 1998). In the 1980s, academics turned their attention more 
towards the individual rather than the organisation as a unit of analysis and this is 
when neo-institutionalism began to be more accepted amongst scholars. Scott 
(2004) claims, however, that now both old institutionalism and new institutionalism 
are keenly discussed and researched and often complement each other. Kostova, 
Roth and Dacin (2008) also criticise gaining from only one of the forms of 
institutionalism and calls for using elements of both in discussing issues connected 
with MNCs and their strategies. They particularly highlight the need for remembering 
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about so-called ‘old’ institutionalism because it asserts more dynamism, change and 
social construction than the newer forms. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that as the scholars move from institutionalism to 
new institutionalism the term ‘institution’ modifies its character. In the older approach 
institutions are believed to be the result of human design and people’s purposive 
actions. However, in the more recent approach, institutions are thought to be created 
by humans, but not necessarily in a conscious way. New institutionalism asserts that 
people, and therefore whole organisations, are driven by forces which are often not 
realised and which lack consciousness (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Peng 2002). 
Consequently, organisational structure is often based on taken-for-granted beliefs 
and actions and common understandings which are seldom explicitly articulated 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Any changes are therefore unintentional, lack 
reflexivity and are often taken-for granted. This is a much more cognitive process 
than the one asserted by old institutionalism and more directly reflects the idea that 
companies are shaped by tacit knowledge which is often so deeply rooted in 
people’s behaviour that its existence is not even realised. Explicit practices are 
merely results and reflections of deeply embedded values and beliefs, and as a 
result are often difficult to explain and justify. The new institutionalism, consequently, 
benefits more from the resource-based view than its older form because it considers 
knowledge (both tacit and explicit) to be the company’s resource which is central to 
all decision-making (Wach 2014).  
Some Institutionalists (North 1991, Peng, Li Sun, Pinkham and Chen 2009) assert 
that individuals and organisations (actors) create or change institutions by their 
rational decisions and actions which suggests that knowledge plays an important 
role in actors’ decision making. Boland (1992) presents, however, an alternative 
perspective on the role of knowledge in institutional change. He claims that what 
causes change in institutions is not knowledge but the lack of it; people and 
organisations try different solutions to problems they face and when these solutions 
do not bring the expected results actors change their strategies. Institutional change, 
therefore, is not based on constant success as presumed by many Institutionalists 
(North 1991), but on systematic failure caused by the lack of knowledge or reliance 
on false knowledge.  
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2.2.2. The Institutional perspective on strategy 
Peng (2002) calls for the inclusion of an institutional perspective when analysing a 
firms’ strategies. In this he follows North (1991) and Scott (1995) who consider the 
influence of institutional frameworks on organisations as essential, as opposed to 
Porter (1980) who only focuses on industry conditions or Barney (1991) who 
stresses the relevance of firm’s resources. Peng (2002) calls this new perspective 
‘an institution-based view of business strategy’ and states that strategic choices are 
not only a result of a firm’s resources or industry conditions but they also reflect 
formal and informal constraints of a certain institutional framework. He states that an 
institution-based view on strategy sees dynamic interactions between institutions and 
organisations as key forces which drive organisation’s strategic choices. Peng et al. 
(2009) argue that an institution-based view can complement the existing resource- 
and industry-based approaches and allows for a broader understanding of strategies 
within a wider context. They call it ‘a third leg for a strategy’ suggesting that none of 
these methods on their own can effectively explain strategic choices, whereas 
combining them allows for an in-depth study. This is also the approach adopted in 
this study. As previous stated this research benefits from the institutional paradigm 
inasmuch it analyses a company in its multiple economic and social settings. 
However, it also benefits heavily from the resource-based view which focuses on 
knowledge residing in the company as its core resource.  
Scott (2005) highlights that in the global economy organisations are often affected by 
foreign practices, beliefs or actors even without leaving their home countries. This 
applies even more to multinational companies which operate simultaneously in 
numerous institutional environments, and even more so to international hotel 
companies which not only operate in foreign countries but also serve guests coming 
from a range of countries and cultures. As mentioned earlier, not only employees of 
companies are carriers of values, habits and widely understood knowledge, but so 
are customers who travel to different locations, gain various experiences and 
transfer certain expectations across national borders.  
Strategic choices depend on institutional environment in which the MNC is 
embedded and this is the reason why both institutional and resource-based angles 
should be consulted when planning a corporate strategy. The decision of transferring 
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certain practices from parent firms to subsidiaries depends heavily on the strategy 
which the MNC undertakes. There is a wealth of literature on strategies undertaken 
in the global market and growing debate on whether MNCs should have a more 
global outlook or focus on local practices and institutional settings. Companies which 
have a more ethnocentric character are less likely to adapt to local standards and 
often apply standardised operations (Yu, Byun and Lee 2014). Their decision-making 
is centralised and products and services are delivered in exactly the same manner 
wherever they are sold. Thus there is little adaptation to local cultural norms and 
institutional arrangements (Perlmutter 1969). The geocentric approach, on the other 
hand, gains knowledge and experience from foreign subsidiaries and uses them to 
construct the most flexible strategy which is reactive to local preferences and 
changes (Simmonds 1985). Decision-making in this case is not so centralised and 
subsidiaries often communicate and transfer knowledge between themselves instead 
of only following the parent firm. As argued by Stonehouse, Hamill, Campbell and 
Purdie (2004), however, a strategy rarely means a set plan which is not amended. 
Usually MNCs have a strategy which allows for emergency changes and 
adaptations. Thanks to these, MNCs can actively compete against other businesses. 
Subsidiaries which are open in foreign countries usually represent a mixture of pre-
planned strategy and emergency decisions made to address pressures from the 
local environment (Stonehouse et al. 2004). This is, once again, where institutional 
approach is clearly linked with the resource-based view in that companies decide on 
how to use their resources in response to institutional pressures from external 
environments.  
Institutionalists assert, therefore, that every organisation is set in a wider context 
(environment) which is driven by a range of institutions, whether they are formal or 
informal, and that this environment has direct impact on company’s operations. 
Kostova (1997, 1999) argues that before analysing the transference of organisational 
practices one needs to draw up a country institutional profile (CIP) which: 
“Reflects the institutional environment in that country defined as the 
set of all relevant institutions that have been established over time, 
operate in that country, and get transmitted into organisations through 
individuals” (Kostova 1997: 180) 
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Following Kostova’s recommendation, this study includes an in-depth discussion on 
the historical and cultural context of the case (see Chapter Four). This author further 
claims that CIP is issue-specific and should not be regarded in general terms, but 
should rather be applied to specific phenomena. As argued earlier, companies learn 
not always from their parent companies, and not even from other subsidiaries of the 
same MNC, but often from their competitors or other organisations operating in the 
same field. Organisations in the same field create a ‘population’ which develops as a 
result of the transference of knowledge within it (Argote, Ingram, Levine and 
Moreland 2000). Kostova et al. (2008) take this argument even further and claim that 
MNCs, by having to operate in different environments, create their own distinct intra-
organisational fields. Such fields are increasingly disconnected from national 
institutional environments which stems from the global nature of MNCs (Djelic and 
Quack 2003). 
The core idea that organisations are deeply embedded in social and political 
environments suggests that organisational practices and structures are often either 
reflections of or responses to rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider 
environment. This however, applies equally to the home (where the firm originates 
from or where its major operations and headquarters are situated) and host (where 
the company or its subsidiary operates) environments. The concept of 
institutionalism emphasises the relationship between organisations and their 
environments (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) and demonstrates clear linkage with the 
resource-based view of the firm (Dunning and Lundan 2008). The following section 
will use these ‘umbrella’ concepts of institutionalism and the resource-based view to 
further analyse multinational companies as pools of resources (Penrose 1959) and 
discuss the process of their internationalisation. It will particularly focus on corporate 
knowledge and its transference as well as on multiple-embeddedness and legitimacy 
of foreign companies in host countries.  
 
2.3. Multinational companies and their internationalisation  
Multinational companies (MNCs) constitute one of the key focus areas of 
international business literature. They are distinctively different from domestic 
companies in that they operate in a number of countries and environments, as 
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opposed to a single environment of a home country. In the past, MNCs were seen as 
monolithic objects but more recent literature treats them as networks which consist 
of interrelated elements (Dunning and Lundan 2008, Ferraris 2014). There are 
researchers who focus on the distribution of tangible resources (Wernerfelt 1997) 
within MNCs but others consider knowledge to be the essence of MNC’s existence 
and see MNCs as systems of knowledge (Penrose 1959, Kogut and Zander 1997). 
What they have in common is looking at MNCs from the resource-based perspective. 
This chapter reviews previous research on the conceptual distinctiveness of MNCs, 
their multiple-embeddedness, transference of knowledge and legitimacy as theories 
underpinning this study. It begins with a brief introduction to the phenomenon of 
globalisation which is the key motive for rapid internationalisation of modern 
companies.  
Before the discussion proceeds it should be noted that the issues connected with 
MNCs and their internationalisation are underpinned by a wide range of theories and 
concepts rooted in the international business (IB) field. This poses both opportunities 
and challenges for a researcher. Bello and Kostova (2012) discuss the challenges 
faced by scholars researching IB and consider multidisciplinarity to be one of the 
main ones. They claim that scholars usually engage in a diverse range of concepts 
from business and management areas to underpin their studies. As a result, the 
theoretical base is not only multidisciplinary but also multi-layered. This is what is 
considered to be one of the challenges in structuring a thesis such as this because 
cross-referencing between various chapters and sections is inevitable. Another issue 
which Bello and Kostova see as a possible threat to a research project’s rigour and 
conceptual depth is that multidisciplinary research often skims the surface of the 
concepts involved and does not thoroughly integrate them. This is why this research 
strives to limit the number of theories applied as well as utilizes original sources, 
where possible. For example, when discussing institutionalism in this thesis, sources 
by Scott (1995) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) are cited. Using works which are 
considered seminal for some of the knowledge fields is also the reason for some of 
the sources dating back to the 1990s and earlier. Bello and Kostova (2012) suggest 
that in the case of such multidisciplinary research, precise definitions for all 
theoretical constructs should be given to avoid ambiguity, hence the number of 
definitions in this review of previous research.  
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2.3.1. Globalisation 
Since the 1980s there has been a substantial and growing debate on globalisation, 
globalised markets and companies operating on a global scale (Clark and Knowles 
2003, Cavusgil and Knight 2015). Having said this, the exact definition of 
globalisation has been a point of debate (Clark and Knowles 2003) and varies 
between economic, socio-cultural and political dimensions. Clark and Knowles 
(2003) note that a lot of confusion as to what globalisation really means stems from 
often contradictory uses of the term. The word ‘global’ is equally used in the socio-
cultural dimension to talk about a ‘global village’ meaning that the world has become 
‘smaller’ and to express how large its scope is i.e. ‘global world’. They conclude, 
however by stating that globalisation means: “the process by which economic, 
political, cultural, social, and other relevant systems of nations are integrating into 
World Systems” (Clark and Knowles 2003: 368), which clearly addresses all three 
dimensions. They claim that their definition is multi-disciplinary and, as such, has 
particular application to international business studies which are concerned with 
global and multinational firms. The International Monetary Fund (2008) states that 
the term ‘globalisation’ refers to:  
“The increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly 
through the movement of goods, services, and capital across borders” 
as well as to “the movement of people (labor) and knowledge 
(technology) across international borders”.  
For the IMF the essence of globalisation is therefore the movement of resources, be 
it tangible or intangible, across borders which reflect the economic dimension of this 
phenomenon.  
Scholte (2005) claims that there are five main elements to globalisation:  
 internationalisation,  
 liberalisation,  
 universalisation (of products, services and cultures),  
 modernisation (or more specifically Westernisation or Americanisation, which 
suggests that it is the western culture which is being spread) 
 respatialisation (which Scholte defines as a “lack of meaning of territorial 
boundaries”).  
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These features mean that businesses have increased opportunities to enter and 
operate in foreign markets.  
King (1997), who studies the concept of globalisation from a cultural perspective, 
suggests that globalisation could be conceptualised as seeing “the world as a single 
place”. He notes that the process of globalisation is enforced by revolutionary 
developments in communication and transport and increased developments of world 
political structures and economies. There are, however, voices in the literature that 
globalisation does not only mean the process in which the world becomes 
homogenised, but that it actually follows the Western, and more precisely the Anglo-
Saxon model of capitalism (Geppert and Williams 2006). This is driven by 
internationalisation of businesses and policies and the fact that international firms 
adapt similar tools to achieve performance goals (Geppert and Williams 2006). 
These factors, in turn, contribute to a ‘top-down’ process of convergence of business 
strategies and cultures and the development of ‘global mind-sets’ (Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2002) and ‘transnational management mentalities’ (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 2002). This, as a result, leads to the situation where companies are 
increasingly ‘stateless’ (Geppert and Williams 2006). This stresses how globalisation 
and international business reinforce each other.  
The concept of globalisation is a very broad one. It has been studied in the past from 
various angles including culture, sociology, arts, politics, economics and business. It 
is beyond the reach of this research to discuss the phenomenon of globalisation in 
much detail, as there are extensive pieces of research analysing the issues 
concerned with it. It is essential to note, however, that just as the idea of 
globalisation is interlinked with international business, it also underpins this 
discussion on multinational companies operating in foreign countries.  
 
2.3.2. Multinational companies 
The literature on international business refers to companies operating in multiple 
markets as MNCs (multinational corporations), MNEs (multinational enterprises) or 
simply international companies. All these terms refer to firms which operate in more 
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than one country. Dunning and Lundan (2008: 3) define a multinational or a 
transnational enterprise as:  
“An enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
owns or, in some way, controls value-added activities in more than 
one country”.  
Scholars who study companies from a resource-based perspective highlight that 
companies expand by utilising their tangible and intangible resources and they 
internationalise by investing these resources in foreign markets (Wernerfelt 1997, 
Wach 2014, Cavusgil and Knight 2015).   
The exact model of operation of such firms depends on their profile and the industry 
they operate in. In the case of manufacturing firms various parts of a final product 
might be produced in different countries and assembled in one location (i.e. car 
manufacturing). In service firms, such as in the hospitality industry, the complete 
service is provided in different countries around the world with the possibility of some 
activities being performed abroad, (i.e. reservations being centralised) or even 
outsourced. There are also authors such as Kristensen and Zeitlin (2001) who title 
such firms ‘global’, which reflects the relationship between operating in the 
international environment with the phenomenon of globalisation. For the sake of 
consistency this thesis uses the term MNC to refer to a company which operates in 
multiple countries and markets. Stonehouse et al. (2004) highlight that there is a 
difference between a global firm which is centralized but operates on the 
international market and a multinational firm which operates in many countries with 
its decision-making being decentralized. What, however, characterises both types of 
MNCs is that their national identities are replaced by “the commitment to a single 
unified global mission” (Geppert and Williams 2006: 50). This is not to say that such 
a company ignores its roots and country of origin, but that its focus is no longer 
placed on operations in one country but, instead, involves international operations. 
MNCs are, thus, companies which operate in the globalised market.  
Researchers take various approaches to studying these companies. Some study 
them as monolithic objects, others as systems where the HQ plays the key role and 
drives activities of its subsidiaries. Another group, including Coviello and Cox (2006) 
and Ferraris (2014), consider MNCs as networks whose individual elements are 
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interrelated. They claim that such a view allows for a better understanding of the 
transference of resources within the company. Dunning and Lundan (2008) also 
argue that the network terminology is used to speak of MNCs in order to come to 
terms with the complexity of the organisations and operations and this terminology 
will also be adopted in this thesis.   
What is characteristic about MNCs is that they pursue the strategy of 
internationalisation by various forms of foreign direct investment (FDI), or in other 
words, by engaging in transactions with international partners. Companies 
internationalise by a number of methods, ranging from exporting, through to joining 
alliances and joint ventures, to developing wholly owned subsidiaries. Dunning and 
Lundan (2008) characterise an MNC as a company which is involved in FDI under 
two main conditions: 
 It transfers abroad not only financial capital but also a package of assets 
including management and organisational expertise, technology, 
entrepreneurship, incentive structures, values and norms and access to 
markets across national boundaries 
 There is no change of ownership in the process, meaning that the investor 
has got the power to control decision making over the use of the transferred 
resources  
The essence of this is that in the process of internationalisation the company 
maintains control over tangible and intangible assets it transfers abroad. Control over 
these assets is necessary to benefit from internationalisation, or earning rent from 
assets, as referred to in the resources-based view approach (Mahoney and Pandian 
1997).  
Dunning and Lundan (2008) further identify four main reasons for MNC’s 
involvement in FDI: 
1. Seeking natural resources, 
2. Seeking new markets, 
3. Seeking efficiency and  
4. Seeking strategic assets or capabilities  
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These are strategic reasons why a company might choose to invest abroad and they 
are related with the nature of the company (manufacturing or service-based) and 
with its goals. Scholars also seek to understand the essence of the 
internationalisation process. For example, Khojastehpour and Johns (2014) consider 
knowledge and expertise to be the key area in the concept of internationalisation. 
They believe that the aim of internationalisation of a company is reaching new 
markets by the transference of corporate knowledge and adaptation of the 
organisation’s processes. Following in this theme Khojastehpour and Johns (2014: 
239) add that:  
“Internationalisation presents new opportunities for value creation by 
providing access to new resources, foreign stakeholders, new 
institutions and especially the transfer of firm-specific knowledge and 
the accumulation of location-specific knowledge”.  
Internationalisation, therefore, is seen as a learning process for a company and 
knowledge transference plays a key role in this. This concept takes the assumptions 
of the resource-based view a step further as it assumes that knowledge is not only 
essential for successful internationalisation, but that companies actually gain new 
knowledge through the process of internationalisation. Therefore, by 
internationalisation a company can expand further on its existing resources.  
The Uppsala Stage model (Almodóvar and Rugman 2015) asserts that companies 
gradually intensify their activities in foreign countries, beginning from the ones which 
are institutionally similar or which are geographically close to the home country 
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977). By doing so, a company gives itself time to build 
knowledge and experience necessary to negotiate investment in countries with 
different institutional settings. The Uppsala model has since been critiqued and 
updated but its main assumptions are still relevant in the theory of 
internationalisation (Petersen, Pedersen and Deo Sharma 2003). Abdelzaher (2012) 
having studied the Uppsala model offered alternative methods of looking at 
international expansion. She found that companies follow either spider-web or 
octopus-like processes where the former is comparable with the Uppsala Stage 
model. The octopus-like process, on the other hand, suggests that companies might 
‘reach out’ to countries which are geographically and institutionally different without 
having gained much experience in the closer ones. This happens especially in the 
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case of companies which rely more on capital-based rather than knowledge-based 
resources.  
 Dunning and Lundan (2008), alongside academics following the resource-based 
view including Wach (2014), Prahalad and Hamel (1997) and Kogut and Zander 
(1997), believe that corporate knowledge, especially its tacit element, is key in the 
process of international expansion. This underpins the argument that MNCs do not 
necessarily need to own resources to internalise them. In some cases internalisation 
can be achieved by having control over resources, even if they are owned by a third 
party.  
The eclectic paradigm, also called OLI paradigm, developed by Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) is the one which attempts to merge several theories concerned with 
international business already mentioned in this chapter. It asserts that company’s 
internationalisation depends on three ‘OLI’ advantages: 
 Ownership advantages – company’s resources including asset-based 
resources (i.e. capital) and institutional advantages including image, 
knowledge, expertise and culture 
 Location advantages – resources existing in the country in which the firm 
invests (host country) directly related to the reason for investment. They 
include natural resources, favourable conditions, market or specific 
knowledge 
 Internalisation advantages – factors which make it more reasonable for a 
company to perform certain activities itself (internalise them) rather than enter 
partnerships with other organisations (this factor is derived from the theory of 
transaction costs)  
These three elements of Dunning’s paradigm clearly reflect the three approaches 
adopted in this study, namely the resource-based view, institutional approach and 
transaction cost theory. The relationship between these various concepts is depicted 
in Figure 2-1. They serve as umbrella paradigms and the conceptual framework 
underpinning this study. However, following Dunning and Lundan (2008), they are 
not treated as rigid concepts but are used as guidance as to how to look at a 
company. Dunning and Lundan (2008: 120) highlight that the OLI paradigm should 
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not serve as a theory of MNC, but that it is merely helpful to “explain the cross-
border value-added activities of firms at an aggregate level”. This is how it is treated 
in this research. 
 
Figure 2-1. The relationship between individual concepts concerned with the internationalisation of a 
firm. 
Source: Author’s visualisation based on review of previous literature 
 
 
The conceptual distinctiveness of MNCs lies, therefore, in the fact that they operate 
in numerous contexts which creates various pressures on the company, as opposed 
to domestic firms. These contexts include the home country from which the company 
originates and the host country in which it operates its subsidiaries. From the 
perspective of subsidiaries, however, there are more contexts to consider, because 
they are also set within the context of their parent company. This leads to the notion 
that MNCs are multiply-embedded and transfer knowledge between various 
contexts. Such notions are discussed in more detail in section 2.5.  
Having presented the various approaches to looking at MNCs and the reasons for 
their international expansion the discussion will now focus on the key concepts 
concerned with their internationalisation. It will begin with the explanation of what 
knowledge is and how it is transferred. In the following section focus will be placed 
on the multiple-embeddedness of MNCs and negotiation of their legitimacy in foreign 
settings.  
 
Resource-based 
approach 
• Ownership 
advantages 
Institutional 
approach 
• Location 
advantages 
Transaction cost 
theory 
• Internalisation 
advantages 
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2.4. Knowledge  
As previously stated, the internationalisation of MNCs depends greatly on the 
transference of knowledge and adaptation of practices so that firms can operate in 
foreign markets. There are examples, however, where knowledge is the very 
essence of a company, such as in the case of consultancy or marketing companies 
(Abdelzaher 2012). Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma and Tihanyi (2004) divide knowledge 
into explicit and tacit, also entitled operational information and general ‘know-how’ 
respectively (Boh and Nguyen 2013). Simonin (1999) introduces additional 
terminology dividing knowledge into declarative knowledge (referring to factual 
information or statements) and procedural knowledge (which means knowledge of 
how something is done). Although different, both types of knowledge are equally 
important in any organisation. Dhanaraj et al. (2004) claim that tacit knowledge 
provides explicit routines with meaning and that “whereas explicit knowledge 
provides the building blocks, tacit knowledge provides the glue and integrating 
mechanism in learning” (Dhanaraj et al. 2004: 430). Simonin (1999) states that the 
main difference between tacit and explicit knowledge is the ability to codify it. Tacit 
knowledge is based on the notion that people know more than they realise they 
know (Kogut and Zander 1997) and as such it cannot be transmitted into formal 
language or be documented. Evangelista (2009: 64) studying marketing knowledge 
states:  
“Tacit marketing know-how refers to those particulars which are 
omitted, to varying degrees, from abstracted theoretical descriptions, 
yet upon which the successful accomplishment of practical marketing 
action depends.” 
This highlights that tacit knowledge, even though more difficult to identify, underpins 
many areas of declarative knowledge. Declarative (explicit) knowledge, on the other 
hand, can be codified, communicated and taught; characteristics which make it 
easier to transfer (Meyer, Skaggs, Nair and Cohen 2015). Procedural (tacit) 
knowledge cannot be easily learned and, being an accumulation of skills, is best 
learnt by doing (Simonin 1999). Petersen et al. (2003) add to this debate by stating 
that codified (explicit) knowledge maintains an element of tacitness, meaning that 
there is tacit knowledge needed to perform explicit practices. Hence, both types of 
knowledge complement each other.  
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Hong and Nguyen (2009) in turn divide knowledge in MNCs into technical, systemic 
and strategic. Technical knowledge is concerned with task-oriented skills and 
functional expertise and, as such, is the most explicit of the three types. Systemic 
knowledge is related to understanding structural relationships among different 
departmental units while strategic knowledge is concerned with strategic decisions 
about the firm and is acquired by senior managers throughout the course of leading 
the company. When compared with the scale of knowledge tacitness and 
explicitness, technical knowledge is the most explicit and therefore the easiest to 
communicate and transfer, while strategic knowledge is most tacit and takes a longer 
and more complicated process to learn and transfer.  
The literature often uses the term ‘practices’ in reference to knowledge. Kostova 
(1999: 309) defines practices as: 
“Particular ways of conducting organisational functions that have 
evolved over time under the influence of an organisation’s history, 
people, interests, and actions”.  
They are, simply, firm-specific routines which means that similar patterns of 
behaviour are used to coordinate various resources (Szulanski 1996). Practices can 
be in a form of technological solutions and product innovations as well as be 
embedded in personal skills of employees and collaborative arrangements between 
them (Szulanski 1996, Kostova 1999). Thus, the term ‘practice’ does not necessarily 
relate to explicit elements of knowledge, but could also represent its more tacit 
nature. Management ideas and ideologies which become dominant in a certain 
market and which are adopted by many organisations, including MNCs are 
considered to be ‘best practices’ (Geppert and Dörrenbächer 2013).  
The previously introduced OLI paradigm also utilises the concept of knowledge, 
mainly to explain the nature of ownership advantages, namely asset-based and 
institutional advantages. In this it follows the resource-based view which treats 
knowledge, whether tacit or explicit, as yet another kind of company’s resources 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1997, Kogut and Zander 1997, Wach 2014). Institutional 
ownership advantages are concerned with a company’s knowledge and expertise 
but also with its culture, motivation and reasons for behaviour. These advantages, 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) believe, should be of key concern to researchers trying 
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to understand MNCs’ internationalisation, especially in the light of globalisation when 
asset-based advantages are increasingly available and transferable across borders.  
This is supported by Geppert and Williams’ (2006) point of view which asserts that 
global integration is dependent not only on economic, technological and institutional 
factors, but also on what they call ‘power resources’ and managers’ politics. 
Kostova (1999) highlights that organisational practices are often internalised to the 
extent that they are taken for granted and tacit, and are therefore not always visible 
for outside researchers. This is especially the case in older firms which have been 
developing throughout the years and through the generations of employees. There 
are authors, including Nickson (1997), who claim that such deeply-rooted values and 
behaviours are strongly driven by founders or other key figures in organisations, a 
reason why business historians often look to gain an insight into the role of founders 
when building up a historical account of a company. It is difficult to be able to 
understand certain behaviours without going back in time and without analysing the 
roots and paths of development of such behaviour. This is the theme which will be 
addressed in this research and the key role of Conrad Hilton in his company will 
become clear in the case study.  
This chapter has highlighted a number of times that knowledge is the key resource 
when companies expand either in the same country or across borders. MNCs by 
definition engage in various transactions across borders. In order to do so they 
transfer not only capital resources but also knowledge and the process of knowledge 
transference will now be discussed. 
  
2.4.1. Knowledge transference 
The existence and prosperity of every MNC depends on internal communication in 
the firm and transference of various pieces of information from headquarters to 
subsidiaries, subsidiaries to headquarters or between subsidiaries (Argote et al. 
2000, Chang, Gong and Peng 2012). The phenomenon of this type of 
communication is called ‘transference of knowledge’ in the literature on international 
business (Kogut and Zander 1993). Argote and Ingram (2000), who focus on 
learning between organisations, explain that knowledge transference takes place 
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whenever knowledge acquired in one organisation affects another, but this could 
also be said about individual subsidiaries of a MNC. Fang, Jiang, Makino and 
Beamish (2010) posit knowledge in the centre of attention by using a knowledge-
based view which asserts that MNCs are simply systems of knowledge which can be 
exploited and transferred. A knowledge-based view affirms that the performance of a 
firm depends on its ability to create and exploit firm-specific knowledge (Ricart, 
Enright, Ghemawat, Hart and Khanna 2004), however, Argote et al. (2000) add that 
if a company is to be successful it needs to be able to efficiently transfer knowledge 
internally, but at the same time protect it from transferring outside the firm. Dunning 
and Lundan (2008) also place knowledge in the centre of the study of MNCs. They 
assert that MNCs generate and transfer knowledge within their networks using 
formal and informal rules and incentives which, in turn, are underpinned by these 
companies’ institutional frameworks. In other words, transference of knowledge is 
dependent on company’s motivations, beliefs and reasons for operations. As a 
result, internalisation advantages of one firm will be different from other firm’s even if 
they have access to the same assets. This, once again, illustrates how the concepts 
of institutionalism and the resource-based view complement each other, as depicted 
in Figure 2-1.  
Knowledge transference plays a key role not only in the activities of individual 
organisations, but also affects national and international markets (Argote et al. 
2000). Argote (2013) and Baum and Ingram (1998) also believe that the majority of 
organisation’s learning process takes place due to interactions between companies 
and not within an isolated organisation. By such interactions companies cause 
changes in the wider environment they operate in leading to enhanced learning of 
the whole organisational field (Argote et al. 2000). Through the internationalisation of 
practices and continuous learning across organisations and across borders, MNCs 
contribute to “global change-management patterns” (Geppert and Williams 2006: 
50). Thus, once again, knowledge transference within MNCs enhances the process 
of globalisation.  
The process of knowledge transference is not a straightforward one, but is complex 
and not always successful. Kostova (1999) explains that the process of transference 
does not end at the point of adoption of a certain practice or rule. What is necessary 
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for the success of transference is the internalisation of this practice by its recipients. 
Internalisation is ultimately a process in which employees begin to see the practice 
as their own (Kostova 1999). Employees need to become committed to applying the 
practice on a daily basis and, more importantly, to defending the practice against 
others. The deepest form of acceptance, according to Kostova (1999), is 
psychological ownership when an employee considers the practices as their 
‘extended self’. When this happens, transference can be claimed as having been 
successful.  
Fang et al. (2010) argue that there are types of knowledge which are geographically-
specific, and applicable only in a certain location. Such knowledge cannot be easily 
transferred and what causes particular difficulty is the application of such knowledge 
in a new location. Any kind of knowledge which is related to national or cultural 
values or involves particular practices which are not common elsewhere will not have 
immediate value to a foreign subsidiary and will either take a long time to be 
internalised or will never be fully accepted.  
Fang et al. (2010) highlight the role of expatriates in the transference of 
organisational knowledge and practices. They claim that the role of expatriates is 
particularly important because successful development of subsidiaries is dependent 
on close social relationships between the parent company and subsidiaries. 
Expatriates are a link between the two and are seen as knowledge carriers who 
transfer both explicit and tacit knowledge as well as create social ties at the same 
time (Delios and Bjorkman 2000, Goerzen and Beamish 2007, Fang et al. 2010). 
Expatriates, however, are also transfer facilitators because they prepare the 
subsidiary for the continuous transfer of knowledge by building communication 
channels, whether formal or informal. Expatriates to a foreign country are 
themselves subjected to knowledge transfer as well because they have a lot to learn 
from nationals about the host country. This knowledge is essential to achieve 
legitimacy (see Section 2.6) and success of the subsidiary. Fang et al. (2010) argue 
also that the role of expatriates is more influential in the case of less geographically-
specific knowledge. When knowledge is of more geographically-specific character, 
such as in the case of marketing knowledge, local nationals are in a better position to 
facilitate transfer of knowledge.  
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The role of expatriates is well explained by the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989a). 
Applying this theory in the discussion can also bring attention to difficulties 
connected with sending expatriates abroad because it brings forward the notion of 
empowerment, lack of direct control and differences in pursued goals. Agency theory 
asserts that there are often differences between business owners’ expectations and 
employed managers’ actions (Douma and Schreuder 2012). This is particularly the 
case in MNCs which are organisationally complex and which often face the difficulty 
of geographical distance alongside complexity of external pressures. These issues 
ought to be considered by a company when choosing their HR strategy.   
 
2.5. The Multiple - embeddedness  
Having introduced the concept of MNCs and discussed the role of knowledge and its 
transference in the process of internationalisation, the focus will now move to the 
multiple-embeddedness of MNCs. This is where the discussion particularly benefits 
from the institutional paradigm as an analytical framework. As previously mentioned, 
the very nature of international firms locates, or embeds them, in multiple contexts. 
These contexts include the parent company itself with its culture and strategies, as 
well as both the home and the host countries’ environments. Meyer, Mudambi and 
Narula (2011: 236) assert that multiple embeddedness is a result of:  
“Balancing the forces that require local responsiveness of subsidiaries 
with those that require subsidiaries’ global integration within the 
umbrella of the MNE’s overall structure”. 
 Simply, in order to take advantage of various contexts, a subsidiary needs to be 
settled in all of them. This notion is closely related to the concept of legitimacy 
(discussed in the following Section 2.6). Drawing from the institutionalism paradigm, 
each of these contexts exerts various pressures on the subsidiary and requires 
different behaviours from it. Such pressures stem from historically developed 
institutions including financial, educational and industrial relations (Geppert and 
Williams 2006) which are directly linked with the characteristics of business 
organisations in that country and consequently have an impact on their strategies, 
structures and employment relations. This impact also extends to incoming 
companies originating from other countries. On the other hand, incoming businesses 
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are influenced by institutions developed in their home countries as well as by 
institutions specific to their parent companies, including strategy, structure and 
corporate culture (Noorderhaven and Harzing 2003). There is a wealth of literature 
on corporate culture (see notable authors such as Denison 1990, O'Reilly, Chatman 
and Caldwell 1991, Hofstede 2001), which concludes that it involves a wide range of 
elements including vision, values, norms, habits, symbols and the role of the key 
figure. A foreign subsidiary, therefore, should be able to fit both in the context of its 
parent company and the institutional setting of its home country and in the context of 
the host country. This can be achieved by adapting similar ways of running the 
business as local companies or by negotiating acceptance of practices which are 
transferred from the MNC’s home country.  
Multiple-embeddedness is not, however, always just a liability. Figueiredo (2011) 
actually sees it as an opportunity because being set in various environments 
expands a company’s access to sources of capabilities as well as to external actors 
with whom a company might build working relationships (Ferraris 2014). Meyer et al. 
(2011) state that:  
“The ability to create, transfer, recombine and exploit resources across 
multiple contexts is the rationale for the existence of the MNE”.   
Ferraris (2014) shares the same viewpoint by stating that it is the essence of 
internationalisation strategy to transfer “firm specific advantages” to MNC’s 
subsidiaries despite differences between home and host countries’ contexts. It can, 
therefore, be concluded that multiple embeddedness is a natural state for 
international companies and whenever their activities are discussed, the impact of a 
range of contexts should also be considered. 
The literature on IB traditionally considered whole MNCs as units of analysis and 
therefore, focused on knowledge being transferred from HQ to subsidiaries. In more 
recent studies MNCs are treated as networks and more attention is given to 
individual subsidiaries (Dunning and Lundan 2008, Ferraris 2014). Using this 
approach, scholars begin to discuss reverse knowledge transference (from 
subsidiary to HQ) and transference between individual subsidiaries, which is better 
understood when using the network approach. Additionally, Ferraris (2014) highlights 
that a subsidiary is no longer seen as a passive implementer of knowledge which is 
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handed down from HQ, but more an active one which gathers or creates knowledge 
and disseminates it across the network. Most importantly, multiple-embeddedness 
explains how elements of a MNC’s network are interconnected and affect each 
other. 
Multiple-embeddedness is inevitably linked with the concepts of foreignness and 
legitimacy. As companies are set in diverse environments, they often face the 
situation of being perceived as foreign or unaccepted. The following section will 
focus on these issues. 
  
2.6. Legitimacy  
Legitimacy of an organisation means its acceptance in an environment (Kostova and 
Zaheer 1999). Acceptance is necessary to be able to sell a company’s products or 
services and cooperate with other organisations in the same organisational field. 
Suchman (1995: 574) defines legitimacy as: 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.  
This definition not only highlights the relationships of the legitimacy concept with the 
institutionalism paradigm, but more importantly clarifies that legitimacy is unique for a 
given institutional framework and is not transferable across contexts. What is 
appropriate or desirable in one environment will not be in another which explains 
why multiple-embeddedness might pose challenges.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1991), claim that legitimacy is gained by adapting to the 
existing environment and making the company similar to the ones operating in the 
given market. Such a process is known as isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991). The idea that companies operating in one environment adopt similar practices 
and are, therefore, subject to isomorphism (also called homogenisation) is central to 
the institutional paradigm (Kostova and Roth, 2002). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
believe that in order to ensure their survival, organisations need to comply with the 
expectations of their environment and adopt expected structures and management 
practices. It is usually the newcomers that have to adapt to the formal or informal 
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rules which govern the given environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that 
companies are more likely to mimic other firms when they seem to be more 
successful or when the newcomers do not feel entirely comfortable in the new 
environment.  
There is, however, a growing debate in the literature about whether companies 
actually seek to become similar or whether they try to differentiate themselves from 
competitors (Alvarez, Carmelo, Strandgaard Pedersen and Svejenova 2005, 
Kostova et al. 2008). Kostova et al. (2008) claim that there is less isomorphic 
pressure on MNCs than on local businesses and, if there is any, it is only in the 
regulatory and legal domains. Amenta and Ramsey (2010) add that MNCs often 
originate from economically powerful countries and, as such, have the power to 
negotiate their own ways of running the business without the need for adopting local 
practices. Kostova et al. (2008) also claim that legitimacy does not happen by 
becoming similar to other organisations, but rather by becoming different. Gaining 
legitimacy depends on the ability to negotiate an organisation’s position with 
legitimating actors in the environment. By such negotiation, Kostova et al. (2008: 
1001) refer to:  
“A political process of interaction, communications, and exchange, 
which creates a perception about the organisation without its 
necessarily having to implement certain models and practices”.   
In other words, legitimacy does not always depend on adapting practices which are 
treated as legitimate in the given environment, but by making the practices accepted 
by this environment. A company, when it is accepted, is recognised holistically with 
all its practices and knowledge. This also suggests that a company uses its cultural 
knowledge and experience, in other words institutional ownership advantages, to 
negotiate legitimacy within the external environment.  
Another perspective is offered by Alvarez et al. (2005) who discuss issues of 
isomorphism and differentiation in the film industry. They focus on the fact that film 
makers need to adjust to isomorphic pressures to some extent in order to gain 
resources for their production, but at the same time they need to be different enough 
to maintain their creativity and offer something innovative to the audience. 
Companies which want to be competitive in a new environment need to juggle the 
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same duality, they need to be familiar enough to become legitimised (accepted) in 
the society, but at the same time they need to be different enough to have 
comparative and competitive advantage over other local firms. The balance between 
differentiation and compliance to existing rules is called 'optimal distinctiveness' 
(Alvarez et al. 2005). 
This discussion clearly shows that the process of negotiating legitimacy is not a 
straightforward one and that companies gain their legitimate positions in a variety of 
ways. Some adopt local practices and become similar to the local firms while others 
strive to introduce their own ways of doing things. The particular approach depends 
on the strategy which the given company pursues and on the environment in which it 
finds itself (Geppert and Williams 2006). The institutional paradigm which asserts 
such duality of relationship between an organisation and environment is the one 
which underpins the discussion on legitimacy and optimal distinctiveness and which 
assists in understanding its multiple levels.  
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) also highlight the fact that legitimacy is not a permanent 
status achieved at any one point, but that it needs to be constantly re-negotiated by 
various organisational activities. This suggests that transference of knowledge does 
not take place only at the stage of introducing the subsidiary to a new market, but 
that it is constantly transferred within the MNC so that it can respond to changing 
circumstances. Companies learn not only from their own experiences, but also from 
experiences of other organisations in the field, including their competitors (Argote et 
al. 2000). Because every company in the field constantly observes the surrounding 
environment and adapts its behaviour in order to be able to most effectively operate 
in it, the whole organisational field is subject to change as well. In other words, it is 
suggested that an MNC constantly transfers knowledge in order to make emergency 
changes to their planned strategies and to compete in a global market. Companies 
which operate in foreign markets evolve over time but, as argued earlier, they do not 
evolve in a vacuum but are affected by their organisational field and the wider 
surrounding environment which changes as well. Maintaining legitimacy and optimal 
distinctiveness is, therefore, an iterative process which requires the ability to 
effectively transfer knowledge and negotiate company’s position with legitimating 
actors. 
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2.6.1. The role of learning in internationalisation and negotiation of legitimacy 
The Uppsala Stage model (see Chapter 2.3) asserts that companies which want to 
internationalise begin doing so by investing in countries which are institutionally and 
culturally similar in order to gradually build experience and later move to other 
countries. The reason for this is that it is easier to negotiate legitimacy in a country 
which is institutionally similar to the home country. While Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) emphasise the weakness of this approach in that it does not explain the 
behaviour of resource-seeking or so called ‘born-global’ companies, they admit to 
the applicability of this model in explaining the concept of corporate learning in the 
internationalisation process. He also stresses that the network approach to 
understanding MNCs is a useful one in studying knowledge transference and 
learning which takes place between the individual elements of a MNC.  
Abou-Zeid (2005: 147) states that:  
“Knowledge transfer is conceptualized as a multi-stage process in 
which knowledge created within one organisational context is re-
created and utilized effectively in another organisational context”.  
This citation highlights the reference to the Uppsala model and stresses that the 
context or external environment in which the subsidiary and the parent firm are 
embedded plays a crucial role in this company’s ability to transfer practices and 
negotiate legitimacy. The reason for this is that negotiation of legitimacy is a two-way 
process in which the external environment and the legitimating actors are active 
players. Inclusion of the institutional context stems from the institutional tradition, but 
the underpinning idea is not much different from the culturalist tradition which 
highlights the importance of culture in the process of negotiating legitimacy as well 
as in the transference of practices (Kostova and Roth 2002). Followers of both of 
these traditions discuss the issue defined as ‘distance’ (either institutional or 
cultural), which was widely studied by Hofstede in the 1960s and 1970s. ‘Distance’ 
between two contexts (usually between different countries) refers to various 
differences which exist between these two contexts and which are believed to be 
obstacles in efficient knowledge transfer or in the success of negotiation of 
legitimacy (Kostova 1997; Abdelzaher 2012). Cultural difference poses challenges in 
terms of mutual understanding between people due to differing values and 
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orientation as to the future and approach to uncertainty and change (Hofstede 2001). 
Consequently, MNCs which open their subsidiaries in foreign countries are required 
to undertake actions to mitigate the differences. Peng (2012), for example believes 
that a subsidiary can alleviate the difficulties resulting from institutional and cultural 
differences by employing a higher proportion of local people than of expatriates. He 
does not, however, discuss how such strategy impacts upon the MNC’s ability to 
control the execution of decisions in the host environment.   
Mitra and Golder (2002), on the other hand, take an opposite perspective on the 
relationships between host and home countries and focus on similarities between 
them instead of on differences. They introduce the concept of ‘near-market’ 
knowledge which is defined as “a firm’s understanding of potential new markets 
based on knowledge generated from operating in similar markets” (Mitra and Golder 
2002: 351). They divide the near-market knowledge into cultural and economic 
types. It could be argued however, that the traditional institutional division of 
regulatory, cognitive and normative pillars, as described by Scott (2005), is 
applicable as well. Mitchell (2010) and Kostova and Zaheer (1999) note that the 
regulatory domain is the easiest one to observe because it is the most formalised. 
The domain which refers to the deepest structures of the society and is the most 
difficult for an outsider to integrate is the normative domain. 
Whether one focuses on similarities or differences between countries, the result of 
operating in a different context is a learning process. A company learns by gaining 
experience in negotiation with foreign partners and in addressing foreign formal or 
informal institutional requirements. Additionally companies also learn from other 
businesses and the environment at large. Forsgren, Holm and Johanson (2005: 6) 
state:   
“In fact, the firm’s knowledge is no longer seen just as a matter of 
internal knowledge. It embraces knowledge residing in a network of 
important suppliers and customers and other business partners, an 
altogether wider knowledge base that the firm can access through its 
exchange relationships with these network partners”.  
These relationships, which are created in similar markets, as well as in the home 
country, expand a MNC’s knowledge and experience.  
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Such understanding of organisational learning is possible when the network theory is 
applied. This approach allows for placing focus on individual network elements (i.e. 
subsidiary) within their multiple environments. If a MNC was seen as a monolithic 
object, one could miss the diverse processes taking place at the subsidiary level.  
What becomes clear from this discussion is the notion that, by engaging in 
transactions and economic exchanges with parties from other institutional contexts, 
companies learn how to effectively deal with these institutional differences. As a 
result, they build experience which allows them to enter markets which are even 
more different than their own. Adopting the resource-based view, MNCs do nothing 
else, but acquire and develop new knowledge-specific resources which allow them 
further expansion. At this point companies are in the position to use their foreignness 
as a resource in its own right. This concept will now be introduced.  
 
2.7. Foreignness as an asset 
The discussion so far has been based on the assumption that when a foreign 
company enters a new market it is faced with various challenges to address. These 
challenges include institutional and cultural differences between the home and host 
countries and consequently differences between company’s knowledge and 
practices and local expectations. This suggests that foreignness of a subsidiary in 
the host environment constitutes a liability and can be considered an obstacle in the 
negotiation of this company’s legitimacy. Joardar, Kostova and Wu (2014) call for the 
consideration of an opposite perspective, namely that the foreignness of a subsidiary 
might actually constitute an asset. This notion can be particularly applicable to MNCs 
who have wide experience of operating in foreign environments because “more 
internationalized firms may have greater resources and an ability to spread risks and 
developmental opportunities” (Joardar et al. 2014: 1020). This notion is directly 
related to a company’s learning from previous investment experiences and is 
underpinned by the network theory which asserts that a network becomes stronger 
as it grows larger (Grewal 2008). It is argued that knowledge gained in foreign 
environments increases MNC’s ability to turn the liability of foreignness into an asset: 
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“Assets are likely to exceed liabilities for foreign entities that have 
developed capabilities of dealing with foreign environments and are 
better able to leverage their distinct strategic competences abroad, 
whereas the difficulties of being foreign may be insurmountable for 
entities that lack such capabilities and are unprepared or unfamiliar 
with the host country” (Joardar et al. 2014: 1020).  
This means that MNCs accumulate a specific kind of knowledge by operating in a 
variety of foreign environments, and that this knowledge refers to skills necessary for 
the negotiation of legitimacy in foreign contexts. The more experience an MNC has 
in operating in foreign environments and negotiating legitimacy in them, the easier 
this process becomes.  
Foreignness can also be seen as an asset when one considers that companies 
should achieve the state of ‘optimal distinctiveness’ (Alvarez et al. 2005). Companies 
should adapt enough to be accepted by the local environment but at the same time 
should be different enough to develop comparative and competitive advantage. The 
foreignness of a company can potentially be what makes it more attractive when 
compared with the local businesses. It is also the element which has the potential to 
bring differences and developments into the organisational field. Furthermore, 
without innovativeness and foreignness of incoming companies, the local 
organisational field would have limited capability of developing and progressing.  
 
2.8. Legitimacy spillover in multiple-embeddedness  
Previous research on the negotiation of legitimacy by MNCs’ subsidiaries suggests 
that they suffer (or benefit, as the case may be) from legitimacy ‘spillover’. This 
phenomenon takes place when the host country does not have enough information 
about the entering company and uses stereotypes instead. Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999: 74) state that:  
“The stereotypes used to judge MNCs may arise from long-
established, taken for granted assumptions in the host environment 
regarding MNCs in general, or of MNCs from a particular industry or a 
particular home country”  
They believe that there might be situations where such spillover would result in 
delays in legitimation and continuous suspicion towards, and scrutiny of, the entering 
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MNC. This happens when the hosting environment does not hold a favourable image 
of the country from which the incoming MNC originates.  
Kostova and Zaheer (1999: 74) further propose that:  
“Larger and more visible MNCs and their subunits will find it a greater 
challenge than will smaller and less visible MNCs and their subunits to 
maintain legitimacy, because they are more vulnerable to attacks from 
interest groups”.  
This is because larger and more successful companies tend to be more often 
spoken about, which is explained by the concept of network visibility (Grewal 2008). 
The wider public will therefore hold some kind of perception of the MNC before it 
even enters the foreign market. This perception will be created mainly by media and 
word of mouth. As a result, a MNC has little influence on it, and can only start to 
address this problem by direct actions in the host environment.  
Legitimacy spillover, or simply the image that members of the host environment hold 
about the home environment of the entering MNC, has an impact on the process of 
negotiation of legitimacy. Whether this has a positive or negative effect depends, 
however, on this image and the MNC’s ability to manage it. 
 
2.9. Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed previous research on a range of concepts concerned with 
MNCs, including transference of knowledge, multiple-embeddedness and negotiation 
of legitimacy. It introduced the theoretical paradigms of institutionalism, resource-
based view and transaction cost theory. What became clear through the literature 
review was that the theories of knowledge transference, multiple-embeddedness and 
negotiation of legitimacy are derived from the paradigms of the resource-based view, 
institutional approach and transaction cost theory. As the conceptual framework in 
Figure 2-2 however suggests, there is a gap in the literature in that it is not clear 
whether these concepts reinforce or contradict each other in the process of the 
internationalisation of a company. This study aims to discuss the relationships 
between knowledge transference, multiple-embeddedness and negotiation of 
legitimacy and to, consequently, establish the conceptual link between their 
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underpinning paradigms. This conceptual framework will be used in this research to 
analyse the transference of knowledge from Hilton in the US to its London 
subsidiary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Conceptual framework highlighting the relationship between theoretical concepts. 
Source: Author’s visualisation based on the review of previous research 
 
 
The review of previous research leads to a number of conclusions:  
 It is clear that the transference of practices by the MNC carried out via 
learning processes form one key mechanism by which legitimacy in the host 
country is negotiated. Besides the work of Kostova, there is limited focus in 
research on this linkage. The existing discussion on the relationship between 
the two, rarely utilizes the concept of multiple-embeddedness to explain this 
relationship and extend theory. 
 There is limited literature exploring the notion that foreignness of a company 
might constitute an asset when it opens in a new environment. Previous 
literature suggests that MNCs build their advantages through learning 
processes in terms of gaining experience on how to enter and operate in 
foreign contexts. Arguably, by dealing with foreign institutions companies, just 
like people, learn how to adjust to unknown situations and negotiate 
challenges resulting from these foreign institutional settings. However, the 
idea that foreignness can be used as a differentiator against local companies 
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is not previously explored. This refers to foreignness as an image which is 
often communicated across borders before the company actually enters the 
foreign market. Communication of such an image is often subject to word of 
mouth and the influence of the media which emphasises the role of 
globalisation in the process.  
 There is little research benefitting from both institutionalism paradigm and the 
resource-based view of a firm. This review of previous research, however, 
suggests that these two complement each other, especially when research 
focuses on a company using its resources in an external environment. 
Furthermore, there are scholars who agree that knowledge is the key type of 
resource involved in internationalisation. They do not, however, apply the 
institutional perspective to study how knowledge is shaped by the external 
context.  
 Despite the fact that researchers recognise that MNCs are embedded in 
multiple contexts, they do not discuss the influence these contexts have on a 
MNC and its individual subsidiaries. Multiple embeddedness of a MNC is what 
constitutes its conceptual distinctiveness from domestic companies and 
should, therefore, be studied in more detail.  
There are several reasons why these gaps in research should be investigated. First 
of all, it is not well understood whether foreign companies entering new markets 
become legitimate despite the foreign practices they bring with them or because of 
them. If the research concludes that foreignness of a company and the knowledge it 
brings could constitute its competitive advantage, then it opens up the possibility of 
various streams of future research. It must be stressed that this research does not 
aim to assess whether the London Hilton achieved the state of legitimacy in its 
multiple environments. It seeks to explore the relationship between the concepts of 
transference of practices and negotiation of legitimacy. Secondly, there is little 
research applying the concept of institutional ownership advantages in studying 
MNC’s internationalisation process. Following Dunning and Lundan (2008) and 
Geppert and Williams (2006) these kinds of advantages play a key role in the 
globalised world where there is increased access to asset-based advantages. 
Understanding a firm’s motivation and reasons for certain behaviour can thus explain 
its strategic choices.   
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Finally, addressing these gaps in research not only contributes to expanding the 
literature and building theory, but also can, in the wider perspective, bring 
measurable benefits to the IB practice. The fact that this research is based on a 
business history case study does not mean that the concepts and relationships 
investigated do not have application in the modern industry. On the contrary, the 
international business environment is constantly changing with cultural and social 
influences emerging as world economies develop. Understanding how transference 
of practices influenced negotiation of legitimacy in the past, can greatly enhance 
understanding of similar mechanisms in the future.  
This thesis, therefore, aims to contribute not only to the business history discipline, 
but also to IB literature which studies current events. It is expected that it will expand 
existing theory and establish a framework for further research and practical 
application.  
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3. Methodology  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses and justifies the methodological approach adopted for this 
study. It first introduces business history as an academic discipline. It is deemed 
essential to make such an introduction because of some key characteristics of 
business history in general (Crotty 1998) and because of the recent debates as to 
methodology applied in this field. This chapter then focuses specifically on the nature 
of this research, its philosophical underpinning and the case study approach chosen 
as a method of enquiry in this research. It further discusses data collection process 
and methods of data analysis. The chapter closes with a discussion on evaluation of 
authenticity, credibility and transferability of this study and limitations of the chosen 
research methods.  
It ought to be explained why this thesis, unlike others, begins with an introduction to 
the business history field instead of presenting the researcher’s philosophical stance 
first. Following Crotty (1998), this chapter serves as justification for the choice of 
approach and methods used. Crotty (1998) believes that researchers always bring 
various assumptions to their methodologies. These assumptions should be stated 
and their role in the research process should be discussed, if the research is to be 
trustworthy. There are certain philosophical beliefs which underpin business history 
studies and they will be analysed in the subsequent sections.  
 
3.2. Business History  
Business and economic history have often been neglected and lack the degree of 
impact enjoyed by other business–related fields. However, it is clear that this 
discipline is becoming increasingly more appreciated, both in the academia and in 
service industries ranging from retail to hospitality. This section presents the current 
debate on the key issues connected with business history and the methodologies 
applied in this field.  
One of the key scholars who offered his views and criticism of the state and the 
future of business history as an academic discipline is Geoffrey Jones from the 
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Harvard Business School, believed to be the cradle of business history (de Jong, 
Higgins and van Driel 2015). According to Jones, van Leeuwen and Broadberry 
(2012), one of the key characteristics of business history is its multi-disciplinarity and 
positioning somewhere between economic history and business administration. 
Multi-disciplinarity has been more of a challenge over the past few decades as 
business history has grown significantly in scope. As Jones notes there are various 
issues (networks, business groups, governance), domains (finance, consulting, 
advertising, tourism, fashion) and themes (knowledge, identity, culture, gender, 
ethnicity) being explored which require openness to many more disciplines than only 
economic and business history. In addition, changes in industry itself have caused 
the requirement for a more pronounced multi-disciplinary focus. This is due to the 
growing impact of businesses on global political, economic, social and cultural 
systems.  
The most significant challenge for business history, however, is the general 
disregard for its methodology (Jones et al. 2012). This has a negative impact not 
only on the motivation of academics in the field, but more importantly, also on the 
widely referenced ‘Impact Factor’ of the discipline. Jones et al. (2012) stress that 
business history journals are nowhere near as widely read and cited as management 
or economic journals. He believes that one of the reasons for this situation is a weak 
(or poorly argued) methodology applied by business historians. Despite being rich in 
theoretical underpinning, mainly from the areas of transaction costs and 
institutionalism, the field arguably lacks scholarly quality because it fails to make use 
of standard methodologies applied in the social sciences. This concern is, however, 
shared by all qualitative types of research (Crotty 1998; Sarantankos 2005) which 
are accused of being subjective and lacking reliability or replicability. However, 
Sarantankos (2005) highlights that qualitative research is simply what quantitative 
research is not. As such, there is no reason to compare these two methods or seek 
relationships between them.  
Jones highlights that there is no single ‘best methodology’ in business history but, at 
the same time, he encourages scholars to experiment with small samples of 
qualitative data, more critical analysis of archival sources, testing hypotheses or 
constructing databases. This debate is taken further by de Jong et al. (2015) in the 
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special edition of ‘Business History’ dedicated to methodology in the field. They 
argue that theory developed through business history studies should be confronted 
with empirical evidence and empirical observations should feed into theory 
formation. In other words, they suggest that as much as business history in the 
current state contributes to theory building, it rarely attempts theory testing, so 
acclaimed by Jones et al. (2012). De Jong et al. (2015) recognise the case study as 
the key method in business history but they advocate the use of a ‘feedback loop’ 
where case study analysis generates feedback into further theory building. They 
claim that hypothesis can be built and tested, for example, using multiple data 
observations, to which method archival data lends itself.  
In line with these debates around the discipline and its methodological underpinning, 
this research project does not create hypotheses, but does identify certain themes 
and gaps in knowledge which an analysis of the case study aims to address (see 
Chapter 2.9). It also repeatedly returns to the data to explore theoretical concepts of 
MNC’s internationalisation. Decker, Kipping and Wadhwani (2015) criticize de Jong’s 
approach, arguing that there is space for more methodological plurality in this 
discipline than pure hypothesis testing. They claim that business historians have 
diverse aims in terms of knowledge generation which require a wide variety of 
methods. They highlight that the nature of archival data is that it can only be 
interpreted and not treated objectively and agglomerated into analytical models. It 
needs to be “critically understood and interpreted within the context of their creation 
and storage” (Decker et al. 2015: 32), which emphasises the relationship between 
business history and the underpinning philosophies of constructionism and 
interpretivism which are discussed below. Consequently, while for some kinds of 
business history research, hypothesis testing can be an important method, for others 
interpretive rather than analytical claims are more appropriate. Such interpretive 
methods, according to Decker et al. (2015) include embracing a broader interpretive 
canvas, systemic engagement with philosophy and narrative theory. Despite the fact 
that de Jong et al. and Decker et al. disagree in terms of methodologies, they concur 
in the belief that business history has an important part to play in more broadly 
understood IB and management studies. These disciplines can learn from each 
other and enhance each other’s achievements.  
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Hansen (2012), on the other hand, takes a cultural approach to business history and 
emphasises the role of narrative. He disagrees with Jones et al. (2012) and de Jong 
et al. (2015) because he, similarly to Decker et al. (2015), does not believe that 
historians should be looking for objective truth which can be uncovered by specific 
methods. For this reason, he avoids using the term ‘method’ and replaces it with 
‘analytical strategy’. He asserts that this reflects an interpretivist approach to 
business history research and the fact that history is a culturally – constructed 
phenomenon. A cultural approach, according to Hansen (2012: 715), focuses on the 
construction of meanings rather than a single truth. Consequently, business 
historians are in a position to “contribute to a better understanding of how informal 
institutions have historically constrained the choices of entrepreneurs”, which is not 
available to scholars representing other disciplines.  
One other characteristic of business history which Jones et al. (2012) criticise is the 
fact that it does not tend to address ‘big issues’. In this he supports Chandler (1959) 
who claims that the only way for business history to gain attention is to seek answers 
to questions that many people ask. Among such ‘big issues’ are entrepreneurship, 
globalisation, the natural environment (in relation to business) and social and political 
business responsibility. This piece of research addresses the issue of globalisation. 
Despite the fact that business history has contributed to research on multinational 
companies (MNC) it fails to explore their role in integrating economies (Jones et al. 
2012). Jones asserts that there is scope for business history, especially with the 
partnership of International Business (IB) to address such issues.  
This debate about methodologies applied in the business history discipline is recent 
and has appeared only at the time of writing up of this thesis. However, this study 
addresses a range of areas raised by business historians: 
 It engages with the concept of globalisation and a wide range of theories 
concerned with IB. By doing so it addresses Jones’ (2012) call for seeking 
answers to ‘big issues’ by engagement with IB.  
 It applies interpretive research methods whose aim is to fill gaps in the 
existing knowledge. This is more in line with Hansen’s (2012) cultural 
approach to business history rather than Jones’ (2012) appeal for empirical 
theory testing.  
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 It uses an in-depth case study which is embedded in a number of contexts, 
leading to widening the perspective of the whole study and contributing to 
better understanding of institutional influences on business development 
(Hansen 2012).  
 This research has the potential to be taken further and, therefore, serve as the 
‘feedback loop’ for future hypothesis building and testing (De Jong et al. 
2015).  These opportunities are discussed in section 9.4 in Recommendations 
for further research. 
 
3.3. Nature of this research and its philosophical underpinning 
The aim of historiography is to find meaningful relationships between events, explore 
‘cause and effect’ relationships and provide a rational explanation for the sequence 
of these events (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). Colli (2012) also highlights the fact that 
historians do not only study events in isolation but create a contextual frame for 
these events, an assertion also supported by the institutionalism paradigm and the 
philosophy of constructionism. The goal of an historical study is to interpret the past 
in order to learn about relationships between events as well as about the socio-
cultural, political and economic context which creates the institutional environment in 
which firms operate. This study requires a universal approach to understand 
circumstances both within and outside the firm. According to Patton (2002: 59) “a 
holistic approach assumes that the whole is understood as a complex system that is 
greater than the sum of its parts”. In other words, a holistic approach complements 
the institutional paradigm in that it makes it possible to study the relationships 
between the firm and its environment within a bigger picture. Munslow (2006: 131) 
contributes to the discussion by stating that:  
“Historical explanation tends to ask three questions about the events, 
processes and people of the past ... These are what happened, how 
did it happen and why did it happen in the way the evidence suggests 
it did". 
Therefore, an historical explanation can assist in understanding the process of 
internationalisation of Hilton and the interactions of various variables in this process, 
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including ownership and location advantages, multiple-embeddedness and 
foreignness.  
The main source of information for an historical study is secondary material because 
the researcher rarely has a chance to collect contemporary primary data (i.e. speak 
to people or observe the studied events). Historians, who cannot see or participate in 
the world studied, have to rely on someone’s account of it. Such a situation, May 
(2011) highlights, is not uncommon in social sciences. He claims that since people 
constantly interpret the world, researchers should concentrate on understanding this 
interpretation rather than on what lies behind it. Following May then, it could be 
argued that a historian does not really study the past, but only the interpretation of 
this past. Similarly, Hansen (2012: 709) who uses a cultural approach argues:  
“The business historian using a cultural approach will look for how 
certain meanings were ascribed to events, artefacts and phenomena. 
The decisions and actions of entrepreneurs, business leaders and 
consumers depend on the meanings they assign to events, which can 
be traced in the empirical material”.  
He therefore stresses that business history does not aim to study the objective truth 
about past events, but rather the meanings, or in other words people’s 
interpretations of these events.  
This brings the discussion on to the philosophical assumptions which are transpiring 
through this debate about historical research. It becomes clear that, if historians rely 
on others’ accounts of events, they effectively interpret someone else’s construction 
of reality. Therefore, this research relies mainly on the two philosophical concepts of 
constructionism and interpretivism. These represent two levels of methodology, 
namely epistemology and theoretical perspective respectively (Crotty 1998). 
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge; it explains “how we know what we know” 
(Crotty 1998: 8). Maynard (1994: 10) states that:  
“Epistemology is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding 
for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can 
ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate”.  
Constructionism, therefore, asserts that there is no objective truth and that 
knowledge does not come through the senses alone (Sarantankos 2005). This 
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stands in opposition to positivism which asserts that, by using scientific methods, 
researchers can understand the objective reality and discover the absolute truth.  
Constructionism does not claim that there is no reality independent of human’s 
consciousness, it merely proclaims that such reality does not have any meaning, 
until this meaning is created in the process of interacting with objects. Philosophers 
often use the example of a tree to explain various approaches. From the 
constructionism perspective, a tree can exist without people’s awareness of it, but 
everything that people associate with a tree, like its strength or protective attributes, 
is constructed by humans through their experiences and interpretations (Hall 2003). 
Such understanding can only be created using qualitative methods. 
Consequently, the theoretical perspective guiding such creation of knowledge is 
interpretivism. Interpretation is the process which facilitates knowledge construction 
and reconstruction (Sarantankos 2005). Sarantankos (2005: 39) states that 
interpretation “involves reflective assessment of the reconstructed impressions of the 
world, and integration of action processes in a general context, which will constitute 
a new unit”. The word ‘reflective’ is key in this statement, as it draws attention to the 
fact that interpretation cannot be free from individual’s preconceptions (Mason 2002) 
and is often embedded in one’s cultural and historical context. It is therefore 
important to mention the researcher’s background at this point in the discussion 
because, as suggested by Altheide and Johnson (2011), good qualitative research 
shows the hand of the researcher. As previously stated, the focus of this research 
derived from its author’s interest in the history of grand hotels. Her previous 
academic experience, however, revolves around the areas of tourism destination 
management and marketing. While she was familiar with qualitative research 
methods, conducting this study required the development of skills necessary in 
archival research. She gained tremendously from the assistance of librarians, 
subject specialists and archivists in the British Library and Hospitality Industry 
Archives at the University of Houston and learnt techniques of data searching, 
storing and analysing. Due to the lack of prior training in archival research it was 
necessary to expose the research process and methodology to the wider academic 
community. This was fulfilled by peer debriefing and presenting the methods and 
findings at business history workshops and conferences (see Section 3.9). Prior to 
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this research, the author did not have any relationship with Hilton Hotels, neither did 
she have extensive knowledge on the company’s founder or employees. It was 
inevitable that throughout the research personal opinions or attitudes were formed, 
but these resulted from uncovering the findings rather than being able to influence 
them. The author was able to remain relatively detached from cultural 
preconceptions, because her country of origin is neither the UK nor the US. As a 
result of this research, the author has entered the business history academic 
discipline in which she aims to develop further.  
The positivist approach considers the element of reflexivity to be one of the 
weaknesses of qualitative research but taking the constructionist perspective, they 
allow researchers to study objects and phenomena in specific and realistic contexts. 
Lynch (2005: 545) adds that “studies of hospitality that employ subjective and 
reflexive approaches (…) represent a valuable addition to the exploration of the 
important intangible elements of hospitality”. Such intangible elements include 
history and culture whose study can greatly benefit from the reflective approach. 
Following Hansen (2012), history itself is a culturally-constructed phenomenon and, 
as such, can only be studied using interpretivist methods. This, as well as other 
assumptions of qualitative research which influence this study are presented and 
discussed in Table 3-1. What Sarantankos’ statement also highlights is the fact that 
people can interpret a piece of knowledge, which leads to the creation of another 
piece. This is the feature which is particularly observed in historical research and 
which was referred to earlier. This study uses the existing information to build 
understanding and consequently create new interpretations.  
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Aspect Assumption Impact on this research 
Perception of reality Reality is experienced 
internally, not through senses, 
and resides in the minds of the 
people who construct it 
Researcher’s understanding, prior 
knowledge and experiences all have 
influence on results of this research. Quality 
of these results is judged by peer review.  
Inductive approach Proceeding from the specific to 
the general and from the 
concrete to the abstract 
This research first aims to construct an in-
depth case study which is later discussed 
and analysed in the given theoretical 
framework. Understanding of abstract 
concepts is created through interpretation of 
concrete findings. 
The social purpose 
and context-
sensitivity  
Research purpose is to 
understand actions in social 
context 
Actions and phenomena are studied in a 
very specific time and location context.  
Science is based on 
common sense and 
reason  
Only interpretation, not 
scientific methods, can create 
meaning  
Results are open for discussion, depending 
on individual’s interpretation; research does 
not aim to discover a ‘single truth’ but 
merely offers a viewpoint 
Informative and 
detailed nature of 
research 
Information gathered is often 
presented verbally instead of 
in a numerical way. Data is 
presented in a descriptive 
method.  
Case study is considered to be the key 
element of this research. Unlike in 
quantitative research, qualitative data is 
automatically being analysed as the case 
study is constructed, construction of the 
case study itself enhances understanding.  
Holistic nature Focus is placed on the whole 
study object in its entirety 
Research cannot focus on one element of 
the case, but should present it in its multiple 
contexts (multiple-embeddedness). Hence 
the wide scope of areas discussed.  
Small scale Focuses on small numbers of 
subjects 
Research focuses on one (multiply-
embedded) case study.  
Table 3-1. Nature of qualitative research underpinned by constructionism and interpretivism. 
Source: Author’s adaptation from Sarantankos (2005) and Crotty (1998) 
 
 
Consequently, this research draws mainly from the constructionist and interpretative 
philosophical stances but this is not to say that it disregards other research 
philosophies. Other philosophical assumptions also have an impact, and what is 
more, Bryman (2008: 17) stresses that “particular epistemological principles and 
research practices do not necessarily go hand in hand in a neat unambiguous 
manner”. Philosophical underpinning cannot be seen as a factor constraining 
research, but rather should offer a flexible range of points of support. There are, for 
instance, scholars who advocate following the critical realism (Quek 2007) 
philosophy in business history research. One of the strengths of critical realism is its 
ability to explain causality of historical events (Miles and Huberman 1994). Quek 
(2007) applies this philosophical underpinning in her business history research 
claiming that the external context of the companies studied constitutes what critical 
realism terms ‘natural science’. As such, the external environment is independent 
from business managers’ actions and they have little control over it. This study, 
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however, approaches this issue from a different perspective. Focus here is placed on 
the fact that the researcher does not have access to the external or internal 
environment of the company studied because of the study’s historical nature. The 
researcher can, therefore, only rely on others’ interpretations of the environment, or 
on one’s own interpretation of archival data which does not give an opportunity for 
triangulation.  
One issue that scholars seem to agree on is that historical research is related to the 
concept of institutionalism which refers to formal and informal institutions influencing 
businesses (Skokic, Lynch and Morrison 2016). Van Leuween (in Jones et al. 2012) 
asserts that the neo-institutional paradigm, and especially one of its key creators 
Douglass North, have had a huge impact on the discipline of economics. Similarly, 
Lipartito (1995: 5) stresses that business history with its focus on culture offers a 
new way of “appreciating the relationship between the firm and its environment”, 
which is clearly the focus of institutional attention. Hansen (2012) agrees with 
Lipartito by stating that individuals interpret their world through a culturally-
constituted frame. This frame is affected by formal and informal institutions which 
impact on individuals and businesses. Ingram and Silverman (2002) argue that neo-
institutionalism has always emphasised historical research, the reason being that the 
core precepts of the institutional theory are timeless; if institutions are defined as 
rules constraining the interest-seeking behaviour of actors (Ingram and Silverman, 
2002) then the way they operate is the same regardless of the historical time period 
discussed. Another reason why institutionalism calls for historical research is its 
longitudinal character; if new institutions are built on the basis of older ones (North, 
1991) then “even [a] forward-looking analyst must understand old institutions” 
(Ingram and Silverman, 2002: 5). Hodgson (1998: 175) also advocates for treating 
institutionalism as “evolutionary economics” and it being “biased toward dynamic 
rather than equilibrium-oriented modes of theorizing”, meaning that it focuses on 
change rather than the status quo. Consequently, the institutional paradigm and the 
interpretative research philosophy complement each other in this research which 
approaches MNC’s internationalisation from a business history perspective. 
Assertions of the institutional paradigm and its applications in this study are 
discussed separately in Chapter 2.2.  
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3.4. The case study method 
Yin (2014) asserts that the case study method is a powerful tool when a researcher 
tries to understand a real-life phenomenon together with the context which is 
pertinent to this phenomenon. The development of the London Hilton hotel (reasons 
for selection of this case are discussed in the following section) is discussed in the 
wider context of its multiple-embeddedness (see Figure 3-1), which is the reason 
why this subject lends itself to the case study research method. This multiple-
embeddedness has an impact on the data collection process and so the 
conceptualisation of it as presented in Figure 3-1 will be used in the section 
addressing data collection. The case study method is considered to be the key 
method in business history, even by the business historians who advocate for using 
more science-based methods (see Jones et al. 2012, de Jong et al. 2015 and 
Decker et al. 2015 mentioned previously).  
 
Figure 3-1. Multiple-embeddedness of the London Hilton 
Source: Author’s visualisation 
 
Stake (2005: 444) argues that for the qualitative research community a “case study 
concentrates on experiential knowledge of the case and close attention to the 
influence of its social, political, and other contexts”. An historical case study used in 
this way, therefore, expands the researcher’s knowledge of the whole historical 
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context and not the case in isolation, which is essential in business history research 
(Colli 2012). Such an approach of trying to understand the context of a given subject, 
especially the social and historical context of a written text is known as hermeneutics 
(Bryman 2008). The idea behind hermeneutics is to look at a given text (or a case 
study) from the author’s perspective and interpret it holistically. In other words, the 
development of Hilton in the 1960s cannot be analysed from today’s perspective but 
it should be embedded in the given time period and the socio-economic setting of 
that period. Stake (2005: 450) suggests that in order to gain such an holistic picture 
from a case study it is necessary for the researcher to use intellect and “be 
committed to pondering the impressions, deliberating on recollections and records”. 
This, once again, highlights the interpretive and institutional character of business 
history research, emphasising the relationship between the studied case and its 
wider environment.   
When conducting an embedded case study the researcher needs to remember 
his/her original unit of analysis. According to Eisenhardt (1989b) many researchers 
focus too much on the individual elements of a case and consequently miss the 
larger overview of what they were supposed to study. It ought to be remembered that 
a case study is only an empirical representation of an abstract concept, but is not the 
focus of the study itself. Applied to this research, it means that focus needs to be 
placed on the concept of internationalisation of a MNC as opposed to the Hilton hotel 
itself as the hotel is only an illustration of IB theories. It is, therefore, a descriptive 
case study in that it illustrates the theoretical concepts of multiple-embeddedness, 
transference of knowledge and negotiation of legitimacy in the process of 
internationalisation of a MNC.  
Von Wright (1971) claims that historians, similar to other researchers who refuse 
positivism as a method of understanding the world, want to grasp the individual and 
unique features of objects of their study. He quotes Droysen, a German historian and 
philosopher, who introduced the distinction between explanation and understanding, 
much highlighted in the constructionist paradigm (Crotty 1998). Droysen claimed that 
“the aim of the natural sciences is to explain; the aim of history is to understand the 
phenomena” (Droysen cited in von Wright 1971: 5). A historical case study is a 
method which can help in such an understanding. Business historians highlight that 
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historical research is often not as concerned with theory as other disciplines. 
Schumpeter (1954: 815) is quoted as saying: 
“There are such things as historical and theoretical temperaments. 
That is to say, there are types of minds that take delight in all the 
colours of historical processes and of individual cultural patterns. 
There are other types that prefer a neat theorem to everything else. 
We have use for both. But they were not made to appreciate one 
another.” (Schumpeter 1954: 815) 
It needs to be stressed therefore that, as much as this study aims to explore the 
range of theories concerned with MNCs and their internationalisation, it also aims to 
explore the history of the London Hilton hotel and its relation with the parent 
company and with London of the 1960s.  
 
3.5. Case study selection 
This research is based on an embedded case study of the London Hilton hotel, 
representing theoretical concepts concerned with internationalisation of a MNC and 
the transference of knowledge involved in the process. As argued by Yin (2014) it is 
the main purpose of a case study to represent an abstract concept, rather than be 
the focus of the study itself. The case is embedded in a range of contexts, as 
presented in Figure 3-1. These contexts constitute an integral part of the case study 
and require extensive data collection and analysis.  
As seen in Figure 3-1, the core unit of analysis is considered to be the individual 
subsidiary, the London Hilton (currently trading under the name ‘Hilton Park Lane’) 
which is analysed in the context of its parent company, Hilton International, the 
company’s home country and the host context of London in the 1960s. The reason 
for this approach is to explore the previously discussed multiple-embeddedness of a 
subsidiary of a multinational company. Skokic et al. (2016) stress that contextualised 
research, which adopts the institutional theory and which focuses on the external 
context of a firm, should be contextualised spatially, institutionally and temporally. 
Following this suggestion, the spatial context of this research includes England and 
the US; institutional context includes the socio-economic and cultural situation in 
England and America in the 1960s; and the temporal context is concerned with the 
international expansion of Hilton Hotels.  
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This company was selected from the population of hotel MNCs because of 
numerous characteristics: 
 The London Hilton was the first subsidiary of a multinational American hotel 
chain to open in London in the decades when there was a considerable influx 
of American businesses and travellers to London. At the time of opening in 
1963, the Hilton brand was an emblem of modernity and American culture 
(Wharton 2001).  
 The independence of the hotel company has been consistent throughout the 
years (although it has been owned by different corporations) which has 
contributed to the availability of internal data. For example, the University of 
Houston holds a dedicated archive with data reaching back to the foundation 
of the company.  
 The development of Hilton Hotels and Hilton International followed a clear, 
organic path with the company gradually increasing its presence in the United 
States before expanding internationally.  
 Hilton was also selected because of the unique role and vision of its founder, 
Conrad Hilton who claimed to be committed to equality and democracy and 
was well known for his anti-communism and religious campaigning. He saw a 
greater social and political role in the development of his business which was 
not observed in other hotel MNCs. Nickson (1997: 186) states:  
“Arguably, Hilton can be seen as the most representative example of 
the ‘American model’ of hotel internationalization that drew on the 
certainties offered by the American chains in their home country and 
which sought to create an up-market home away from home for 
American travellers, particularly business travellers”. 
This aspect makes Hilton representative of an American hotel MNC which 
internationalises its operations. Hilton’s distinct corporate culture, derived from the 
founder’s political and social aims is, in turn, representative of what Dunning and 
Lundan (2008) define as “institutional ownership advantages” which include the 
company’s motivation for specific corporate behaviours.  
The fact that this study focuses on a single case study does not negatively impact 
upon the depth of the research because of its multiple embeddedness. The case is 
analysed against the numerous contexts in which it operated, including the socio-
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cultural contexts of America and London of the 1960s and the institutional context of 
its parent company. This research does not aim to generalise from this case study, 
but rather find the conceptual link between two phenomena – the transference of 
knowledge and internationalisation which makes a single, embedded case more 
robust than multiple cases being studied in less detail.  
 
3.6. Data collection 
The multiple-embeddedness of this case study has certain implications in relation to 
the data collection process. As opposed to other single case study research projects, 
it was necessary to collect data concerned with multiple levels ranging from the 
subsidiary and its parent company to the socio-economic context of 1960s London 
(Table 3-2 presents the extent of data collected for each level outlined in Figure 3-1). 
This requirement added greatly to the multi-disciplinarity of the research and 
required development of research skills and knowledge in many different areas from 
MNC strategy to globalisation. Time-wise, data on the individual levels was searched 
for simultaneously but findings were grouped according to the multiple-
embeddedness model. Generally, data on the external context including London 
during the period and America as the home country of Hilton was investigated 
through published sources such as newspaper articles and books. Information on the 
London Hilton and its parent company involved internal documents drawn from the 
Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, University of 
Houston and the internal Hilton on Park Lane collection. Table 3-3 presents the 
extent of archival data collected from these two sources.  
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Level of 
embeddedness 
Data type Main sources Access 
American 
institutional 
context 
Books ‘The American Hotel. An anecdotal history’ 
(Williamson 1930), ‘The Americans. Vol.2, The 
national experience’ (Boorstin1966), ‘Palaces of 
the People. A Social History of Commercial 
Hospitality’ (White 1968), ‘Statler. America's 
extraordinary hotelman’ (Miller 1968), ‘Land of 
desire : merchants, power and the rise of a new 
American culture’ (Leach 1993), ‘Living downtown: 
The history of residential hotels in the United 
States’ (Groth 1994), ‘Hotel: An American History’ 
(Sandoval-Strausz  2007), ‘Americanization of the 
European economy’ (Schroter 2005), ‘The 
economic ascent of the hotel business’ (Slattery 
2009), ‘Hotel dreams: luxury, technology, and 
urban ambition in America, 1829-1929’ (Berger 
2011), ‘Turning the Tables: The Aristocratic 
Restaurant and the Rise of the American Middle 
Class, 1880-1920’ (Haley 2011), ‘The Spectre of 
Americanization: Western Europe in the American 
Century’ (Gassert 2012) 
British 
Library, UWL 
Library, 
personal 
collection 
Newspaper 
and magazine 
articles 
The New York Times, Time Magazine, Vogue, The 
Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts, Wall 
Street Journal 
British 
Library (hard 
copies and 
electronic 
copies)  
Hilton 
International 
Internal 
magazines 
Hilton Magazine, Dorchester Magazine, Hiliner Hard copies 
stored by BL, 
Hilton 
Archives  
Internal data Letters between Hilton employees and customers, 
internal reports and memorandums, meeting 
minutes, internal magazine ‘Hiltonitems’, leaflets, 
pictures 
Hilton 
Collection at 
the 
Hospitality 
Industry 
Archives, 
Hilton 
College, 
University of 
Houston 
Books ‘Be my Guest’ (Hilton 1957); ‘Building the Cold 
War’ (Wharton 2001), ‘Conrad N. Hilton, hotelier. A 
biography’ (Comfort 1964), ‘Great American 
Hoteliers. Pioneers of the Hotel Industry’ (Turkel 
2009)  
British 
Library, UWL 
Library, 
personal 
collection 
The London 
Hilton 
Internal data  Letters, internal reports and memos, leaflets, 
pictures  
Hilton 
Collection at 
the 
Hospitality 
Industry 
Archives, 
Hilton 
College, 
University of 
Houston; 
Hilton Park 
Lane internal 
archives 
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Industry and 
Newspaper 
articles  
Caterer and Hotelkeeper, The Daily Telegraph, 
The Financial Times 
British 
Library (hard 
copies and 
electronic 
copies)  
London 
organisational 
and 
institutional 
context 
Industry 
magazines 
Caterer and Hotelkeeper, British Hotelier and 
Restaurateur  
Hard copies 
stored by BL, 
Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper 
archives, 
Institute of 
Hospitality 
library 
Newspaper 
Articles 
The Observer, The Independent, London Times, 
The New York Times, Financial Times, The 
Economist, London Illustrated News 
ProQuest, 
hard copies 
stored by BL, 
British 
Newspaper 
Archives, 
publisher’s 
archives 
accessed via 
subscription  
Books ‘The British hotel through the ages’ (Borer 1972), 
‘The Golden Age of British Hotels’ (Taylor 1974), 
‘The luxury hotels of London‘ (Sheppardson 1991), 
‘A History of London’ (Inwood 1998), ‘White heat : 
a history of Britain in the swinging sixties’ 
(Sandbrook 2006), ‘London. A Social History’ 
(Porter 2000), ‘London. The Biography’ (Ackroyd 
2001), ‘British Tourism: The remarkable story of 
growth’ (Middleton 2005), ‘Americanization of the 
European economy’ (Schröter 2005), ‘Sociology’ 
(Giddens 2006), ‘The economic ascent of the hotel 
business’ (Slattery 2009), ‘The Spectre of 
Americanization: Western Europe in the American 
Century’ (Gassert 2012) 
British 
Library, UWL 
Library, 
personal 
collection 
Table 3-2. Extent of data collected for each level of multiple-embeddedness  
Source: Author’s review of previous research 
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Type of material  Number of 
pages from the 
Hilton Collection 
at the 
Hospitality 
Industry 
Archives 
Number of pages 
from the London 
Hilton Archive 
Number of 
pages from 
the British 
Library  
Leaflets, brochures and pictures 25 60  
Magazines and newspapers 70 30 175 
Letters (between Hilton employees and 
between customers and employees) 
110   
Memorandums, internal magazines 
(including Hiliner and the London Hilton 
Magazine), news releases, Conrad Hilton’s 
speeches, annual reports and other internal 
documentation  
275  20 
Other material (including Red Book hotel 
listings)  
40 Data collected by 
Grieve (1966), 300 
pages  
 
Table 3-3. Extent of the analysed archival material 
Source: Author’s analysis of archival data 
 
 
The first stage of data collection involved a systematic review of national 
newspapers from the studied time period. Unfortunately, this stage coincided with 
the Newspaper Library being moved from Colindale to the main British Library 
location in central London. Therefore, the review of periodic newspapers had to be 
divided into a further two stages where the first one involved electronic resources, 
however, availability of these was limited and inconsistent. Electronic resources had 
one advantage in that they allowed for key-word searching which was more efficient 
than manual methods. The British Library e-resources were utilised to search for 
articles relating to the development of the London Hilton hotel and reference to Hilton 
Hotels or Conrad Hilton in any other capacity. It was possible to save the searched 
articles as PDF files which greatly assisted in coding and analysing them in later 
stages. Another advantage of using electronic resources was in gaining access to 
some of the archival editions of American titles, including The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal. A total of just under 200 clippings were reviewed.  
When the Newsroom re-opened in the British Library in April 2014, British 
newspapers from the studied time period were searched manually. Key titles 
including the London Illustrated News, The Times and The Evening Standard were 
interrogated for items related to either the development of the London Hilton or other 
references to the company. Editions published in the months preceding the hotel 
opening were searched, but also a snowballing sampling technique was used where 
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possible. For example, it was found that Wharton (2001) referred to an article in The 
Times from November 7th 1957. Having this information, it was easy to retrieve the 
edition in question and follow the subsequent articles. These periodicals were 
searched on micro-films, therefore it was not possible to save them or take 
photographs of them. Detailed notes and quotes were taken for later reference.  
In order to gain an understanding of the external contexts, including the contexts of 
America and the UK in the 1960s (see Figure 3-1), a wide range of books including 
Sandbrook (2006a, 2006b), Slattery (2009), Chandler, Amatori and Hikino (1997), 
Schröter (2005), Kroes (2007), Bonin and de Goey (2009) and Gassert (2012) were 
used. It would be beyond the scope of this study to discuss in detail the economic, 
social, political and cultural situation of these two countries and therefore focus was 
placed on their mutual relationships and influences. This research on America and 
the UK was specifically used to gain knowledge on the context in which 
internationalisation of Hilton Hotels took place. There are examples of extensive 
research having already been taken on both London in the 1960s and on the 
influence of America on Britain and Europe over this decade. It needs to be, 
therefore, stressed that the discussion on both issues is not exhaustive but, at the 
same time, great effort was placed in presenting a balanced view. It is suggested 
that readers who wish to gain more detailed historical knowledge on these issues 
should access the original sources.  
Having gathered data on the external context, focus shifted towards Hilton Hotels as 
the parent company and the London Hilton as its subsidiary. This required access to 
the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College at University 
of Houston. Dr Mark Young, the Curator of the collection was contacted and a trip to 
Houston was undertaken. Documents in the Archive were searched manually but it 
was possible to take digital pictures of each, which accelerated the research 
process. The visit lasted 14 days, but extensive preparation work was done 
beforehand. The author of this research was given access to the Archive’s catalogue 
which lists the overall themes of material held in each archive box. The catalogue 
was searched manually and a list of potentially relevant boxes was created. This 
preparation greatly enhanced the quality and the efficiency of work when in the 
Archive itself. Tremendous assistance was received from the Curator of the 
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Collection in the Hilton Archive. He was available during the visit and was able to 
locate additional data when required. On numerous occasions when a significant 
piece of material was found, he was able to track down other pieces of data related 
to the theme. A good working relationship with the Curator was maintained during 
the analysis and writing stages which allowed for clarification of information 
throughout the course of this research. Due to time constraints, no coding of data 
was performed while in the Archive. However, this initial review of material began the 
process of immersion in data which is considered to be the first stage of data 
analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994). The efficiency of the collection process while 
in the Archive resulted in exhaustion of this source of information as far as the 
London Hilton was concerned. A total of over 500 pages of letters, brochures, 
memorandums and reports was collected and analysed.  
Apart from the visit to Houston, thanks to institutional links between the University of 
West London and Hilton Worldwide, a visit to the London Hilton on Park Lane 
(current name of the London Hilton) was arranged. The author was given a tour 
around the hotel which, despite major changes in decoration, brought to life the 
information about the layout and organisation of the hotel. In the course of the visit it 
became apparent that the hotel held a small collection of documents and newspaper 
clippings from around the opening of the hotel in 1963. With the permission of the 
present General Manager, Michael Shepherd, access to these resources was 
granted and they are used in this study. In total, over 300 pages of material were 
available in this collection. The researcher was also given an opportunity of 
personally meeting the current and longest serving General Manager of the London 
Hilton as well as having a telephone conversation with a member of the hotel staff 
from the 1960s. Moreover, the author visited the current EMEA Headquarters of 
Hilton Worldwide in Watford and discussed her research with senior members of 
management. All these meetings, presented in Figure 3-2 on a timeline, were 
extremely useful in maintaining rigour and verifying accuracy of this research. 
Individual meetings did not present substantial information enough to be included as 
sources for this study but, nevertheless, they played an important role in confirming 
the findings and, perhaps more importantly, in enhancing the interest and feeling of 
authenticity throughout the process.  
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Figure 3-2. Timeline of research visits 
Source: Author’s visualisation 
 
 
Data collection did not proceed in a strictly linear way, but it often took an 
opportunistic character. Additional sources were found throughout the course of the 
research and even during writing up of the thesis new information was unearthed 
and included where appropriate. This process highlights the very nature of business 
history or any archival research which often cannot be entirely planned for. In this 
kind of process the researcher needs to be flexible and prepared to change the 
course of his/her work when new pieces of information emerge, or where similarly no 
data is available. As asserted by Schumpeter (1954), there are “types of minds that 
take delight in historical processes” and they treat historical research as a journey 
which is guided by the information found rather than by a pre-planned schedule. This 
has been the experience of the researcher. Data collection reached the point of 
saturation in that no new information was emerging and individuals who were 
consulted did not negate any of the findings. To the author’s best knowledge, data 
on the development and opening of the London Hilton in 1963 has been exhausted 
but this in no way negates the fact that further material might exist in sources outside 
her knowledge.  
 
Secondary 
research 
including visits 
to the British 
Library 
September 
2012 - July 
2014 
First visit to 
Hilton 
Worldwide 
EMEA 
Headquarters 
in Watford  
June 2014 
First visit to the 
London Hilton 
on Park Lane  
August 2014 
Primary 
research in the 
Hospitality 
Industry 
Archives, Hilton 
College, 
University of 
Houston 
September 
2014 
Second visit to 
the London 
Hilton on Park 
Lane 
 October 2014 
Telephone 
conversation 
with a member 
of the London 
Hilton's staff in 
the 1960s 
February 2015 
Second visit to 
Hilton 
Worldwide 
EMEA 
Headquarters 
in Watford  
May 2015 
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3.7. Referencing style  
A note ought to be made on the referencing style this thesis follows. Consistent 
referencing proved to be a challenge because of the wide variety of sources utilised. 
Material ranged from published books, through to newspaper articles and 
unpublished documents such as letters or company memorandums. In order to 
achieve as much consistency as possible, The Chicago Manual of Style (2003) 
guidelines were followed. Consequently, footnotes are used throughout the thesis to 
refer to unpublished sources and archival material. Newspaper and magazine 
articles are also referenced in footnotes as they are treated as archival sources in 
this study. In the case of published material, i.e. books, academic journal articles or 
websites, the Harvard system, which is the most commonly adopted referencing 
system in British institutions, is adopted. The aim of using footnotes is to give as 
much information as possible on material which would otherwise be difficult to 
identify, including internal documents and Hilton’s correspondence. For the sake of 
confidentiality it was decided not to include names of customers appearing in the 
internal documentation, which it is perceived does not affect the quality of data. The 
names of employees of Hilton Hotels Corporation or Hilton International are cited, 
where publicly available. Therefore, a footnote which reads: “Letter to Conrad Hilton 
on 23rd July 1974” refers to communication between a customer and Conrad Hilton, 
whilst “Curt Strand to Conrad Hilton on 12th January 1960” refers to communication 
between two employees of Hilton Hotels.  
 
3.8. Data analysis  
Once data was collected it had to be categorised and analysed. This refers to both 
newspaper articles and internal documents from the Archive, however, newspaper 
articles were grouped in themes whilst collected. OneNote and NVivo 10 software 
were used to assist in grouping and categorising data.  It should be stressed that 
data ranged from accounts of Conrad Hilton and his career to the public response to 
the development of the London Hilton.  
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Processing data was divided in two main stages:  
1. Writing up of the case study and;  
2. The analysis of the case in light of previously reviewed literature and the 
constructed analytical framework.  
Case study scholars (such as Bryman and Burgess 2002, Hartley 2004 and Yin 
2014) highlight that in this method, data collection and analysis are simultaneous 
and iterative. In other words, through the process of writing up of the case study data 
is automatically analysed. In these two stages of the case study construction and 
analysis, three kinds of codes were applied. This follows the approach suggested by 
Miles and Huberman (1994) who advocate the use of descriptive, interpretive and 
pattern codes for data analysis (see Table 3-4 below). There are other frameworks 
for coding qualitative data as well. For example, Skokic et al. (2016) use a six-staged 
coding pattern: familiarization, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, 
mapping and interpretation. Unlike their study which benefits from creating matrices 
and data charts from interview transcripts, this research considers the narrative of 
the case study as the key source for further analysis. It was, therefore, decided that 
Miles and Huberman’s (1994) three-staged coding framework would be more 
effective in gaining knowledge transmitting through the narrative.  
Codes  Elements 
Descriptive Conrad – early life, Conrad – his mission, Conrad – the businessman, Conrad – 
the celebrity, Hilton’s domestic development, Hilton’s international development, 
entry model, American hotels with local flavour, The London Hilton – controversies, 
the London Hilton – project development, Construction and design, Guest rooms, 
Food and Beverage facilities, Technological and operational solutions, Staffing 
decisions, Marketing and public relations, Business market advertising, Acquisition 
by TWA 
Interpretive  MNC – key characteristics, Internationalisation strategy, Knowledge and its 
transference, Multiple – embeddedness internal and external pressures, 
Foreignness, Legitimacy 
Pattern Role of knowledge transference in the negotiation of legitimacy, Foreignness as a 
differentiating asset, Impact of multiple-embeddedness on MNC’s subsidiaries 
Table 3-4. Three-stage coding process 
Source: Author’s adaptation from Miles and Huberman (1994) 
 
 
3.8.1. Descriptive codes 
First, in order to construct the case study, all the material was reviewed and 
descriptive themes were identified. Descriptive codes referred to factual elements of 
the case study, i.e. Conrad Hilton and his career, the separation of domestic and 
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international divisions or marketing strategy of the London Hilton. NVivo 10 software 
was found particularly useful at this stage because it allowed for efficient grouping of 
large amount of data. Even later in the analysis process it made it easy to go back to 
the original sources and consult them when needed. Based on these descriptive 
themes, a case study was constructed and individual themes were used as headings 
in the case study for sake of clarity. Creating too many codes and therefore diluting 
analysis was avoided. This resulted in some pieces of data being coded at multiple 
codes which is considered to be an advantage as it assisted in maintaining a holistic 
approach to the case study.  
 
3.8.2. Interpretive codes 
The second stage of coding (interpretive codes) is where this research benefits most 
from the conceptual framework constructed in Chapter 2. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) define the conceptual framework simply as the main things to be studied with 
the presumed relationships between them. Such a framework can be presented 
either in a graphic or narrative form. They assert that the construction of a 
conceptual framework involves placing individual elements (i.e. factors, constructs or 
variables) in intellectual ‘bins’ which group the existing knowledge in a logical way. In 
the case of this study, these ‘bins’ are presented in the form of individual headings 
and subheadings in the review of previous research and the relationship between 
them was depicted in  
 
 
Figure 2-2. Miles and Huberman (1994: 20) stress that conceptual frameworks 
develop with the progressing research because they are “the current version of the 
researcher’s map of the territory being investigated”. This is also what happened in 
this study. The knowledge on MNCs and their internationalisation expanded with 
time and the conceptual framework was consequently re-worked several times. This 
experience is shared by other scholars working within the institutional paradigm. 
Skokic et al. (2016: 5) state that in the process of their research “the emerging 
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thematic framework was constantly compared to theoretical conceptualization, 
working back and forth between various categorizations of the data”.  Some 
knowledge areas developed throughout the process of this research in the direction 
not initially considered. These are discussed in Chapter 9.2. Such outcomes 
highlight the interpretive nature of this research which is very different from 
quantitative methods used in other disciplines. Therefore, concepts and theories 
discussed in the review of previous research serve as conceptual framework in this 
study and gaps in the existing knowledge identify possible relationships between 
individual concepts. Conceptual ‘bins’ were used as interpretive codes. These, 
therefore, include elements such as multiple-embeddedness, transference of 
knowledge or organisational learning process, as shown in Table 3-4. There are 
scholars who refer to such codes as ‘variables’ (Quek 2007), but this term is avoided 
in this thesis, given its association with a measurable element, which can ‘vary’ in 
different circumstances. This research asserts that studied theoretical concepts are 
not quantifiable and it is not the aim to measure them in any way. The aim, on the 
other hand, is to discuss findings with reference to the theoretical framework. The 
interpretive codes were applied to the case study being now treated as a narrative 
and were used as key terms driving Chapter 8.   
 
3.8.3. Pattern codes  
The final stage, pattern coding, was applied simultaneously with the writing up 
process of the discussion. This is where business history research differs 
significantly from social sciences. The writing up of business history research is more 
of a ‘journey’, as opposed to a clear reporting of the findings. In other words, the 
researcher is learning about the subject while writing his/her work. Some of the 
relationships between individual elements (i.e. patterns) were realised only when 
individual sections of the discussion were written. Consequently, the discussion was 
the most time-consuming element of the whole research. The final chapter included 
in this thesis has been rewritten many times. This stage is also where the interpretive 
approach is most evident. The researcher can only interpret the relationships 
between individual elements and argue their relevance using findings from the case 
study. There is scope for hypothesis creation and testing, as advocated by de Jong 
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et el. (2015) and it is suggested that these methods should be adopted in further 
research on this topic. This is also the stage which directly addresses gaps in the 
previous literature. It was identified that the concepts of negotiation of legitimacy and 
transference of practices are rarely discussed in relation to each other. It was also 
emphasised that scholars do not discuss in detail the impact that multiple-
embeddedness has on a MNC’s subsidiary. Pattern coding allows for finding 
relationships between these individual elements and then the discussion of them.  
The process of this type of coding can be tracked using the Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 in 
Chapter 5.3.5. These excerpts from newspapers and internal documentation present 
the policy of providing in-depth training and promoting senior managers from within 
the company. These excerpts were descriptively coded as ‘staffing decisions’. The 
discussion which follows from these elements of data is the one in Chapter 8.3 b, 
focusing on the role of employees in the transference of knowledge, by applying the 
interpretive code of ‘knowledge transference’. Finally, the development of the 
discussion led to the identification of pattern coding of ‘the role of knowledge 
transference in negotiation of legitimacy’ where it is argued that internal training and 
promoting managers from within greatly contributed to the standardisation of Hilton’s 
practices and the negotiation of legitimacy of these practices in foreign locations. 
This process consequently led to the conclusion that Hilton was a knowledge-based 
company and that this knowledge was embedded in its trained employees.  
 
3.9. Evaluation of research 
It was noted in the beginning of this chapter that qualitative research and historical 
research, in particular, is criticized for the lack of methodological rigour. Qualitative 
researchers, however, respond by highlighting that qualitative research is 
underpinned by distinctly different philosophical assumptions and, as such, cannot 
be directly compared to quantitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Crotty 1998; 
Sarantankos 2005). The terms such as truth, validity, reliability and generalizability 
are a legacy of positivism and have tended to be replaced by qualitative researchers 
with ones which respond better to assumptions and methods adopted in qualitative 
research. Following Sarantankos (2005) this refers to terms such as authenticity, 
82 
 
credibility and transferability respectively (see Table 3-5 for a comparison of these 
terms).  
 
 
Quantitative research Qualitative research  
Validity - the property of a research instrument 
that measure its relevance, precision and 
accuracy 
Authenticity – methodological excellence 
ensuring that research performance is 
professional, accurate and systematic 
Reliability - the capacity of measurement to 
produce consistent results 
Credibility – following procedures that guarantee 
that multiple researchers produce comparable 
results; also increasing the documentation of the 
results 
Generalizability – capacity of a study to 
extrapolate the relevance of its findings beyond 
the boundaries of the sample 
Transferability – ability to transfer findings to 
another case 
Table 3-5. Terminology applied in the evaluation of research 
Source: Author’s adaptation from Sarantankos (2005) 
 
 
It ought to be noted that qualitative research essentially rejects the notion of 
objectivity, greatly valued in quantitative research. Also this study follows the 
interpretivist path instead of seeking objective truth. Sarantankos (2005: 94) offers 
an interesting argument by stating that “objectivity legitimises beliefs and practices 
that people take for granted”. He further adds that abandoning objectivity frees 
thinking and leads to capturing reality more effectively. Consequently, it is the aim of 
this research to adopt rigorous methodology which reflects values of authenticity, 
credibility and transferability, but at the same time it does not seek to be objective 
but rather be interpretive in nature.  
Altheide and Johnson (2011) stress that validity, adequacy and truthfulness of 
qualitative research can be determined when the research process ensures a high 
level of transparency. They add that the weakness of qualitative research often lies 
in the lack of transparency in data collection and analysis and the blurring 
borderlines between the two. Creswell and Miller (2000) designed an extremely 
useful framework assisting in choosing procedures which are meant to ensure 
qualitative research’s qualities as described above and the transparency of the 
research process. The framework divides choices according to the philosophical 
paradigms and their assumptions as well as research lens, meaning perspective of 
the researcher, study participants or people external to the study. This tool is 
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deemed to be very useful because it equips the researcher with a range of methods 
available in qualitative studies, but at the same time, guides him/her as to which 
method is most suitable in the adopted philosophical paradigm. Creswell and Miller 
(2000) emphasise that their discussion refers to the quality of inferences drawn from 
sources rather than sources themselves. Based on this framework, this research 
applies the following procedures: 
 Disconfirming evidence – procedure in which researcher establishes initial 
themes or categories and searches for data either confirming or disconfirming 
these themes. In the course of this research all available data was collected 
and recorded. Attention was paid not to overlook any disconfirming evidence 
and, on certain occasions, the research suggests that there is the possibility 
of alternative explanations, however, not enough evidence was found to 
confirm them. In order to increase the possibility of finding disconfirming 
evidence a wide range of sources were consulted; these are discussed in 
more detail in Section 3.6 of this chapter. Miles and Huberman (1994) stress 
that the lack of negative evidence should not be treated as confirmatory tactic 
but that the benefit of this procedure lies in openness to alternative results. 
Following this notion, this research does not claim to offer indisputable 
answers but is open for new information emerging and affecting the findings.  
 Researcher reflexivity - Creswell and Miller (2000) suggest that this tool 
applies to research underpinned by the critical paradigm but it can be argued 
that, to some extent, it is also adaptable in this constructionist study. It 
involves acknowledging and describing the researcher’s beliefs and biases to 
allow readers their own judgement. This chapter explains the underlying 
assumptions guiding this research and therefore illuminates the researcher’s 
own beliefs and views. Moreover, Section 3.3 provides details of the author’s 
academic and cultural background, as well as her development in the 
business history discipline. Such transparency, Altheide and Johnson (2011: 
588) state, promotes “empathic and sympathetic understanding and 
participation between the author and the audience”. It also enhances 
authenticity and credibility of this work as it gives the reader accurate and 
detailed information on the research rigour so that it can be tracked and 
repeated. 
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 Prolonged engagement in the field – this tool, in the form described by 
Creswell and Miller (2000), applies more to ethnographical studies and was 
not possible to implement in this study. However, the author of this research 
project had the opportunity to immerse herself in raw data which was captured 
electronically. In the course of working on this thesis (almost four years) it was 
possible to return to data and repeatedly analyse it. This, it is argued, 
provides similar results to prolonged contact with ethnographical data.  
 Thick, rich description – as the name suggests this procedure refers to 
detailed descriptions which aim to transport the reader into a setting or 
situation (Denzin 1989; Creswell and Miller 2000). For this reason the reader 
of this thesis will find in-depth description of the case study together with its 
wide historical context. Moreover, this description is supported with a wide 
range of pictures whose aim is to create as vivid an image of the discussed 
company and its activities as possible. In-depth description refers also to 
methodology and the theoretical underpinning of this study. Yin (2014) 
stresses that the case study method does not lend itself to generalisability or 
transferability. However, it is argued here that the analytical framework of this 
study provides the opportunity for application in future research. Following 
Sarantankos (2005) the analytic constructs that guide the study are clearly 
defined (see Section 3.8) and data collection and analysis procedures are 
meticulously specified. Should another researcher wish to conduct a similar 
study on a different company, they will be able to adapt similar data collection 
methods and analytic framework, depending on access to data. Thick 
description therefore also has application to the transferability of the study 
because it allows readers comparison and decisions on the applicability of the 
methods and findings to similar contexts or settings.  
 Peer debriefing – this is another procedure which Creswell and Miller (2000) 
assigned to critical research. Quoting Lincoln and Guba (1985), peer review 
“challenges researchers’ assumptions, pushes the researchers to the next 
step methodologically and asks hard questions about methods and 
interpretations”. The role of such peers was played by the supervisors of this 
study who reviewed and challenged decisions made at each stage. 
Furthermore, the author ensured dissemination of findings and progress at 
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least once a year in the course of this research. This was carried out by 
presenting at subject specific conferences and workshops focused on 
business history studies (see Table 3-6). During these events the author had 
the possibility of exposing her methodology to peers and experts who offered 
invaluable feedback and critique. Dr Mark Young, the Curator of the Hilton 
Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives reviewed the analysis of 
archival data which verified accuracy of its interpretation. Finally, the author 
maintained a working relationship with the current and past employees of 
Hilton International. These individuals are not treated as sources of 
information as such but, nevertheless, through their comments they 
contributed to maintaining clarity and rigour.   
 
Date and Location Event  
May 2013, Edinburgh  Council for Hospitality Management Education Annual Conference 
May 2014, London University of West London Annual PhD/MPhil Conference 
March 2015, Oxford University of Oxford Business History Workshop 
May 2015, London University of West London Annual PhD/MPhil Conference (Best Paper 
Award) 
July 2015, Birmingham University College Birmingham Annual Research Conference  
June 2016, Oxford University of Oxford Business History Workshop 
July 2016, Guildford University of Surrey School of Hospitality and Tourism Management 
Conference  
Table 3-6. Timeline of events at which progress of this research was presented 
 
 Audit trail – a method which is compared to fiscal audit by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985). Providing an audit or evidence trail involves documenting each stage 
of the research process and exposing this documentation to external auditors. 
A detailed trail was created throughout the process of this research. The key 
element of the trail is this chapter which discusses all decisions as to data 
collection and analysis methods, structure of the thesis and the research 
process itself. Furthermore, the research process was documented by 
Supervisory Meeting Reports and Annual Progress Reports which were 
reviewed and approved of by the University Research Degrees Sub-
Committee, part of the Graduate School at the University of West London. 
Finally, apart from peer debriefing and internal review of the audit trail 
documentation, the thesis was assessed by External Examiners who offered 
comments and constructive criticism on the methodology.  
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3.10. Ethical considerations 
Ethics is defined as “a science of morality” (Homan 1991:1). Silverman (2013) states 
that the role of ethical concerns is to convince all the concerned individuals and 
organisations that no risk is involved in conducting research or that the risk of any 
harm is controlled and minimised. There are two overarching theories in ethical 
philosophy: deontology and consequentialist theory (Kent 2000). Deontology, 
following Immanuel Kant, advocates obeying natural laws and rights even if this 
leads to unfortunate consequences. Consequentialist theory, represented by John 
Stuart Mill, asserts that individuals should minimize suffering and maximize well-
being. Such difficult ethical dilemmas must be considered especially in the case of 
social research where it is likely that research could harm individuals or influence the 
society at large. This research is also subject to ethical concerns and, following 
Doucet and Mauthner (2002) researchers have “epistemic responsibility”. In other 
words, the key responsibility for the researcher is simply to produce good quality 
research (Miles and Huberman 1994) and contribute to the development of 
knowledge in the best possible way.  
Traditionally ethics in research have been associated with informed consent and the 
impact of research results on the participants and audience (Ali and Kelly 2012), 
however, an ethical approach to research is relevant in every stage of the research 
process from formulating research questions to publishing findings. Kent (2000) 
devises four key ethical principles to ensure this: 
1. Beneficence 
2. Non-maleficence 
3. Justice 
4. Autonomy 
There are a number of measures that were undertaken in this study in order to 
translate these ethical principles into practice. First of all, the purpose and aims of 
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research were academic and Hilton, despite being the interest of this study, did not 
play a role in the research process. Current Hilton Worldwide strategies, plans or 
developments were not the focus of this research and were not reviewed (other than 
information publicly published and referred to in the ‘Epilogue’). Beneficence and 
non-maleficence were at the core of this research and its underlying aim was to 
contribute to the wealth of knowledge. 
Hilton Worldwide and the London Hilton on Park Lane Hotel are not, in any way, 
beneficiaries of the study which ensures justice in terms of access to resources and 
to research findings. Hilton Worldwide provided the researcher with accommodation 
during her visit to Houston, however, this was offered as part of Hilton Worldwide’s 
ongoing support for the International Centre for Hotel and Resort Management at the 
University of West London and information was not passed back to Hilton Worldwide 
in return for this sponsorship.  
As part of the commitment to the requirement for autonomy, the researcher ensured 
that no customer or patron of Hilton can be identified in this thesis. As previously 
explained, customers’ names have been removed from exhibits displayed in this 
work. Private addresses, Social Security Numbers or any other personal data which 
could be used to identify individuals remain invisible in the exhibits. The corporate 
addresses of Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International are at times included 
to add ‘life’ to the presented archival data, although this is not regarded as sensitive 
information as it is publicly available. Names of employees are stated where 
relevant, the reason being that identifying employees enables the understanding of 
discussions. However, no private or sensitive matters are discussed in the 
correspondence reproduced at any point in the study.  
The archival data was subject to a number of procedures regarding its use and 
storage which further ensured participants’ right to autonomy. Holders of the 
Archives both at the University of Houston and the London Hilton on Park Lane were 
informed about the aims of the study and the researcher was granted permission to 
use the archival material (see Appendix 1). All sources used in the study are 
acknowledged, using either footnotes or the Harvard style of referencing and no 
copyrights have been violated. The main condition for using material from the Hilton 
Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives was to use the Archives’ watermark 
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which is visible in exhibits. All data gathered was stored on a password-protected 
hard drive and was at no point made available to any third party.  It was used solely 
for the purpose of this study and the dissemination of knowledge directly resulting 
from this study, e.g. related conference presentations.   
Finally, the research process was overseen by the academic community at the 
University of West London and peers concerned with this study. 
 
3.11. Note on limitations of this study 
Throughout this chapter it became clear that quantitative and qualitative researchers 
are driven by distinctly different paradigms and philosophical assumptions. 
Therefore, what is considered to be a limitation for the former is often seen as an 
advantage by the latter group. There are, however, some limitations of methodology 
which transpired in the course of the research. First of all, limited availability of 
sources is considered to be the key constraint. This is the challenge faced by all 
business historians because they can only construct their understanding based on 
what is available to them. It is clear that a historian will never have such in-depth and 
real-time access to sources of information as an ethnographer would. Historians 
cannot make observations, cannot experience the events they study or often even 
speak to people who were involved in such events. This is, however, the very nature 
of historical study and it cannot be considered its weakness; it simply should not be 
compared to other types of qualitative research.  
There was one limitation connected with using NVivo10. As noted earlier, material 
from the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives was recorded by digital 
pictures. This made it impossible to search material by key words (which is possible 
when using Word or PDF files). It was therefore necessary to manually highlight 
relevant areas of each picture and code them under individual themes. Nvivo was, 
nevertheless a useful tool which allowed for efficient categorisation of data.  
Finally, another researcher could choose other themes and codes or even construct 
a different conceptual framework to analyse data. It is possible that they would, as a 
result, arrive at different conclusions. This is, however, the nature of interpretive 
study, that it is constructed and presented from the author’s perspective. As argued 
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throughout this chapter, it was not the aim of this research to create an objective and 
generalizable study. Data collection and analysis are carefully explained so that 
undertaking a similar study is possible.  
Emphasis should be placed on the fact that it is a multidisciplinary study which 
incorporates knowledge from many different areas. In that it is different from pieces 
of research which focus on one issue but employ multiple cases to study them. 
Limitations of this study, including some limitations of its methodology are discussed 
in more detail in Conclusions in Chapter 9.  
 
3.12. Summary 
This is a business history research utilising the method of a single embedded case 
study to achieve its aim. It derives mainly from the constructionism epistemology and 
interpretive theoretical perspective which is also associated with the institutional 
paradigm. It addresses the recent discourse about methodology in business history 
in that it explores issues concerned with globalisation and in that it applies a broad 
conceptual framework to analyse findings (Hansen 2012, Jones et al. 2012). It is 
also hoped that this research can serve as a platform for further investigations which 
could focus on hypothesis testing, as advocated by de Jong et al. (2015).  
The theoretical framework established by concepts concerned with MNC’s and their 
internationalisation predicated data collection and analysis. These follow the 
framework suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). The analysis utilises three 
stages of coding which range from descriptive codes to finding relationships between 
the individual elements.  
Finally, this research adopts a range of tools suggested by Creswell and Miller 
(2000) and Miles and Huberman (1994) to ensure its quality. The following Chapter 4 
constitutes the first stage of data analysis, the case study.  
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Part 2 – The embedded case  
Constructing the case study is a key objective set for this research. This stems from 
the nature of this study. It is natural that, when using the case study method, 
qualitative data is being analysed as the narrative is being written. Part 2 of this 
thesis, consequently, serves not only as the presentation of data, but also as the first 
stage in its analysis. It begins with contextualising the case in its wider historical and 
social context, following its multiple-embeddedness model presented in Figure 4-1. 
Having established the historical and social contexts, the case study focuses on 
Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International, beginning with the founder, 
Conrad Hilton. Finally, the case study discusses the opening and early development 
of the London Hilton, the company’s first foray into the UK.  
 
4. The English and American contexts  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to set the historical context of the study of Hilton Hotels and its 
international expansion. It serves as a brief overview of the development of hotel 
industries in the UK and US throughout the decades. The focus is specifically placed 
on grand and luxury hotels as in-depth discussion on lodging industries at large 
would be beyond the scope of this study. The chapter first studies the historical 
development of grand hotels in London. Moving chronologically, it then discusses the 
socio-cultural context of London in the 1960s and how it was influenced by the 
process of Americanisation. After that, following the depiction of Hilton’s multiple-
embeddedness in Figure 4-1, it then shifts to discussing the development of hotels in 
America. It also provides a comparison of the early hotel-keeping practices in 
England and in America to fully understand the similarities and differences between 
hotel industries in these countries. 
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Figure 4-1. Multiple-embeddedness of the London Hilton 
Source: Author’s visualisation 
 
4.2. English context  
4.2.1. Early development of grand hotels in London 
The majority of London grand hotels developed from the tradition of gentlemen clubs 
which flourished around the St James’s and Mayfair area from the middle of the 18th 
century. They remain in operation to this day (Borer 1972, Slattery 2009). These 
include the Boodles, Brookes, Oxford and Cambridge, Athenaeum, Carlton and 
Reform clubs. Gentlemen’s clubs provided facilities for meeting like-minded people, 
as well as dining and accommodation facilities and they therefore left their footprint 
on the style and service offered in grand hotels. Gentlemen’s clubs have always 
been bastions of tradition and have resisted modern changes (Slattery, 2009) which 
might have had an impact on the traditional feel of London grand hotels.   
Chapter 4.2 
Chapter 4.4  
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Early grand hotels, including Grillion’s, Gordon’s and The Pulteney were established 
either from transformed gentlemen’s clubs or in former mansions of the wealthy 
members of society located in central London. As a result they were often relatively 
small and restricted in terms of redevelopment. They were often opened not by the 
British but by French chefs or butlers who previously served in noble houses, both in 
the UK and on the Continent and who had fled France in the advent of the French 
Revolution (Borer 1972, Sheppardson 1991). Their influential relationships with 
employers and the connections established whilst working for the upper classes 
were said to have granted them loyal customers (Taylor and Bush 1974). It was, 
therefore, their servants and not the members of the upper classes themselves who 
were interested in developing businesses. This reflected the traditional approach of 
society in which it was not deemed appropriate for the upper classes to engage in 
commercial business, rather preferring managing their family estates.  
The first large hotels in England which were built on a truly grand scale followed the 
development of railways and were “geared to the progress of the railways” (Taylor, 
2003: 35). The first of this type was the Victoria at Euston Station which opened in 
1839 (Slattery, 2009) and was later followed by the Great Western Royal Hotel 
(1854), The Grosvenor Hotel (1861), Charing Cross Hotel (1865), The Midland 
Grand Hotel (1873) and The Great Central Hotel (1899), (see Borer 1972, Taylor and 
Bush 1974, Inwood 1998 and Trend 2011). The development of the railway brought 
distinct changes to the size, location and provision of hotels. Trains carried many 
more people than stage coaches and they significantly reduced the length of 
journeys (Slattery, 2009). People stayed considerably longer in these hotels than 
they would in coaching inns, creating demand for additional facilities including 
laundry, provision of meals, as well as for entertainment in reading rooms and 
lounges. Borer (1972) states that the difference between service offered by railway 
hotels and coaching inns can be compared to the comfort provided by rail travel as 
opposed to the hazards of travelling by coach, and that railway hotels gave the 
middle-class travellers an opportunity of experiencing luxury for the first time. These 
mid-market hotels were the first examples of hotel chains in Britain, however, they 
were not uniformly branded. Slattery (2009) highlights that railway hotels, just like 
grand hotels, did not invest in any kind of advertising, but they benefited from the 
relationship with railways which created steady demand. The emergence of railway 
93 
 
hotels changed the landscape of the hotel market in all major cities of the UK, 
including London. They not only added to the provision of accommodation in the 
capital but also enhanced competitiveness between hotels. The Midland Railway, 
one of the railway companies involved in building hotels along their networks, 
recognised this competition and committed Sir Gilbert Scott to design the Midland 
Grand Hotel at St. Pancras Station. This was at the time, and still is today, one of the 
most extravagant and exotic hotel designs to be seen in London (Taylor and Bush 
1974). Railway hotels expanded quickly, often at high cost to their parent companies, 
and by 1900 there were approximately 165 of them country-wide (Borer 1972). Many 
of these hotels remain still in operation, often under the management of hotel MNCs.  
Some of the early hotel chains were developed by Gordon Hotels and the Trust 
House Company. Gordon Hotels operated four properties in London and another 
nine in costal resorts in the UK and France, while Trust House acquired existing 
coaching inns and mid-market hotels to control 71 properties by 1919 and to grow 
the portfolio to 222 hotels by the outbreak of the Second World War (Borer 1972, 
Slattery 2009). Trust House hotels benefited greatly from the popularity of motor cars 
in the 1920s and provided accommodation for those exploring the English 
countryside. They gained high reputation for reliability and good value for moderate 
charges (Borer 1972: 243). 
One key aspect which has always differentiated England and other European 
countries from America is the presence of royalty. London for centuries has been 
one of the largest and most prosperous capitals in Europe and significant on the 
political, economic and social map (Porter 2000, Ackroyd 2001). For these reasons it 
has been regularly visited by the aristocracy from Europe as well as other countries 
around the world. More importantly, local hotels, restaurants and gentlemen’s clubs 
have frequently been patronised by the English upper classes and royalty. This has 
influenced the development of a certain type of market and hotels which needed to 
provide an appropriate standard of service.  It also created a ‘natural’ quality rating 
system. Hotels thus patronised were automatically assigned a grand and/or luxury 
status. The popularity of London grand hotels amongst members of the upper 
classes from across Europe quickly enabled smaller hotels to give way to the larger 
ones which began to bear more the appearances of palaces rather than gentlemen’s 
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clubs (Taylor 1974). The Langham, opened in 1865, was the first purpose-built hotel 
of this type (Slattery 2009). Borer (1972: 190) highlights the fact that the latter was 
the first to correspond to the “vastness of modern demands”. Its facilities included 
large dining and drawing rooms, post, telegraph and parcel offices as well as billiard 
and smoking rooms. All floors were connected by a lift which was a novelty in 
London at the time (Borer 1972). The hotel had 300 toilets and 14 public lavatories 
as well as its own artesian well and steam laundry. Hot and cold running water was 
available in every room and, since it was targeted at rich customers, the hotel 
provided separate quarters for customers’ servants (Slattery 2009). 
Another hotel which had a significant impact on the hotel market in London was The 
Savoy, opened by Richard D’Oyly Carte on the Strand in 1889. From its very early 
days The Savoy brought entertainment to its fashionable patrons, having been 
planned by D’Oyly Carte as a venue for those frequenting the Savoy Theatre. 
Inwood (1998: 649) believes that Richard D’Oyly Carte “brought American standards 
of comfort to London with the Savoy”. D’Oyly Carte’s most influential business 
decision was however the one to employ Cesar Ritz as the general manager. Ritz, 
together with Auguste Escoffier who became the head chef, changed the way hotel 
services were provided in London. Cesar Ritz is still considered one of the greatest 
hotel keepers because of his innovative approach to hotel management (Borer 
1972).  
The fact that it was often French chefs and butlers who managed early London 
grand hotels was previously stressed, however, a particular role in the development 
of the hotel and restaurant scene was played by the influence of French cuisine. 
Gatley (2012) argues that while French practices of cooking and eating were not 
heavily impacted by the economic and industrial developments of the Nineteenth 
Century, British national and regional cooking styles almost vanished. The main 
reason for this, Gatley (2012) argues, was the rapid industrialisation of Britain. 
People who previously lived in the countryside and worked in agriculture moved to 
cities to seek employment in factories. Lack of access to fresh produce and 
increasing numbers of women in full-time employment contributed to the fact that dry 
foods and meals sold by street vendors became the core of worker’s diet. As a result 
of these rapid changes, Britain almost lost its indigenous culinary culture (Lane 
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2010). French food culture, on the other hand, was disturbed to a much lesser extent 
and preserved the rural cooking traditions. These differences contributed to the fact 
that in France cooking was considered to be a prosperous career and many men 
trained to achieve the chef status (Taylor and Bush 1974). In Britain, on the other 
hand, cooking was associated with daily chores and was not respected as a career 
(Gatley 2012). Consequently, with the development of London grand hotels and the 
influx of French chefs to British capital, it was the French cuisine that was considered 
to be of high class and was referred to as “haute cuisine” (Taylor and Bush 1974). 
Auguste Escoffier introduced the principles of production line to the Savoy’s kitchen 
which allowed for the popularisation of à la carte menu (Taylor and Bush 1974). 
Restaurant menus were written in French which became a standard practice in 
Britain for many years to come (see Exhibit 77 for the menu from the London Hilton 
opening Luncheon written in French). Consequently, French cuisine and chefs, 
including Escoffier, were the ones responsible for making dining out a popular form 
of entertainment.  
Further examples of grand hotels which continue to operate to this day include 
Claridge’s, the Dorchester and the Ritz. Claridge’s, in its current form was opened in 
1897. The operation of its predecessor with the same name began from a small, 
single house hotel run by William and Marianne Claridge. Following several 
architectural alterations it was finally bought by Richard D’Oyly Carte and 
demolished in order to build a more modern Claridge’s (Maybourne Hotel Group 
2012). It was said to be one of the most luxurious and expensive hotels in London, 
but evidence to document this was lost during the demolition of the original hotel 
(Borer 1972). It is known, however, that Claridge’s, whether in its current or previous 
form, has always been particularly popular with royalty (Maybourne Hotel Group 
2012). This differentiates it from The Savoy which has instead been associated with 
entertainment and celebrities (Borer 1972).  
The youngest of the hotels considered to be the ‘grand dames’ of the London hotel 
market is The Dorchester on Park Lane which opened to the public in 1931. Despite 
being opened eight years before the breakout of the Second World War, this hotel 
celebrated its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, decades of particular influx of 
Americans to London. The Dorchester, alongside Claridge’s is believed to have been 
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popular with the Royal Family, despite the fact that it tended to be more American in 
style (Sheppardson 1991). Sheppardson comments about this cultural change: 
 “Finally, there was a shift in the social values of the day that resulted 
in a sexual and youth revolution that was to culminate in the 1960s. 
The process began in the 1950s with the emergence of such new 
ideals as the ‘Sex Kitten’, started by Marilyn Monroe, the ‘rebel’ 
symbolized by James Dean, the new musical beat, popularized by 
‘Elvis’ and the debut of Playboy magazine in 1953.” (Sheppardson 
1991: 84) 
The Dorchester hotel is said to have been in the centre of this shift (Sheppardson 
1991, Dorchester Collection 2014) and together with the Grosvenor House Hotel, 
opened in 1929, made Park Lane “resemble Fifth Avenue, only without skyscrapers” 
(Porter 1980: 332). The London Hilton on Park Lane was to add the missing element 
in 1963.  
The history of hotels would not be complete without mentioning the critical events of 
the World Wars which influenced not only the hotel industry but the overall 
economic, political and social situation of many countries. The British Isles, as 
opposed to other European countries were not invaded during either of the World 
Wars, but many buildings, especially in London, were destroyed during the bombings 
of the Second World War (Inwood 1998). This War also changed the services 
offered by the London grand hotels. Naturally, almost all leisure demand ceased and 
many hotels were taken over by the government to accommodate civil service 
departments which had to be evacuated from their offices or they were used to 
shelter refugees. The grand hotels of London became havens for officials, diplomats, 
officers, journalists and members of foreign royal families (Taylor 1974). Claridge’s, 
The Savoy, The Langham, The Ritz and The Dorchester all boast on their websites 
about playing an important role in the War years and hosting prominent guests1. 
Famous are the stories of survival in the times of food and fuel rationing, the lack of 
male staff and the requirement for blackouts. These events, however, stalled any 
                                            
 
1
 http://www.claridges.co.uk/about-the-hotel/history/; http://www.fairmont.com/savoy-
london/hotelhistory/; https://www.dorchestercollection.com/en/london/the-dorchester/history-of-the-
dorchester/; http://www.theritzlondon.com/history-ritz/  
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development of the industry and no new hotels were built in London between 1939 
and 1945.  
 
4.2.2. Developments in the British hotel industry after the Second World War 
In the decades following the Second World War the tourism and the hotel industries 
gradually regenerated alongside other industries. When fuel became de-rationed and 
growing numbers of people could afford a car, day trips became popular. The 
development of motorways also enabled longer trips to be taken.  With the growing 
proportion of people in full-time employment who had paid holiday allowance, people 
started to spend summer holidays at seaside resorts. In the 1960s, the majority of 
British families still spent their holidays in Britain, and the trend for overseas travel 
only began to develop in the 1970s (Slattery 2009, Taylor 2001). When taking 
holidays, British people would usually travel to seaside resorts and not to London 
which was, in turn, the prime destination in Britain for international tourists. An 
innovative initiative was undertaken by ‘Stardust Mini Holidays’ which promoted short 
package breaks in London (Taylor 2001). The package would include rail 
transportation, accommodation and food. It proved to be very popular (Taylor and 
Bush 1974) and increased leisure demand for hotel accommodation. 
London was, as it always had been, a hub for business which was developing at a 
fast pace in the decades after the war. The growing public, finance and retail 
services all contributed to the growth in accommodation demand (Slattery 2009). 
Slattery (2009) believes that people who worked in these tertiary industries were 
required to travel around the country for business, hence triggering business 
demand. In addition, enhanced access to higher education resulted in demand not 
only for accommodation but also for conference space in hotels (Slattery 2009).  
Foreign inbound travel developed rapidly, encouraged by the London Olympic 
Games in 1948 and the Festival of Britain in 1951 (Inwood 1998). Figure 4-2 
presents the increase in international arrivals between 1961 and 1970. 1963 saw the 
establishment of the London Tourism Board (Middleton and Lickorish 2005) whose 
aim was to promote the city as a tourist destination. The most significant influence on 
the number of foreign visitors to Britain and London was, however, the development 
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of trans-Atlantic flights (by 1970 20% of all UK visitors came from North America, 
(Slattery 2009)). Flights took a considerably shorter time than traditional sea crossing 
and were less expensive. Figure 4-3 presents a comparison of the number of arrivals 
via air and sea.  
 
Figure 4-2. Number of international visits to the UK 
Source: Author’s chart based on data from Office for National Statistics (2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Comparison between international arrivals by air and sea 
Source: Author’s chart based on data from Office for National Statistics (2010) 
 
 
Slattery (2009) estimates that foreign demand for British hotels in 1950 accounted 
for 3 million room-nights, this had doubled by 1960 and went on to reach 31million by 
1980 (Slattery 2009). Inwood (1998) highlights that many international visits could 
have been triggered by the gradual devaluation of sterling. Foreign visitors spent 
£190million in 1964 and £432 million in 1970. The categories which triggered most 
demand for hotel accommodation were business travellers and holidaymakers. 
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International customers, as opposed to the domestic market, would often choose 
London as their destination.  
The growing demand for hotel accommodation in London was recognised by 
investors and local authorities and in 1960 the ‘Caterer and Hotelkeeper’ reported 
that London had not experienced such a large hotel building programme since the 
1930s and that at least five new hotels were in the pipeline (Caterer and Hotelkeeper 
1978 cited in Slattery 2009). The biggest development was seen, however, amongst 
acquisitions by hotel chains. The main hotel acquisitions in London in the 1960s are 
presented in Table 4-1.  
Company Major acquisitions (number of rooms in brackets) 
Grand Metropolitan Piccadilly Hotel (265), Europa Hotel (300), Mayfair Hotel 
(290), Britannia Hotel (437)   
Forte London Airport Hotel (440), Russell Hotel (370), 
Kensington Close (500) 
Trust Houses  Grosvenor House (450) 
Oddenino’s Royal Garden Hotel (500) 
Rank Organisation  Royal Lancaster (392) 
Centre Hotels Heathrow Airport Hotel (300), Bloomsbury Centre (310), 
Regent Centre (330) 
Table 4-1. Major hotel acquisitions in the 1960s London 
Source: Adaptation of data from Slattery (2009) 
 
 
The largest increase in hotel provision came in the first years of the 1970s due to the 
Hotel Development Incentive scheme (HDI), introduced as part of the 1960 Tourism 
Development Act. The Act was passed to enable the hotel industry to progress and 
to address growing demand (Middleton and Lickorish 2005). It is estimated that by 
1974 there were 20,000 rooms added in London as a result of this scheme, although 
they were mostly in small hotels (Slattery 2009).   
In contrast to the US, there were few hotel chain companies operating in the UK after 
the Second World War. One of the first was British Transport Hotels (BTH) (Carter 
1990) serving railway termini, which was established in 1947 with 57 hotels in its 
portfolio. 18 had been sold by the mid-1950s due to poor performance. Trust House 
Company, which was established before the Second World War and which was at its 
peak with 222 hotels in 1938 (Middleton and Lickorish 2005) was still in operation but 
focused on restructuring its portfolio instead of acquiring new hotels (Slattery 2009). 
In 1972 it controlled ten properties in London and another 171 around the country. 
Similarly to the pre-War years, it catered mainly for the middle-class market (Borer 
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1972). Another chain which operated primarily in London was Grand Metropolitan 
Hotels created by Maxwell Joseph in the 1950s (Middleton and Lickorish 2005). 
Such chains were, however, relatively small and could not benefit greatly from 
advantages of economies of scale. Hotels in these chains were either owned or 
leased because the franchise and management contract models were not commonly 
used at the time (Bell 1993). This heavily limited the investment opportunities of 
these companies. More importantly, according to Slattery (2009) hotels in these 
shorter chains did not operate under one brand and could not benefit from brand 
recognition (this was one of the major features which differentiated Hilton hotels). 
 
4.2.3. Socio-cultural situation of the 1960’s Britain 
Much is written about the various changes which were taking place in 1960s Britain. 
Terms including “swinging sixties”, “rock ’n’ roll”, “Labour Government” and “Carnaby 
Street” all appear when one researches 1960s Britain or 1960s London. The 1960s 
saw the change in the British Government from the Conservative to Labour Party as 
well as many changes in the demographic, racial and cultural profile of society. This 
section of the chapter discusses the many issues which had an impact on the British 
society of the 1960s and the changes which took place during this decade. It will look 
at the demographic conditions and cultural change as well as economic factors 
which shaped the reality of the 1960s. This thesis focuses on the London context but 
it would be impossible to discuss the circumstances in London without considering 
the rest of the UK.  
 
a. Changing demographic, economic and cultural environments  
One of the first factors which are mentioned in the literature (Time 1966, Sandbrook 
2006b) in respect to the 1960s is the large proportion of young people in society.  
Many Western nations, including the US and the UK enjoyed what became known as 
the ‘baby boomer’ period. These are people who were born in the immediate years 
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following the Second World War (exact years varied between countries) and who in 
the 1960s were in their late teens or early twenties. It is estimated that in the 1960s 
nearly 30% of the UK population were between 15 and 34 years old2. Such a large 
proportion of young people had a direct impact on the rapidly changing trends in 
music and fashion which was noticeable nation-wide, although the literature and 
press refer mostly to London when discussing the term ‘swinging sixties’. The Time 
Magazine published a special article on ‘Swinging London’ in 1966 (presented in 
Exhibit 1). Time claimed that London was the city of the decade, where young 
people walked the streets in colourful, ‘trendy’ clothes and listened to British music 
by the Beatles and The Who. The article stated that “buildings and skirts went high”. 
Due to post-War hardship of the late 1940s and early 1950s young people were 
increasingly moving to London to seek employment. London was also the destination 
glorified in songs and movies and young people wanted to enjoy a lifestyle they had 
heard about (Benyahia, White and Gaffney 2008). National Service for men had 
been abolished in 1960 and young men were undertaking employment straight after 
leaving school. Shops with fashion for men, or ‘boys’ as the Time Magazine called 
them in 1966, opened on and around Carnaby Street (Inwood 1998, Lester 2010), 
which became a destination in itself for young, fashion-conscious people. Benyahia 
et al. (2008: 235) argues that ‘swinging Britain’ is the term which relates to:  
“Changes in a whole range of attitudes, behaviours and moralities 
where Britain finally shook off the bleak, post-War way of living, where 
caution, practicality, repression and obedience were the norms. (…) 
With full employment, young people had a greater disposable income, 
and music and fashion came to dominate the culture. Confident in 
peace and prosperity, this ‘swinging’ approach developed across 
social boundaries, and an ‘anything goes’ attitude was popularized.” 
This highlights how people’s attitudes were changing, together with new trends in 
music and fashion and also how one triggered the other.  
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Exhibit 1. Time Magazine, 15th April 1966 cover 
 
The growing numbers of residents in London put pressure on housing (Inwood 
1998). What also contributed to the housing problem was the extent of damages 
caused by the London bombing during the war (Ackroyd 2001). Young people, for 
the first time, started sharing accommodation and renting individual rooms, which 
possibly also contributed to the so-called ‘sexual revolution’ (Porter 2000). People 
from this generation believed they were fighting against authority and against the 
establishment which was expressed by their clothes, hairstyles and behaviour.  In 
1961 the contraceptive pill was made legally available, first to married women, and 
then in 1967 to everyone (NHS 2013), which is also seen as a factor which made 
citizens feel more in control of their own lives (Middleton and Lickorish 2005). It is 
worth noting that although legal, the pill was not widely accepted and made available 
for another few years.  
Despite the initial difficulties with housing, the 1960s are still considered to be the 
decade of life becoming easier and the society becoming richer. It is also referred to 
in the literature as ‘The Golden Age of Capitalism’ (Skidelsky 2009) as the age of 
rapid increase in prosperity in the post – Second World War decades. The exact 
dates of this ‘economic boom’ vary from country to country but it is generally agreed 
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that it began in the first years of the 1950s (Middleton 2010) and finished between 
1971 (the collapse of the Bretton Wood system) and 1973 (the oil crisis) (Skidelsky 
2009). It is connected with a number of changes in the economy which had an effect 
on the whole society. First of all, growing productivity led to an increased number of 
people in full-time employment and consequently increasing disposable income. 
Weekly earnings were believed to outstrip the cost of living by 183% nationally (in 
London this figure was believed to be even higher)3 and an increasing proportion of 
the society was working in so-called ‘white collar’ jobs and in services (Giddens 
2006). Inwood (1998) states that an important source of new jobs in services sector 
was the tourism industry. The turn from a manufacturing to a service-based economy 
had an impact on the retail sector which began to change dramatically in the post-
War years. Daily shopping in local groceries was gradually replaced by irregular 
visits to supermarkets which began to open in the UK in the late 1950s (Alexander, 
Shaw and Curth 2004). Such a model of shopping was facilitated by increasing 
access to refrigerators, freezers and cars, which were usually bought on credit, not 
previously available (Peston 2015). Workers, therefore, could afford more and could, 
gradually, enjoy a lifestyle similar to the one enjoyed by members of the middle 
class. This led to the development of an ‘affluent worker’ and the notion that “the 
differences between the middle class and working class are disappearing, with well-
paid manual workers merging into the middle class” (Browne 2011: 35). People 
could enjoy various forms of entertainment which consequently contributed to the 
development of restaurants, bars and fashion shops nationwide.  
Fordism is yet another concept which helps describe changes in the economic 
environment. Even though Henry Ford adopted the assembly line and revolutionized 
the market by providing workers with sufficient income to buy the produced goods in 
the early Twentieth Century, Fordism refers also to the post – Second World War 
development of capitalism (Giddens 2006). This period saw the development of 
trade unions and their increasing power to negotiate working conditions, wages and 
benefits which all contributed to the further establishment of the ‘affluent worker’. The 
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increasing confidence of workers had an impact on their consumption of the goods, 
therefore creating a mass market and promoting greater productivity gains. This 
cycle is believed to have ended in the 1970s, together with an increased proportion 
of people working in the service sector, bringing greater flexibility, but at the same 
time uncertainty as to working conditions (Giddens 2006).  
Another aspect which contributed to making people’s lives easier was the 
development of technology and the growing access to this technology. Never before 
had people access to so many home appliances which made daily chores much less 
time consuming and gave, especially women, more leisure time. British homes were 
suddenly equipped with washing machines, vacuum cleaners and freezers. 
According to Sandbrook (2006a), these appliances, alongside cars, increasingly 
became symbols of status and welfare. Also, reducing the time spent on household 
chores went hand in hand with growing numbers of women in full-time employment 
(Slattery 2009). Being a housewife was no longer the only option a woman could 
take. Together with various home appliances and with the rising numbers of women 
in employment came ready-made meals which first appeared in America in 1953. 
They were advertised as time-saving and convenient and had the additional benefit 
of being served on trays so that they could be eaten in front of the TV, another new 
arrival to British homes (Winterman 2013). Sandbrook (2006a: 391) quotes Doris 
Lessing:   
“Before, when the men came back from work, the tea was already on 
the table, a fire was roaring, the radio emitted words of music softly in 
a corner, they washed and sat down at their places, with the woman, 
the child and whoever else in the house could be inveigled 
downstairs…They all talked… 
And then…television had arrived and sat like a toad in the corner of 
the kitchen. Soon the big kitchen table had been pushed along the 
wall chairs were installed in a semi-circle and, on their chair arms, the 
swivelling supper trays. It was the end of an exuberant verbal culture”.   
This quotation illustrates how the increasing TV ownership, amongst other 
developments, influenced family life and contributed to the wider socio-cultural 
changes in the society. Furthermore, there seemed to be a growing trend of 
choosing to stay at home to drink alcohol, instead of doing so in a pub (the number 
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of off-licence shops grew four times faster than the number of pubs between 1966 
and 1968) (Slattery 2009), which also had an impact on people’s social lives.  
The feeling of security of the 1960s was further enhanced by the development of the 
‘welfare state’, which in Britain is connected with the establishment of the NHS in 
1948. The NHS for the first time granted free healthcare to all citizens (NHS 2013). 
Other changes brought by the ‘welfare state’ included paid holiday, social security 
system with a portfolio of benefits, council housing and free and compulsory 
education (Browne 2011) until the age of 16. As a result of all these improvements in 
economic conditions and the rising feeling of security, Harold Macmillan, the 
Conservative Prime Minister at the time stated that “most of our people have never 
had it so good” (Sandbrook 2006a), which is also the title of Sandbrook’s book about 
this period.  
The changes discussed applied to the whole of UK, but as suggested earlier, were 
mostly visible in London. This is where access to entertainment was greater and 
where people had more disposable income to enjoy it. The London bar and 
restaurant scene was suddenly compared to those of New York and Paris4. 
‘Conspicuous consumption’, the phenomenon examined by Thorstein Veblen already 
in the 19th century (Veblen 1899), was especially visible amongst young people who 
did not feel the need to worry about the future due to the protection of the ‘welfare 
state’ and who could spend their disposable income on leisure. They were the group 
targeted by the emerging businesses (Slattery 2009). Time (1966) published a map 
with the key points of ‘swinging London’ which is presented in Exhibit 2. It is 
essential to note, that apart from shops, bars and clubs there are only two other 
locations marked on this map, Buckingham Palace and the London Hilton. There is 
no explanation in the article as to why the London Hilton is the only hotel marked on 
this map, but it can be clearly seen that the London Hilton was perceived to be in the 
very centre of the Swinging London.  
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Exhibit 2. Map of the key attraction of the 'Swinging London' according to Time Magazine, 1966
5
 
 
 
b. Changes in the political scene 
The introduction to this chapter mentioned that the 1960s was also a decade of 
political change in the UK. There was a shift from the ruling Conservative Party to a 
Labour Government. This came as a result of the increasing influence of the ‘affluent 
worker’ and the general national mood of Britain losing its status as the Empire. 
British colonies gained independence, the Cold War was threatening the whole 
Western world and the Suez Crisis became known as a factor which “contributed 
significantly to Britain's decline as a world power” (Peden 2012). Various members of 
the Conservative Government were involved in political scandals including the 
‘Profumo affair’. As a result of these and other factors, the general election in 1964 
was won by the Labour Party led by Harold Wilson. He was, in line with the ‘baby 
boomer’ trend, one of the youngest Prime Ministers (he was 47 at the time of taking 
the Prime Minister’s role). He was also determined to highlight his working class 
background, which was to bring him support from the masses of the working class. 
He spoke with a strong Yorkshire accent, smoked a pipe in public (despite the fact 
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that he was believed to have preferred cigars) and claimed to enjoy the popular TV 
serial ‘Coronation Street’ at leisure, as opposed to reading classic poetry like his 
Conservative predecessor Harold Macmillan (Sandbrook 2006a). He had a vision of 
an ‘optimistic new Britain’ where citizens could benefit from scientific and 
technological developments. Most importantly, however, he was very supportive 
towards the young and was a strong advocate for minimising the disparities between 
different social classes. He himself stated that he had been raised a Yorkshire boy, 
but was later educated in Oxford, so he could not see the need for defining his class 
status. Such an approach was very new to the British society which in the 1950s was 
believed to be conservative and “class obsessed” (Sandbrook 2006b). This means 
that people valued stability and order and automatically placed themselves in a 
certain class and the majority of them did not seek to change this status quo. 
Sandbrook (2006b), however, believes that what the young and affluent people 
wanted to see was a “classless” society. It could be suggested that due to the rising 
disposable income, an increasing number of people working in ‘white collar’ jobs and 
their access to consumer goods and leisure activities previously available only to the 
middle class, the differences between classes became to blend (Browne 2011). The 
working class could increasingly afford to behave like the middle class, while clerical 
workers, who were previously associated with the middle class, were gradually 
beginning to lose status (Giddens 2006). The reason for this was that firstly, with the 
development of services industry more people worked in clerical jobs and secondly, 
wider access to higher education made career progression more difficult (according 
to Browne (2011) managers would often be recruited from university graduates 
rather than promoted from the existing employees). This is not to suggest that class 
stratification was suddenly removed, but rather that due to various economic and 
social changes, visible differences between classes were becoming less obvious.  
The 1960s was also a decade of many changes in the racial structure of the British 
society. After the Second World War citizens of many British colonies were 
encouraged to come to Britain (Inwood 1998). Many of them came with hopes for 
better life standards than offered in their home countries. The biggest influx of 
immigrants from the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent came between 1958 
and 1962 (Inwood 1998), but by 1961 the number of West Indians in London only 
exceeded 100,000. This added to the difficulties with housing discussed earlier but 
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also caused many issues related to racial discrimination, including the Notting Hill 
Riots in 1958 (Inwood 1998). The race Relations Act was passed in 1965 and it 
outlawed any acts of race discrimination which was to contribute to London 
becoming a more multicultural city (without managing to completely eliminate 
discriminatory incidents).  
Despite rising living standards, increasing economic stability, the availability of 
welfare and credit as well as the generally positive mood, not everyone was so 
positive about the changes which came about in the 1960s. Time (1966) reported 
that those who preferred the older and quieter London found its ‘swinging’ side too 
vulgar and decadent. Traditionally the upper classes were finding it difficult to accept 
the trend towards amalgamation between classes and the rising status of ‘affluent 
worker’. Society, which despite all the changes was still relatively conservative 
(Sandbrook 2006b), was slow in accepting liberalisation of sexual behaviour and 
social norms. This liberalisation was also heavily criticised in the following decades. 
According to Sandbrook (2006b) Tony Blair went as far as to say in 2004 that the 
1960s were to blame for raising people without parental discipline, proper role 
models and a sense of responsibility. Peter Hitchens arguably expressed a similar 
opinion by claiming that traditional tenets like patriotism, sexual restraint and a 
commitment to religion lost value and as a result, people lost faith in their national 
pride and identity (Sandbrook 2006a). They began to look abroad for new models of 
behaviour and day-to-day solutions which were completely mismatched with what 
Britain used to be like.   
Consequently, it seems that the 1960s was the decade of change. People still 
preferred British products, television programmes and cuisine, but they were 
increasingly exposed to new ways of life, influenced by the media, supermarkets, 
access to credit and more leisure time and disposable money. American companies, 
which were becoming more visible in Britain, gave an impression of being successful 
while American media and marketing communication circulated images of happy and 
wealthy people. British people did not have a favourable opinion about Americans, 
many believing them to be materialistic, with little freedom of thought and putting 
great pressure on conformity (Sandbrook 2006a). With time, however, British society 
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began adopting American products, services and practices. The following section 
discusses this phenomenon and its historical and economic roots.  
 
4.3. Americanisation  
It has been shown that London of the 1960s was a dynamic environment with 
numerous cultural, social and economic changes taking place. The previous section 
discussed the socio-cultural changes in the British society as well the economic 
developments which had an impact upon it. To add to these transformations, British 
economy and business were also influenced by America due to a range of post-War 
recovery programmes. Americanisation of the European economy and culture has 
been discussed by a number of scholars ranging from economists to sociologists. 
The Oxford Handbook of Post-War European History devotes a whole chapter to this 
issue calling the twentieth century ‘The American Century’ (Gassert 2012). Schröter 
(2005) argues that Americanisation of the European economy came in three waves, 
beginning from the early twentieth century, reaching its pinnacle in the 1950s and 
coming into the final stage in the 1980s. Americanisation of businesses is discussed 
in the context of various industries including the automobile (Elger and Smith 2011) 
and retail (Alexander et al. 2004) industries. There is also a number of works which 
use individual American companies as reflections of the world-wide economic and 
social changes including ‘The McDonaldization of Society’ (Ritzer 2008) and ‘The 
Disneyization of Society’ (Bryman 2004). Alexander et. al. (2004: 568) highlight, 
however, that Americanisation “refers to changing patterns of behaviour rather than 
some events frozen in time” and that it was a process which occurred in both formal 
and informal ways. This means that it involved not only specific management 
practices but also the broader cultural impact.  
This section discusses the role American capital and culture played in the 1950s and 
1960s, the years of the London Hilton development. It begins with the historical 
outlook on the process of Americanisation and then discusses the nature of this 
process.  
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4.3.1. Historical outline 
In April 1948, three years after the Second World War was over, the American 
Government proposed a plan whose aim was to support Europe in recovering its 
economy by rebuilding the devastated regions, modernising the industry and 
removing trade barriers. The plan was to be called the European Recovery Program6 
(ERP) but it became more recognisable by its unofficial name of the Marshall Plan 
(after George Marshall, the US Secretary of State at the time). European countries 
which accepted the offer (all the countries of the Eastern Bloc rejected it) were to 
prepare their national redevelopment plans whose execution would be funded by the 
US government. This began the expansion of American foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Europe. American FDI was spreading quickly but it was not evenly 
distributed. In the 1950s investment in Europe constituted 14.7% of the world total 
and rose to 31.4% in the 1970s. Until 1963, however, more than a half of the 
invested funds went to the UK and then they gradually moved to France and 
Germany. The Marshall Plan focused on more tangible aspects of the economy and 
only the European Productivity Agency which was created in 1953 focused more on 
the intangible resources including the transference of American business 
proceedings, habits and values. Europeans began to be informed about American 
methods of running businesses and American businessmen and trade union 
representatives were sent to Europe to inform their European counterparts about 
American organisations and methods (Schröter 2005). In Britain, this kind of 
cooperation began earlier than in the rest of European countries and operated as the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity between 1948 and 1952. Its aim was to 
“promote economic well-being by a free exchange of knowledge within industrial 
organisations in terms of methods and techniques” (Alexander et al. 2004: 568). In 
order to fulfil this aim, the Council sponsored study visits to the US for British 
managers and representatives of various industries.  
In the course of these development programmes, not only were Americans sharing 
their business knowledge with the local people, they also opened many subsidiaries 
                                            
 
6
 American spelling is applied when American names are cited 
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of their own companies. The main scholar who has studied these companies was 
John Dunning who became known as a ‘father’ of international business. In 1953, 
Dunning conducted research to explore the differences between European and 
American management practices. He studied 205 subsidiaries of American firms in 
the UK and found that these companies differed significantly from the English ones. 
He also found that these companies were managed in a typically American way and, 
as a result, were very similar to each other and to their parent firms back in America 
(Dunning 1998). What is meant by the ‘American way’ is what Chandler (1959) 
understands as the American ‘Managerial Revolution’ and which includes 
implementation of a number of innovations including separation of ownership from 
control, corporate structure, the rise of the professional managerial class and 
increasing investment in marketing. He believes that these practices shifted the 
American economy from the 19th century style of management to the 20th century 
development of big business (Chandler et al. 1997). Dunning concluded that the 
industrial productivity of the UK was advanced by applying the American managerial 
methods and philosophies. Much in the same way as the ‘Managerial Revolution’ 
advanced the American economy, similar principles helped enhance the British 
economy in the years after the Second World War. Dunning’s research was 
restricted to the manufacturing sector, similarly to other studies on the importation of 
the ‘American model’ (Alexander et al. 2004). Alexander et. al. (2004) found, 
however, similar patterns of transference in the retail sector so it could be expected 
that the services industry followed suit.  
Bonin and de Goey (2009), on the other hand, argue that the UK was more resistant 
than other countries to the changes brought from America because it was itself a 
“cradle of modern industrialization”. This does not mean that American business 
management practices or cultural norms had no impact on Britain, but rather that this 
impact was not so easily discernible, because these two countries were already 
culturally close due to a common heritage and language traditions (Bonin and de 
Goey 2009). This was not the type of relationship that could be observed between 
America and one of the developing countries but one based more on partnership and 
cooperation. These close ties led to coining the term ‘special relationship’ between 
America and Britain, which was founded not only on a common heritage but also on 
military, political and economic cooperation. Both America and Britain claim to have 
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maintained the status of the ‘special relationship’ despite political changes in both 
countries throughout the years (Dumbrell 2006). 
Following the extensive foreign direct investment from America and the exposure to 
the American business model under the Thatcher government between 1979 and 
1990, the UK arguably became “a standard-bearer for American-style policies as 
deregulation and privatization” (Bonin and de Goey 2009) took hold. This would 
suggest that despite initial resistance and intrinsic cultural similarities, it was Britain 
who followed in American footsteps and not the other way round.  
 
4.3.2. Americanisation as a two-way transaction 
It would be a simplification and a mistake to think of Americanisation as a one-way 
process where practices and values simply shifted from America to Europe. It was, 
instead, a long-term two-way transaction involving countries on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Schröter (2005: 4) believes that Americanisation should be understood as “a 
national or even regional adaptation to an American-originated influence”. He adds 
that in the process of transfer all practices were adapted to local customs and 
requirements. He compared the American influence on other nations with the Soviet 
impact and found that “organisational patterns can be exported by force, but unless 
they meet with genuine consent they are doomed to break down once the power that 
forced the export is removed” (Schröter 2005: 4). Moreover, these patterns and 
institutions need to be understood by the receiving side before such transfer takes 
place. Therefore, in order to effectively transfer certain institutions, there should be a 
degree of similarity between the two countries and a readiness to become involved 
in the process. The previous research suggests that Europe expressed such 
readiness in the decades after the Second World War.  
Due to the development of media and communication, the British people had access 
to American music, movies and television programmes (however, as mentioned 
earlier, British television programmes were believed to be more popular). The 1960s 
saw the shift from the ‘Golden Age of Hollywood’ (Maltby 2003) to the so-called ‘New 
Hollywood (King 2002) or ‘post-classical cinema’ as well as the Walt Disney 
Company’s most prosperous years (Holliss Sibley 1988). Consumers in Europe were 
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increasingly gaining access to products of these companies which, with time, 
blended with the local ones. Kroes (2007) discusses how citizens of European 
countries were exposed to American products and later to advertising. One of the 
first products which became synonymous with the American presence was Coca 
Cola which, arguably, arrived in Europe with the American soldiers (Bonin and de 
Goey 2009). Amongst the most widely advertised brands in the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, were PanAm, Hilton Hotels and later McDonalds, Gap and Best Western 
(Wilkins 2009). Marketing of American goods often used images of happy, wealthy 
people pictured in attractive locations, often with symbols of status like a car or 
expensive home appliances. At the same time, the presence of American 
businesses was becoming more visible on the British market and people started to 
associate the advertising images with the achievements of the American economy. 
As a result, the British public was inclined to believe that American ways of 
managing businesses were the way to gain the glamorous lifestyle represented in 
advertising. Bonin and de Goey (2009: 13) state that “looking at the USA was like 
looking in the future” and the term ‘American’ became for some people the synonym 
of ‘modern’ (Gassert 2012). Consumerism in the form communicated by the media 
and advertising turned out to be, therefore, a distant dream in the post-War Europe 
and its arrival on the continent was eagerly anticipated (Kroes 2007). Alexander et. 
al. (2004), on the other hand, seem to treat American advertising as an ‘assault’ on a 
British customer. They claim that the images portrayed by the media were 
particularly alluring to people in Europe because it was still “torn” after the Second 
World War (Alexander et al. 2004). This, together with the wide-spread adoption of 
American management practices, caused by growing American FDI led to what 
Gassert (2012) calls “voluntary Americanisation from below” which reached its 
pinnacle in the 1950s and 1960s. What he means by this term is that American 
values and practises were transferred not only on government or business 
management levels, but they also reached ordinary citizens.  
However, even though looking towards America for innovative solutions and for 
means of achieving a more comfortable lifestyle, Europeans did not accept them 
without adapting them to local conditions. For example, American companies, 
according to Bonin and de Goey (2009), began operating by using American 
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management methods, but these were, with time, blended with the local ones. Kroes 
(2007: 50) explains this relationship in the following quote:  
“Americanization is never a simple zero-sum game where people 
trade in their European clothes for every pair of blue jeans they 
acquire. It is more a matter of cultural syncretism, of an interweaving 
of bits of American culture into European cultural habits, where every 
borrowing of American cultural ingredients creatively changes their 
meaning and context. Certainly, Europe’s cultural landscape has 
changed but never in ways that would lead visiting Americans to 
mistake Europe for a simple replica of their own culture“. 
Additionally, as suggested earlier, there were certain cultural and institutional 
similarities between the UK and the US which helped the two blend more easily. 
According to Gassert (2012), in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, America and 
the whole of Europe were in such close communication that it is “impossible to 
pinpoint the origins of a particular cultural item”. He adds that “we should conceive of 
Americanization as part of a dialogue among the cultures boarding the Atlantic” 
(Gassert 2012: 185). Also Dahrendorf (cited in Schröter 2005: 6) understands the 
process of Americanisation in the similar way and highlights its succeeding nature: 
“Americanization in Europe is a process whereby values that 
originated in Europe were developed and processed in the United 
States and then re-imported back to Europe. The historical ties of [sic] 
between the two countries were of great importance in the 
development of American institutions, and in turn were a helpful 
conditioning for the Americanization of Europe”.  
This statement reflects the process of the development of American and British hotel 
industries and the ‘special relationship’ between them which stems from a common 
heritage and which helped shape these countries’ economies and cultures. Nickson 
(1998: 54) states: 
“American multinationals did initially dominate the international hotel 
industry and provide a ‘best practice’ hotel management model. This 
transfer of management practices, standardised hotel formulas and 
modern marketing expertise was achieved as US multinationals 
followed the flow of American businessmen and tourists to Europe in 
post-War period”.  
This does not mean, however, that these standardised formulas did not, with time, 
gain local flavour.  
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4.4. American context 
Having discussed the British historical context, the focus now shifts towards America 
as the home country of Hilton Hotels Corporation and its subsidiary, Hilton 
International. It is necessary to move back in time from the 1960s to the 19th Century 
and the origins of American grand hotels. This section of the chapter illustrates the 
development of American hotels and compares them with the British hotels operating 
in the same time period. The comparison includes not only architectural and 
technological characteristics, but also service standards and the social role of these 
establishments.  
 
4.4.1. The development of hotels in America 
Early development of the hotel industry in America followed much the same pattern 
as in England, beginning with inns and taverns providing accommodation for people 
travelling by stage coaches. The first recorded inn is believed to have been one in 
Jamestown, Virginia which was built around 1610 (White 1968). Rather 
controversially, White (1968) claims that what triggered the steady improvement of 
inns and hotels erected in America was frequent fires. He further claims that most of 
the currently operating historical hotels would have been rebuilt at least once or 
twice within the last century due to the destructive power of fire (White 1968). 
The literature concurs that the Tremont house in Boston is considered the first 
American grand hotel, despite the fact that there were other hotels built before it. 
White (1968: 129) states:  
“It was an American claim that there is as big a difference between the 
old inn and the modern hotel as between a broom and a vacuum 
cleaner; that the modern luxury hotel is as much an invention as the 
sewing machine and that it was an American invention, the first 
transatlantic development that owed nothing to Europe”.  
It is important to highlight the term ‘invention’, especially in the context of buildings 
which, as agreed by a number of researchers (Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011) 
resembled European palaces and grand homes. Even White, who claims that the 
Tremont was a purely American invention, later refers to the fact that French 
decorations were used throughout. Americans, however, like to speak of the 
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Tremont as the predecessor of all modern grand hotels (White 1968, Sandoval-
Strausz 2007, Berger 2011). White’s (1968: 129) chapter about the Tremont begins 
with the sentence:  
“The first hotel that was ever invented, the Tremont, opened in Boston, 
Massachusetts, on 16th October, 1829”.  
Whether one agrees with this statement or not, it is essential to introduce this hotel 
as one which was seen as an unrivalled example for many years. The Tremont was 
innovative in many areas (Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011): it was one of the 
first hotels which had a lobby where checking in and out took place (Slattery 2009). It 
also had a dining hall which could accommodate 200 customers, private dining 
rooms and separate drawing rooms for gentlemen and ladies. A number of authors 
agree that the Tremont House in Boston was ‘the first world’s modern hotel’ (White 
1968, Sheppardson 1991, Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011). Nikolaus Pevsner, 
a renowned architecture historian, is quoted by Wharton (2001) as claiming that the 
Tremont was the first hotel to be treated as ‘an architectural monument’. Everything 
in it was said to be innovative: secure door locking, indoor plumbing, steam heating, 
gaslight, call bell system, fireproof construction and the façade of the hotel which 
was covered with granite. Berger (2011) believes that the Tremont in Boston was the 
only one of its kind and something of a tourist attraction, which seems to be an 
ultimate designation of a hotel being grand. Having been so successful it also set 
standards for many other hotels. She also highlights that the Tremont was not only 
modern but also very elegant in its design, residents of Boston often calling it “one of 
the proudest achievements of American genius” (Williamson 1930: 15). White (1968: 
130) claims that: “there is little doubt that the opening of the Tremont was the start of 
what we now know as the American Way of Life”, which is an important statement in 
the context of this study focusing on the Americanisation of hotel-keeping practices.  
Despite being so modern and innovative, the Tremont remained open for only 66 
years. Slattery (2009) claims that it was common for American hotels to close fairly 
quickly because of the very fast development of hotel keeping standards and new 
technologies. New, more modern hotels were built at such a fast rate that the older 
ones lost their appeal very quickly. A key role in the rapid changes in the American 
hotel market was played by the fact that America was a country of high migration, 
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both from Europe (Pollack 2011) and within its borders (Sandoval-Strausz 2007, 
Berger 2011). As new cities were established and expanded, movement of people 
followed suit. Politicians, merchants and entrepreneurs needed space not only for 
accommodation, but also for sharing their ideas, discussing plans and establishing 
connections (Sandoval-Strausz 2007). Hotels were considered as spaces that 
provided social inclusion and freedom that facilitated advancement of American 
society and they were expected to progress at an equally fast pace.  
Observing the growing success of the Tremont House, John Jacob Astor, one of the 
first American financial tycoons, concluded that if such a grand hotel could find 
customers in Boston, it should also be able to do so in New York. This motivated him 
to build the Astor House in 1836, the design of which he committed to Isaiah Rogers, 
the constructor of the Tremont (Sandoval-Strausz 2007). As every other new hotel 
on the market, the Astor House included some innovations, such as its own gas 
plant and printing facilities and 18 shops located on the ground floor (Slattery 2009). 
Already in 1897, however, the Astor House was overshadowed by two hotels built by 
Astor’s grandsons, William Waldorf and John Jacob IV. The two neighbouring hotels, 
The Waldorf and the Astoria, were later connected by the “Peacock Alley” and 
formed the Waldorf-Astoria, the largest and most complex hotel in the world at the 
time (Berger 2011). It boasted a ballroom, theatre, banqueting room, a suite for 
wedding receptions, lecture rooms and rooms for secret meetings, stock broker 
offices, a photography gallery and a range of services including hairdressing and 
Russian and Turkish baths (Slattery 2009). Despite its grandeur, the Waldorf-Astoria 
was affected by the difficult times of prohibition and could not defend itself against 
technological advancements, the most affecting of which was the technology which 
allowed for the building of skyscrapers (Slattery 2009, Berger 2011). In the late 
1920s the centre of New York’s elegant social life moved farther north (Sandoval-
Strausz 2007). The original Waldorf-Astoria was demolished in 1929 after only 32 
years of operation, giving space to the construction of the Empire State Building. 
New York was not, however, left without a Waldorf-Astoria and the new one with this 
name was constructed in 1931. It was twice as large as the original one, more 
modern and designed in art nouveau style (Wharton 2003, Slattery 2009). The hotel 
is still in operation and is seen as one of the landmarks of New York. The central 
place in the lobby is occupied by the clock which was preserved from the original 
118 
 
Waldorf-Astoria and which adds an authentic historical feel to the ambience of the 
hotel (Wharton 2003). A special area on the ground floor has been arranged as a 
small museum which illustrates a rich collection of pictures and artefacts from both 
Waldorf-Astoria hotels. One of the plaques calls the hotel “The Unofficial Palace of 
New York” which illustrates the role that the Waldorf-Astoria plays on the New York 
grand hotel scene7.  
Prohibition, the Great Depression and growth in the automobile industry were the 
key factors which affected the American hotel industry in the first half of the 
Twentieth Century. The social role of grand hotels amongst the American upper 
classes led to the situation where a high percentage of revenue was generated by 
non-rooms demand. When in 1919 all production and sale of alcoholic drinks 
became banned, hotels lost a great proportion of business coming from restaurants 
and hotel bars. The situation was worsened by the Great Depression and the Wall 
Street Crash in 1929 which led many businesses and personal fortunes to 
bankruptcy. In 1933 the American Hotel and Lodging Association (AHA) recorded 
the lowest average occupancy rate of 51% to date (AHA 2016). The American hotel 
industry had to look for new markets and new solutions. One such opportunity came 
from the automobile industry.  When Ford, General Motors and Chrysler all adopted 
integrated mass production techniques incorporating the use of assembly lines and 
the car industry became the largest industry in 1930 (Slattery 2009), demand for 
appropriate infrastructure became evident. Motels were developed as a response to 
this need, the first one being San Luis Obispo in California which opened in 1925 
(Watters 2011). They were located along motorways and offered limited, 
standardised service (Sandoval-Strausz 2007). Generating up to 75% from renting 
bedrooms (Slattery 2009), these establishments became immune to challenges 
connected with prohibition. A similar principle was adopted by so-called ‘apartment 
                                            
 
7
 Conrad Hilton purchased the Waldorf-Astoria in 1949, making it Hilton Hotels’ eastern coast 
headquarters. The hotel was owned by Hilton until 2015 when it was purchased by Chinese Anbang 
Insurance Group Ltd. It is still to be managed by Hilton Worldwide, under a new management 
agreement signed for a 100-year period (http://news.hiltonworldwide.com/index.cfm/news/hilton-
worldwide-closes-sale-of-the-waldorf-astoria-new-york-and-reaches-agreements-to-redeploy-
proceeds-to-acquire-five-landmark-hotels ).  
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hotels’ which provided permanent accommodation to their residents. They provided 
a different kind of product than motels, but the principle of generating revenue from 
accommodation instead of from bars and restaurants was similar.  
The first half of the Twentieth Century saw the rapid expansion of mid-market chain 
hotels including Western Hotels (now Westin), United Hotels, Sheraton, Marriott, 
Holiday Inn and Statler (Slattery 2009, AHA 2016). The latter is considered to be the 
first chain of standardised hotels. Ellsworth Milton Statler was committed to 
developing a chain of hotels affordable for travelling salesmen and for families. His 
famous slogan of “A bed and a bath for a dollar and a half” summarised his vision 
(Miller 1968). Statler’s methods of hotel keeping are often associated with the 
management techniques of Henry Ford (Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011). 
Hotel building plans and operations were designed in ways that allowed for 
maximum efficiency and economies of scale as well as for control over mass 
production. For example, bathrooms in rooms were built back to back in order to 
share a single plumbing system, guest and service lifts were grouped together to 
benefit from one shaft and machinery and bedrooms had connecting doors so that 
they could be converted into suites. Restaurants adopted bulk purchasing and large-
scale food preparation (Sandoval-Strausz 2007). Members of staff were required to 
memorize prescribed instructions and were often surprised by quality inspections. 
They were, however, entitled to paid holiday, free health care and profit sharing 
which further strengthened the similarity between Statler Hotels and Ford’s 
Automobiles’ management systems (Miller 1968, Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 
2011). Statler Hotels are believed to be the first chain which was recognisable 
because of this standardised approach to managing hotels; a feature later 
associated with Hilton Hotels.   
The biggest difference between the American and the British hotel industry in the 
early 20th Century is the fact that the American industry was much less affected by 
the Second World War. The US entered the War only after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbour and even then hotels did not cease operations with many of them 
earning considerable revenues from renting rooms to the Military (Young 2016). As a 
result, in 1946 AHA (2016) recorded the highest ever average occupancy rate of 
93%. Many grand hotels, and especially those in New York, benefitted from the 
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wealth of their founders such as the Astors and their patrons including the 
Vanderbilts and the Rothschilds (Berger 2005). Family fortunes allowed for constant 
redevelopment of hotels and the implementation of technological innovation even 
when these investments could not generate any considerable profit (Slattery 2009). 
While development of British hotels almost stalled in the first half of the 20th Century, 
American hotels, both luxury and mid-market, operated with few interruptions. This 
gap was not to be closed for many decades.  
 
4.4.2. Comparison of the early grand hotels in London and America  
a. Design 
It was mentioned earlier that operating a hotel in London was perceived as a lifestyle 
choice and that often elegant hotels were managed by charismatic individuals, with 
the support of their families (for example, William and Marianne Claridge and Rosa 
Lewis, the owner of The Cavendish Hotel, married to butler Chiney Lewis). In 
America, on the other hand, hotels were a means of developing business and were 
established by wealthy investors or consortia which explored modern methods of 
funding including lottery or stock shares (Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011). 
Wharton ( 2003) highlights that urban hotels in the United States were usually built 
for the profit of investors, as opposed to European hotels which were built as a 
vocational activity for families. This reflects the capitalist drive which was visible in 
the United States from the early days (Boorstin 1966). American entrepreneurs 
never denied the purpose of their businesses, which was always to generate profit. 
The literature on European immigration to America concurs that people moved 
across the Atlantic hoping for better conditions of life and a more prosperous future 
(Pollack 2011). It is, therefore, hardly surprising that more entrepreneurial individuals 
quickly set up and developed their own businesses here.  
The Langham, being the first London hotel built on a truly grand scale, was enjoyed 
by American visitors. Watkin and D'Ormesson (1984) claim that they appreciated its 
grandeur, reminding them of hotels back home. However, even then, it was said that 
it could not be compared to American hotels which were larger, more modern and 
significantly more technologically advanced (Borer 1972, Taylor and Bush 1974). 
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Already in 1861 August Sala considered hotels in America to be at least a century 
ahead of those in England (Sandoval-Strausz 2007) and this disproportion widened 
further in the first half of the 20th Century. Boorstin (1966) describes American hotels 
as mimicking Buckingham Palace, being as roomy and as elaborately decorated and 
boasting a similar range of drawing rooms, suites and bedchambers. This highlights 
the fact that American hotels were designed so that they resembled European 
palaces, as opposed to what White (1968) claims about the Tremont. Haley (2011) 
suggests that America, being a young nation, had to reflect on European trends in 
fashion, cuisine and design. The wealthy Americans were usually of English descent, 
white, Protestant, well-educated and from the upper-class families (Haley 2011). The 
only way for them to differentiate themselves from others was to enjoy these top-
class European ways of entertainment and to live in ‘palaces’ which reminded them 
of the grand homes of Europe.  
Such an approach to standards depicts how young (in terms of being a relatively 
new country) Americans moulded various formal and informal rules to their own 
needs, consequently creating the whole new world of new institutions. It also 
suggests that people do not necessarily take institutions for granted, but they are 
restrictive in what they accept and refuse, and that they are willing to adapt 
institutions which do not suit their ways of life, thus reflecting Oliver’s view on 
institutional change (Oliver 1991). 
 
b. Technological innovations 
American hotels were able to adopt new technological advancements because the 
majority, including the Tremont House and grand hotels in Manhattan, were purpose-
built. One such innovation was steel-framing, which made buildings fire-proof 
(Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011). As buildings became taller throughout the 
years, lifts for both luggage and guests became more common. Modern solutions in 
plumbing systems were another feature which differentiated American hotels. Private 
bathrooms, widely available running water hygienically disposed of waste were 
features enjoyed by American hotel guests (Borer 1972), while in London many 
hotels did not provide private bathrooms until after the Second World War.  
122 
 
Sheppardson (1991) claims that English hotel patrons resisted such changes for 
some time suggesting there was no need for private bathrooms. One of the first hotel 
managers who introduced modern technological solutions to London hotels was 
Henry Ford, J.J. Ford’s son who in 1882 came back from Canada to take over the 
management of Brown’s hotel (Borer 1972). By 1885 he had introduced such 
novelties as bath tubs, electric lighting and telephones, which were first complained 
about but later made Brown’s one of the most popular hotels in London. 
It would be easy to conclude that the technological modernity of American hotels 
was the factor which increased their appeal. Some might go further in their judgment 
and argue that people in London resisted change because they were traditionalists 
(Borer 1972). Such an explanation would, however, be extremely simplistic because 
evaluating this issue from an institutional point of view offers alternative conclusions. 
It would be unfair to expect London hotels to adopt technological innovations when 
they were often established in existing mansions in the centre of a busy (even at that 
time) city. American hotel constructors did not face this problem as they could freely 
choose where they wanted their hotels to be built (at least to some extent). 
Moreover, the London’s hotel market was influenced by the political situation in 
Europe and the two World Wars much more strongly. While London hotels were 
struggling for survival, American hotels were being constantly invested in and 
modernised.  
 
c. Dining habits 
One of the major differences between the early grand hotels in London and America 
was the approach to dining. It was not common amongst English society, and 
especially for women, to dine in public until the 1880s (Borer 1972). In London 
hotels, food orders would be taken by a butler each morning and meals would be 
served in private dining rooms. This stemmed from the lifestyle lived by members of 
the upper classes. They were a closed circle of people and dining, like other forms of 
entertainment, was to be enjoyed in privacy just by the chosen members (Borer 
1972, White 1968). Such an institutional arrangement deeply rooted in English 
culture was not easy to change. People who were raised in this kind of environment 
simply could not imagine any other way of social order. 
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All this changed when Cesar Ritz took over the management of the Savoy. Ritz, who 
gave up his prominent job as a hotel manager at the Grand Hôtel National in 
Lucerne to move to London, brought with him the chef Auguste Escoffier. Together 
they transformed British dining habit and developed eating out as a social event 
(Ackroyd 2001). What was innovative in their approach was the attention they paid to 
women’s needs. They created dishes which appealed to women’s tastes, but they 
also took care of the layout and design of the dining rooms so that women felt 
comfortable in them. The restaurant at the Savoy attracted celebrities of the time and 
customers from America. Borer (1972: 211) states:  
“In foggy, lamplit London, where Society was still unashamedly 
ostentatious, the Savoy quickly became an unqualified success. 
London at last acquired the restaurant habit and the stars of the stage 
and the opera, the American and South African millionaires were all to 
be seen at the Savoy.” 
This quotation suggests that this new approach had a wider impact, contributing not 
only to the Savoy’s success, but actually influencing trends in society. Brown’s was 
another London hotel which introduced public dining (Borer 1972), however, its 
Director, Henry Ford, retained private butler services for guests who preferred more 
traditional ways. 
When trying to understand the role of Ritz and Escoffier in making dining out firstly 
accepted and then fashionable, an institutional-focused researcher should ask 
whether there were any other conditions which triggered this shift. It can be argued 
that the world at large was becoming more modern. Nineteenth century was the age 
of technological development, increased travel and growing wealth (Leach 1993). 
The Industrial Revolution in Britain was a turning point in history when making 
money was no longer available solely to the upper classes, but offered growing 
opportunities for other members of the society as well. These changes in economic 
and social areas of life would have an impact on people’s behaviour and choices. 
This suggests that one cannot discuss issues like the development of public dining in 
isolation from the surrounding factors. The role of Ritz and Escoffier is hardly 
questionable, but one needs to appreciate the wider conditions which allowed the 
new trends to prosper.  
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As opposed to London before the times of Ritz and Escoffier, Americans at home, 
enjoyed public dining and spent their time in large lobbies where they could be seen 
by other influential members of the society (White 1968, Groth 1994, Slattery 2009). 
Dining in a hotel restaurant among hundreds of well-dressed people was seen as a 
highlight of a trip to the city (White 1968, Groth 1994). Dining in public had a kind of 
symbolical meaning for American citizens. It was supposed to mirror the American 
ideals of democracy and open market. Americans even claimed that dining in private 
“engendered the spread of dangerous blue-blood habits” (Groth 1994: 30). 
Americans not only shared the pleasure of dining with others, but also conducted 
business when dining. This again highlights how American society adapted existing 
rules to suit their needs. Sandoval-Strausz (2007: 314) states:  
“Hotels were part of a larger project that created a new American 
space. This involved a number of overlapping efforts, all of which were 
intended to remove barriers to mobility, freeing people to move about 
the national territory in pursuit of arable land, commercial 
opportunities, and new forms of social and political association”. 
This quotation suggests that changes observed in hotels were only one of the visible 
changes in the wider society. Similar shifts were evident in other areas of life and 
American society at large was becoming more open and public than in Europe. 
Chapter 4.2.1 discussed the role of French cuisine in the development of restaurants 
and grand hotels in London. This cuisine also played an important part in the 
expansion of American hotels and popularisation of restaurants. Haley (2011) 
believes that it played a crucial role in enforcing class stratification in the evolving 
American society. He states: 
“By consuming the cuisine of Old World elites, society leaders of the 
late Nineteenth Century believed they were asserting a claim to 
membership in a European-style aristocracy. If you are what you eat, 
then eating like the French nobility made you an aristocrat” (Haley 
2011: 2).  
It was not only the taste for French meals that diversified society, but the habits 
associated with dining in French restaurants served as a self-selective mechanism. 
People from the middle-classes, even if they could afford to dine in these 
establishments, often could not understand menus written in French and for this 
reason were faced with the hostility of waiters. They would, consequently, avoid 
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patronising the most elegant restaurants and would seek adequate service 
elsewhere. Haley believes that this contributed to restaurants becoming, with time, 
more egalitarian and cosmopolitan and to the fact that service in these restaurants 
became less formal and offered ethnic and American cuisines. This was, however, a 
slow process and the restaurants in early American grand hotels were dominated by 
the French culinary heritage.  
 
d. ‘Palaces of the people’ 
American hotels, in general, were designed with many public spaces so that guests 
had several opportunities to socialise and interact. It was fashionable to be seen in 
lobbies, restaurants and drawing rooms. Sandoval-Strausz (2007) even claims that 
establishing a paradigm for public life in America was the intended purpose of hotels. 
Europeans, who were not accustomed to such behaviours complained about the lack 
of privacy in American hotels (Sandoval-Strausz 2007). Boorstin (1966) claims that 
the boundary between ‘private’ and ‘public’ became very blurred in the 19th century. 
He writes that Americans created the new world of open doors, first names, front 
lawns and eventually restaurants, bars and hotel lobbies.  
This new communal world was, according to Boorstin (1966), neither public nor 
private. This gave citizens the opportunity to ‘consume’ hotel services without 
actually staying in them. People would happily meet and socialise in hotel 
restaurants and lobbies which gave them the sense of belonging to this privileged 
world. 
A number of authors write about American hotels being ‘palaces of the people’ 
(Boorstin 1966, White 1968, Sandoval-Strausz 2007, Berger 2011). Sandoval-
Strausz (2007: 62) explains that this phrase combines two opposing characteristics:  
“Palaces recalled the luxury and splendour of European aristocracy 
but also evoked the exclusionary, antidemocratic character of the Old 
World social order. By contrast, invoking ‘the public’ indicated respect 
for a citizenry whose symbolic ownership of the hotels paralleled the 
way it controlled its government.” 
American hotels were supposed to reflect the democratic ideals of this modern 
society, where people were responsible for their own fate. In America, as opposed to 
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London, everyone could come to a hotel and expect to be served; the word 
‘everyone’ applied, however, only to white male, Christians (Sandoval-Strausz 2007). 
This ‘equality’ was available only to wealthy people. White (1968: 146) writes: “Every 
citizen was a king and the hotel was his palace so long as he had the price in his 
pocket”, which highlights the main difference between English and American society, 
that wealth was the determinant of social status. Berger (2011) notes that this 
novelty gave Americans an opportunity not only to live beyond their means but also 
to live a certain lifestyle despite their political views. Berger (2011: 137) states: “For a 
price, any good republican could live like a prince, be treated like royalty, and feel 
entitled to aristocratic luxuries.” This suggests, again, how Americans used various 
institutions for their own benefit.  
The creation of public life and making hotels available for the wider public could be 
treated as a clear example of organisations’ impact on existing institutions. On the 
other hand, there is a dilemma whether it was the organisations that changed the 
rules, or people’s demands for such adaptation to which hotels simply reacted. This 
question is not simple to answer, especially from the perspective of time. Some 
authors claim that American hotels did not provide for consumers’ needs, but by their 
luxury and flamboyance they actually created certain needs (Leach 1993). People 
could not expect particular levels of luxury because they had never experienced it 
before. A similar argument can be made about access to flamboyant hotel 
restaurants and lobbies; citizens did not consider public spaces important until they 
actually tried living the public life. Such an explanation would be a representation of 
organisational impact on institutions and consequent isomorphism because, as 
argued by Boorstin (1966) the public life and entertainment spread to other areas of 
social life, not only hotels. If, however, hotels only reacted to the changing trends 
and habits of modern society, then it would not be organisations’ influence on 
institutions but rather people’s decision to mould and change the existing institutions. 
This question is relevant especially in light of the discussion about Hilton being one 
of the first ‘modern’ hotels in London.  
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e. Permanent residency 
In the early days of grand hotels development in London in the 19th Century it was 
often necessary to be provided with a personal introduction in order to stay at a 
grand hotel (Sheppardson 1991). In comparison, Americans paid to live in residential 
apartments thus living the lives of the upper-classes without the need for actually 
possessing a grand home (Groth 1994, Dolkart 2005, Slattery 2009, Berger 2011). 
This trend continued on to the second half of the 20th Century (Slattery 2009). Living 
in hotels was so common in America that, according to White (1968), it was widely 
believed in England that home life in a house was virtually unknown, that all 
Americans lived in hotels. Groth (1994: 30) explains that the reason for using grand 
hotels for residency was the difficulty in finding well-trained servants who would be 
as docile as their colleagues in England. However, he also adds that living in a grand 
hotel in America was a means of buying social status without the need for actually 
accruing it. This social status of the wealthy was to be seen by others, hence the 
designs of dining rooms, lounges and flamboyant lobbies.  
Another reason why some people chose to live permanently in hotel apartments was 
the unique combination of privacy and publicity (Groth 1994). Hotels provided a 
shelter from public interest, which was appreciated especially by politicians and 
stage personalities. Hotel clerks would notice every person coming in and leaving 
the hotel which provided security, but they would not ask unnecessary questions 
enabling residents to feel that their privacy remained intact. On the other hand, 
public life in dining and drawing rooms as well as lounges and lobbies was available 
whenever the resident required it. 
English visitors to London, on the other hand, did not stay in hotels for very long and 
they did not consider permanent residency (Taylor and Bush 1974). One of the main 
reasons for this was that English guests never knew what to expect on their bills as 
prices were not published and customers were forced to pay for various ‘extras’, 
such as candle light (Berger 2011). Taylor and Bush (1974) claim that a gentleman 
would stay in a hotel only until he found appropriate lodging and he would not bring 
his family to live in a hotel but preferred a private mansion.  
This highlights the differentiated approaches to hotel accommodation in America and 
London and how, looking from an institutional point of view, different institutional 
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arrangements shaped people’s preferences. Despite originating from the same 
Anglo-American traditions, consumers had different expectations and different goals 
in their lives. By making certain choices they also created rules of social behaviour 
and therefore amended the existing institutional environment. As noted earlier, 
members of American society originated from Europe so they were accustomed to 
European rules and standards of behaviour, however, they decided to change them 
to suit their own purposes. Such behaviour, on the other hand, reflected the 
circumstances people found themselves in. There was no need to build one’s status 
in England, because upper classes were well established. In America, where the 
society was essentially created by immigrants, there was an opportunity to shape 
one’s status. This reflects the duality of relationship between actors and institutions; 
institutions shape actors’ behaviour, but at the same time actors have the power to 
amend institutions by making choices, whether these choices are intended or not.  
 
4.5. Conclusions 
It is clear that despite common British and American heritage, there were certain 
differences in development of the hotel industry in these countries throughout the 
years. The key conclusions arrive from the discussion of the development of hotel 
industries in England and in America:  
 The comparison of early grand hotels in London with their counterparts in 
America suggests that there were major differences between them, despite 
sharing common heritage. What differentiated these hotels, however, were 
not only technological advancements, but also the role they played in society. 
While in Europe grand hotels were the ‘playground’ of the noble, privileged 
classes, in America customers who frequented the most luxurious hotels were 
the nouveau-riches and industrialists who wanted to be perceived as upper-
class but did not see the need for spending time on accruing this status. Such 
an approach to using hotels reflected democratic ideals of American society 
and was an early reflection of the growing commercialised market. As Amatori 
and Colli (2011: 84) suggest, nineteenth century America was “about to 
become the first nation of mass consumption”. As the mass consumption 
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spread across the western world, so has the American style of service in 
grand hotels, despite the traditional attitudes of the English society. 
 What also becomes evident from the review of the early development of grand 
hotels is that hotel management practices were transferred from England to 
America and vice versa in two stages. First, Americans constructed their 
hotels designing them so that they looked like grand homes and palaces in 
which the English upper classes lived. They were elaborately decorated to 
make residents feel they belonged to the privileged few. Relatively quickly, 
however, Americans re-developed ideas brought over from across the Atlantic 
and became forerunners of hotel development and management. American 
standards of hotel keeping became a benchmark for hoteliers around the 
world (White 1968, Wharton 2001, Sandoval-Strausz 2007).  
 The gap between hotel standards in America and in England which was 
clearly visible in the 1960s was caused by the critical events of the Twentieth 
Century and mainly by the Second World War. While the English hotel 
industry almost stalled between 1939 and 1945 and hotels were forced to act 
as shelters and provisional offices, the American hotel industry was affected 
to a much lesser extent and financially benefited from accommodating the 
Military. The Twentieth Century in America saw the development of chain 
hotel companies, including Statler, Holiday Inn, Marriott and Hilton. At the 
same time the hotel industry in England was highly fragmented and lacked 
investment.   
Americanisation was not forced on European businesses and citizens. American 
values, lifestyle and methods of running businesses were eagerly anticipated in 
Europe which was rebuilding itself after the War. The reason for this anticipation was 
mainly the fact that America was portrayed as a land of success and profitability 
which stood in contrast to war-torn Europe. People who were exposed to the 
marketing of American products and services associated them with a comfortable 
and prosperous life. In addition, managers of European businesses were persuaded 
by their American colleagues that businesses run with American methods were 
successful and could expand worldwide. This led to the acceptance of American 
business management practices and elements of American lifestyle, despite 
apparent differences between the two societies.  
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5. Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International  
5.1. Introduction 
The first chapter of Part 2 aimed at presenting and analysing the external context in 
which Hilton Hotels, and later the London Hilton, developed. Further following the 
multiple-embeddedness model presented in Figure 5-1, this chapter now focuses on 
Hilton Hotels as the parent company of the London Hilton. This is the section which 
benefits mainly from archival sources collected in the Hilton Collection at the 
Hospitality Industry Archives in Houston and in-house Archives of the London Hilton 
(now Hilton on Park Lane). Before discussing the company, however, its founder will 
be introduced. Chapter 2 clearly stated that one of the key institutional ownership 
advantages which allow companies to internationalise is the company’s culture. Key 
figures often have an impact on how such corporate cultures are shaped and 
consequently how they affect corporate strategy. In order to understand some of the 
company’s decisions, one needs to learn about its founder, his upbringing, beliefs 
and dreams. Chapter 3 also stated the reasons why Hilton was chosen as the case 
in this study. The reasons included the fact that for many years Hilton was owned 
and managed by its founder who had strong beliefs. This study illustrates how these 
influenced the company and its strategic decisions. In order to fully understand these 
choices this section begins with a description of Conrad Hilton’s early life and his 
career in the hotel industry. 
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Figure 5-1. Multiple-embeddedness of the London Hilton 
Source: Author’s visualisation 
 
 
5.2. Conrad Hilton  
5.2.1. The entrepreneur from San Antonio  
Conrad8 is often associated with Texas, however, born in 1887, he was actually 
raised in San Antonio in New Mexico. He discusses his childhood and early years of 
his career in much detail in his autobiography “Be my guest” (Hilton 1957) and states 
there that in his family home he learnt two values which would guide his whole life: 
work and faith. Conrad’s father, Gus Hilton, an immigrant from Norway was an 
entrepreneur who opened the first dry goods store in San Antonio and who taught 
his children to help in the business from their early years (Hilton Worldwide 2012). 
                                            
 
8
 Conrad Hilton is referred to as ‘Conrad’ from this point onwards in order to distinguish between the 
company name and the founder.  
Chapter 5 
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Conrad’s mother was a very religious person and instilled in her son a deep devotion 
to the Catholic faith and a belief in the power of prayer (Hilton 1957). The store and 
the family house were located by the main train line and so the family started renting 
rooms to travellers. This would be the first hotel management experience for Conrad, 
though he did not expect at the time that this would become his career (Hilton 1957).  
Conrad attempted a few different career paths before he became an hotelier. The 
first opportunity came in 1911 when New Mexico became a State and offered 
political opportunities. Conrad served two years in the Lower House of New Mexico 
First State’s Legislation, but he found the world of politics too slow and frustrating 
(Danajo TV 2011) and therefore decided to return to his home town. Upon his return 
he served as a band manager and agent to his sister’s musical band, but this 
business hardly broke even. Having failed in the entertainment business he turned to 
the world of finance and decided to establish the first bank in San Antonio (Hilton 
1957). The local economy proved, however, to be too small to sustain a bank and 
Hilton was forced to close it after a year of operation (Danajo TV 2011).  
When America entered the First World War in 1917 Conrad travelled to Europe 
where he served in the army in France. He was discharged from service and 
returned to San Antonio upon the news of his father’s death. In 1919, instead of 
taking over the family business, in which he could not see prospects for further 
development, he travelled to Cisco, Texas to buy a bank there. Texas was a rapidly 
developing state where millionaires were made overnight thanks to the flourishing oil 
industry. However, the price of the bank was suddenly raised and Hilton never 
acquired it (Hilton Worldwide 2012).  Instead, he purchased the Mobley Hotel where 
he was coincidentally staying. Over the years Conrad bought numerous other hotels 
in Texas and in 1925 opened the first hotel to bear his name, the Dallas Hilton.  
 
5.2.2. The hotelman with a mission 
Conrad became known for buying hotel properties when they were not profitable and 
turning them into prosperous businesses. He managed to achieve this by focusing 
on customers’ needs. While hotels in Fort Worth and Dallas served business and 
transit customers (Young 2016) others, including the Mobley, accommodated oil field 
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workers. Conrad realised that what they needed the most was a good meal and a 
comfortable sleep. He therefore changed the balance of the hotel business by 
limiting the area occupied by lobbies and lounges and adding additional bedrooms, 
dining rooms and bars9. He also turned closets into gift shops and sold counter 
space to advertisers (Danajo TV 2011). This allowed Conrad to earn revenue from 
spaces previously only there to improve the aesthetics of hotels but which did not 
make a profit. He quickly developed his pioneering strategy of ‘Mini Max’ – 
minimising cost and maximising service to customers (Hilton 1957). At the time he 
did not struggle with selling his services because there was a constant demand for 
accommodation. What he wished to achieve, however, was what he learnt when 
working for his father: “The buyer should get a bargain, the seller a profit, 
somewhere in between is the fair price” (Hilton 1957). By maximising service and 
minimising cost he was able to accomplish that. He also placed particular trust in 
esprit de corps (Nickson 1997) and believed that only motivated staff could make the 
difference between a satisfied and dissatisfied guest.  
Hilton’s journey through the world of business was not a straightforward one and he 
faced many difficulties including prohibition and the stock market crash in 1929. He 
claimed that what helped him survive the difficult years were hard work, deep faith 
and “dreaming big” (Hilton 1957, Wright 1969). Conrad Hilton spoke openly about his 
faith and anti-communism political views. These views became the backbone of 
Hilton Hotels’ mission statement: “To achieve world peace through international 
trade and travel” (Hilton 1957: 234). During the escalation of the Cold War and the 
threat of nuclear war Conrad particularly focused on his ambition of promoting 
peace. According to his son Barron, Conrad felt that the whole world should be 
aware of the importance of prayer, especially in difficult times (Hilton 2009). To 
spread this message he wrote a special prayer “America on its knees” which was 
later distributed in hotels around the world and broadcast on TV. A copy of this 
prayer is available in Exhibit 3.  
                                            
 
9
 Time Magazine, 19
th
 July, 1963 
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Exhibit 3. "America on its knees" - a prayer written by Conrad
10
 
  
Conrad claimed that American hotels played a twofold role, they were to be homes 
away from home for American travellers, but more importantly they were, as Conrad 
                                            
 
10
 Picture from the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, University of 
Houston 
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chose to call them “little Americas” (Hilton 1957) located around the world. Conrad 
described the vision for his business:  
“It was the beginning of a dream to manage and build hotels in other 
countries. There is an old and impressively wise saying in geo-politics: 
If business does not cross frontiers armies will. I hold with the most 
sincere conviction that hotels are the best insurance of good 
neighbourliness and warm international relations”. (Comfort 1964: 99) 
He wanted Hilton hotels around the world to be seen as a haven of democracy and 
freedom, just as America was portrayed at the time on the international political 
scene (Leach 1993). Conrad stated:  
"Each of our hotels is a 'little America', not as a symbol of bristling 
power, but as a friendly centre where men of many nations and of 
good will may speak the language of peace”. (Hilton 1957: 265) 
Considering these and other statements by him, Nickson (1997: 186) describes 
Conrad in the following words:  
“Hilton arguably saw his role as a benign, paternalistic and anti-
Communist figure spreading American expertise, in both the 'hard' and 
'soft' aspects of hotel management”.  
Correspondence from John Hauser (Executive Vice President of Hilton International) 
suggests that Conrad also phrased his dream in a less politically-correct way, which 
was never published but was known amongst people close to him. The dream was to 
establish “a Hilton hotel in Red Square Moscow, right across the corner from a 
crowded church”11, a statement which comprises all the elements of Conrad’s goal: 
business, religion and democracy. He believed that Hilton hotels were helping to 
tackle the issue of unemployment and raising standards of living while at the same 
time spreading better understanding of different ways of life12. In fact, in 1960 
Conrad Hilton negotiated with Nikita Kruhshchev the possibility of opening a large 
hotel in Moscow, but this project did not come to fruition13.  
                                            
 
11
 John Reagan McCrary to John Houser on 22
nd
 April 1958 
12
 Conrad Hilton in “President’s Letter to Stakeholder” on 10
th
 March 1965 
13
 George Christopher to Conrad Hilton on 12
th
 January 1960 
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In 1949 Conrad achieved one of his most daring dreams, he bought the Waldorf 
Astoria in New York, later establishing it as the East Coast headquarters. As far back 
as 1931, when The Waldorf Astoria opened, he had considered it to be the grandest 
and finest of hotels. In the same year Hilton International division was born with the 
opening of the first Hilton abroad, the Caribe Hilton in Puerto Rico.  
 
5.2.3. The businessman 
Conrad was what scholars refer to as a ‘key figure’. He founded the company, but 
also heavily influenced its development over the years. The memory of Conrad is still 
alive in the company, despite the fact that the Hilton family no longer has shares in 
the business (Hilton 2009). This part of the company’s heritage is still remembered in 
current operations (Carter 2014) and the company’s vision remains: “To fill the earth 
with the light and warmth of hospitality” (Hilton Worldwide 2014a). Conrad was 
involved in the business with a very ‘hands on’ approach. He served as its President 
and Chairman of the board and after Hilton International’s spin off from its parent 
company in 1964 (discussed in Chapter 5.3) he still held a leading position in both 
(he remained Chairman of Hilton Hotels Corporation and became Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Hilton International). He remained very active in both 
positions despite being 77 years old at the time of this reorganisation.  
Throughout the years of both companies’ development, Conrad would regularly 
receive and reply to letters from customers. Documents from the Hilton Collection at 
the Hospitality Industry Archives at University of Houston suggest that he earned 
customer’s respect and was regularly contacted by them, even on the most personal 
of matters. Exhibit 4 presents an example of such a communication from a grateful 
customer.  
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Exhibit 4. An example of a customer's letter to Conrad
14
 
 
The press15 and co-workers glorified Conrad as a very reliable and honest 
businessman. Despite always trying to make the best deal possible, he was willing to 
pay a fair price and was believed to keep his promise. For example, in the times of 
financial difficulty in the 1930s he turned to his hotels’ suppliers and asked them to 
contribute $5,000 each to the payment of the lease on the El Paso Hilton, which was 
the only Hilton hotel to survive the depression. In return he promised to buy from 
these suppliers for as long as he would be in business (Hilton 1957). The company 
documents appear to highlight that the company was saved and then rebuilt thanks 
to Conrad’s negotiation skills. Ironically, the times of depression put Conrad in a 
strong position in the years to come because his company was one of very few 
which did not go through bankruptcy (Hilton 1957).  Table 5-1 illustrates the timeline 
for key events in Conrad’s professional life.  
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 Letter to Conrad Hilton on 23
rd
 July 1974 
15
 Time Magazine, 19
th
 July 1963 
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1919 Conrad buys his first hotel, Mobley in Cisco, Texas 
1925 The Dallas Hilton opens, the first hotel to bear the Hilton name 
1943 Hilton Hotels expands to New York and becomes the first coast-to-coast hotel group 
1946 Hilton Hotels Corporation is listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
1949 The Caribe Hilton opens in Puerto Rico, Hilton International Division is established 
Conrad acquires the Waldorf-Astoria in New York 
Conrad appears on the cover of Time Magazine (being the first hotelier to achieve this 
accolade) 
1954 Conrad acquires the Statler Hotel System  
1955 Hilton creates the first centralised reservation system 
1958 Carte Blanche is introduced 
1964 Hilton International is separated from Hilton Hotels Corporation 
1967 Trans World Airlines (TWA) acquires Hilton International  
1979 Conrad passes away at the age of 91 
Table 5-1. Timeline of key events in Conrad's professional life 
Source: Author’s analysis of archival data and literature 
 
 
5.2.4. The celebrity 
Conrad was an innovator in a range of business areas, one of them was recognising 
the value of celebrity endorsement. Over the years he also built strong relationships 
in political circles and was a close friend of President Eisenhower (Hilton 1957). His 
connections seemed to be most visible during openings of new hotels which were 
often considered a major event and were accompanied by lavish celebrations16. For 
example, The Istanbul Hilton on its opening in 1955 was celebrated with issuance of 
its own post stamp and post code (Hilton Worldwide 2014a), as presented in Exhibit 
5, and was followed by five days of special events17. 
 
Exhibit 5. Post stamp celebrating the opening of The Istanbul Hilton, 1955
18
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 Time Magazine, 19th July 1963 
17
 Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 11
th
 June 1955  
18
 Picture from the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, University of 
Houston 
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Depending upon the location, local royal families or politicians would be invited to 
new hotel openings. Journalists and key figures in business were also flown from the 
US to take part in the celebrations. There would be designated jets chartered to 
transport Hilton’s guests from the US to the new destination on the company’s map 
(for a full list of guests travelling on a chartered jet for the “Around the World” trip see 
Appendix 2). Each opening would be tailored to local customs, but each of them was 
meant to be much talked about. For example, Exhibit 6 presents an excerpt from a 
letter about the expected cultural differences in the Netherlands and adjustments 
which had to be made to please local patrons. Conrad himself was a man who 
enjoyed entertainment and he led celebrations by dancing his favourite Varsoviana 
with one of the celebrity guests (Hilton 1957).  
 
Exhibit 6. Letter discussing the opening of The Amsterdam Hilton in 1962
19
 
 
Conrad would appear in newspapers, magazines and popular television programmes 
including “What’s my line?” (What’s My Line 2013) and “The Art Linkletter Show” 
(Hilton Worldwide 2013). These media often highlighted the political role of Hilton 
hotels and the fact that they were meant to be ‘homes away from home’ for 
Americans. Exhibit 7 presents a page from an in-house magazine “Hiltonitems” 
depicting publicity about Conrad, which clearly highlights his role in the American 
hotel industry.  
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 John Joseph to Robert Caverly on 9th November 1960 
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Exhibit 7. Page from the Hiltonitems Magazine depicting publicity about Conrad, 1963
20
 
 
Conrad appeared on the cover of Time Magazine twice, in 1949 and 1963, which 
was considered an achievement. He received numerous congratulation letters on 
both occasions, including the letter from Howard Johnson, another hotel tycoon of 
the time (see Exhibit 8 for a copy of this letter). Conrad would also be invited to give 
speeches at various meetings from the Annual Meeting of the Public Relations 
                                            
 
20
 Hiltonitems Magazine October 1963, p. 17 
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Society of America21, through to the opening of a Boy’s Scout of America Camp22 
and the National Conference of Christians and Jews23.  
 
Exhibit 8. Congratulatory letter about being featured in the Time Magazine from Howard Johnson of 
Howard Johnson's Hotel Company
24
 
 
The Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives holds letters which were 
received by Conrad and addressed simply to: “The greatest Hotel Man in the world” 
or “King of Hotels New York”. Exhibit 9 illustrates a selection of the letters, which 
reached Conrad despite the lack of address details on the envelopes. All these 
qualities appear to have made Conrad a person who, in the language of the modern 
media, would be called a ‘celebrity businessman’. 
Analysis of the press and media reports as well as communication with customers 
indicates that Conrad was a widely glorified individual. It ought to be considered, 
however, that such findings could also be a result of skilful public relations 
management by the Hilton Hotels Corporation. The available data implies that he 
established his respected position by being an honest and fair partner in business. 
                                            
 
21
 “The Face of America” speech delivered on 15
th
 November 1961 in Houston, TX.  
22
 Dedication of Camp Hilton Arrowhead Springs Hotel in San Bernardino, CA on 16
th
 March 1952. 
23
 “The Battle for Freedom” speech delivered on 21
st
 November 1950 in New York.  
24
 Howard Johnson to Conrad Hilton on 29
th
 July 1963 
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As suggested by Nickson (1997), internal company data, and especially sources like 
autobiographies, need to be treated with caution due to their bias. It needs to be 
noted however, that in the process of this research, no criticism towards Conrad as a 
person or as a business partner was found.  
 
Exhibit 9. Letters addressed to Conrad Hilton as the "Greatest Hotelman in the World"
25
 
 
Conrad, who died in 1979 at the age of 91, left 99% of his $300m fortune to the 
Hilton Foundation (Hilton 2009, Danajo TV 2011). The theme of Conrad’s will was 
the “elevation of human suffering” (Conrad N. Hilton Foundation 2016) and the 
Foundation aims to achieve that through numerous projects including those 
concerned with access to water in African countries, access to education and 
reducing violence (Conrad N. Hilton Foundation 2014). The foundation is also the 
key sponsor of the Conrad N. Hilton College of Hotel and Restaurant Management at 
the University of Houston and the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry 
Archives at the same institution (Young 2014).  
                                            
 
25
 Picture courtesy of the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, 
University of Houston 
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5.3. Development of Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International  
Having introduced the role of Conrad as the company’s founder this section of the 
case study focuses on the early development of Hilton’s domestic and international 
divisions. It discusses the process of development and the business model adopted 
by Hilton to expand internationally. The focus of the discussion moves from the 
domestic operations to the international operations in 1949, when Hilton opened the 
first hotel abroad. 
 
5.3.1. Early development in the US 
Hilton Hotels Corporation began its operations in 1919 when Conrad purchased the 
Mobley Hotel in Cisco, Texas, however it was not listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange until 1946. The development of Hilton Hotels Corporation did not progress 
without certain obstacles. During the depression of the 1920s and 1930s Conrad lost 
control of all of his hotels except for the El Paso Hilton (Hilton 1957, Young 2016). 
Archival sources suggest a number of stories of how Conrad managed to save the 
company, which appear typical of autobiographies or internal company sources 
(Nickson 1997) where stories of crisis and survival are overemphasised to increase 
appeal to the reading audience. One such story known in the company is the one 
about a bellboy who lent his life savings to Conrad thus helping his employer save 
the company (Hilton Worldwide 2012). Conrad’s mother is also believed to have 
invested in the company when Conrad was facing financial difficulties (Hilton 1957). 
Allegedly, as a result of these interventions the company never went through 
bankruptcy nor seized operations.  
Conrad began the development of the company from one hotel in Texas but by 
1943, he was the owner of hotels operating from coast to coast (Young 2016). In 
1954 Conrad led the largest real estate transaction since the Louisiana Purchase, 
acquiring the Statler Hotel system for $111 million. The system comprised of 10 
hotels and was the second largest after the Hilton chain. Following this transaction 
Conrad owned 28 hotels (Lester 2011). Figure 5-2 illustrates the expansion of the 
Domestic and International divisions. It highlights the steady growth of the 
International Division following its rapid expansion from the early 1960s.  
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Figure 5-2. Overview of the number of domestic and international hotels between 1949 and 1969 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
Hilton Hotels were subsequently developed as a recognisable hotel chain. From the 
mid-1950s increasingly more hotels included ‘Hilton’ in their names and the company 
began to introduce innovative practices. For example, in 1955 Hilton launched, what 
the company believes to have been, the first centralised reservation system (Hilton 
Worldwide 2014a). The company boasted about customers being able to book a 
room at any location in the world by contacting any of the Hilton hotels by telephone, 
telegram or Teletype. Guests would also receive immediate confirmation of their 
booking which, arguably, was not previously available. This service was believed to 
be so unique that it was used in the company’s promotional material, as presented in 
Exhibit 10.  
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Exhibit 10. Promotional material emphasising the newly created centralised reservation system (Hilton 
Worldwide 2014a)  
 
In 1958 another corporate service was introduced by Barron Hilton, Conrad’s son 
whose presence was becoming more visible in the 1950s and who, eventually, 
became the President of Hilton Hotels Corporation in 1966 (Forbes 2010). This was 
Carte Blanche, which served not only as a loyalty card but as a credit card which 
guests could use to pay their bills in hotels around the world. It is believed that Carte 
Blanche was the first loyalty credit card in the hotel industry. The correspondence 
from customers suggests that the card was regularly used and was treated as a sign 
of loyalty towards the company because when guests were dissatisfied with their 
experience at Hilton hotels they would return the card. Exhibit 11 presents such a 
complaint where a customer returned his card as a result of unsatisfactory 
experience in the London Hilton.   
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Exhibit 11. An example of complaint which led a customer to return his loyalty card
26
 
 
It was Conrad’s goal to make Hilton Hotels a modern company which would serve 
Americans travelling for business or leisure and he therefore encouraged innovative 
thinking and creative problem solving. By 1963 it was identified that because of the 
development of technology Hilton hotels were no longer competing only with other 
hotel chains but also with media which allowed for communication without the need 
for travel27. The development of jet plane travel was also seen as a threat to the 
company’s operations because it was feared that more people could travel to and 
from meetings in the same day28. Due to declining occupancy in Hilton hotels, a 
Manager’s meeting was called in 1963 with the aim of finding methods of increasing 
occupancy and raising earnings to the targeted $10million29. Exhibit 12 illustrates 
that Conrad referred to this meeting as the most important in the company’s history. 
The guest speaker was Professor John D. Glover of the Harvard Business School 
who stated that Hilton Hotels needed to compete against communication media and 
should do it by focusing on group bookings. He believed that the company was not 
capitalising enough on groups which needed space for meetings (whether formal or 
informal). He suggested a shift in business focus which until then had concentrated 
on providing accommodation and food only to individual travellers.  Professor Glover 
also suggested that the company should consult social scientists to conduct more 
robust market research giving detailed information on consumer’s expectations and 
buying behaviour. He argued that Hilton hotels operated in an ‘experience business’ 
and that hoteliers served as showmen in this business. This can be perceived as a 
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 Letter to Barron Hilton on 26
th
 April 1976 
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 “Summary of Managers’ Meeting” held at Conrad Hilton, Chicago, Ill on 22-24 August 1963 
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 “Annual Shareholders’ Report” 1964 
29
 Manager’s Meeting minutes, 22-24 August 1963, Chicago, Illinois 
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very innovative approach as the term ‘experience economy’ did not appear in the 
business studies literature for another three decades (Pine and Gilmore 1999). This 
was an example of Hilton’s innovative thinking and problem-solving as well as 
flexibility of approach in its management.  
 
Exhibit 12. Conrad's address to the delegates to the Manager's Meeting on 22-24 August 1963
30
 
 
As a result of these discussions Hilton Hotels commissioned a specialised market 
research company31 to carry out consumer research. The company then introduced 
a completely new marketing strategy in 196432 which separated the division 
responsible for events from the rest of the business. Consequently the functions 
(events) division became more specialised at creating a targeted product and selling 
it to specific groups including Government employees. More emphasis was placed 
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on corporate advertising (published in major business magazines and newspapers) 
and highlighting features appealing to business travellers. In addition, a number of 
special programmes were created, including Christmas shoppers’ promotions, a 
family plan and bridal promotion programme. Special programmes for corporate 
groups included an ‘American plan’ and a five-year booking programme. The 
position of ‘banquet specialist’ was also introduced whose responsibility was to: 
“improve the efficiency and enhance the image of hospitality accorded to those who 
attend banquets and Hilton facilities”33. The idea behind these changes was to 
increase room occupancy which, if successful, would increase net income and 
improve the company’s financial situation in the years of depressed occupancy 
caused by overbuilding.  
An analysis of the Hilton Hotels portfolio (available in Appendix 3) suggests that 
Hilton acquired large hotels, with a minimum of 400 rooms and ranging up to 3,000 
rooms in the case of The Conrad Hilton in Chicago. It is clearly visible in Figure 5-3 
that domestic hotels were always larger than those developed abroad.  
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Figure 5-3. Average hotel sizes between 1956 and 1969
34
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
Until the late 1960s the hotels were located either in city centres or at key airports 
(Young 2016). It was not until 1970 that Hilton entered the gaming industry, when it 
purchased the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas (Hilton Worldwide 2014a). The first 
brand focusing on holiday resorts, as opposed to urban hotels was the ‘Conrad’ 
brand, which was established in 1982. For the timeline of key developments in the 
company see Table 5-2. The great majority of hotels operated under the umbrella of 
‘Hilton’ (the documentation does not refer to ‘Hilton’ as a brand at that time) or Statler 
(after the purchase of the Statler group). It was Hilton Hotels’ policy to own the 
domestic hotels but many of them, especially in the early years of development were 
not built but established in existing properties because of the lack of credit in the 
years after the War (Bell 1993). There is little data on the exact portfolio of Hilton 
Hotels before 1949, but what is known is that by 1949 Hilton operated 10 hotels in 
the United States.  
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1946 Hilton Hotels Corporation is established and listed on New York Stock Exchange 
1949 Hilton International division is established 
1964 Hilton International is Separated from Hilton Hotels Corporation 
1967 Hilton International is acquired by Trans World Airlines (TWA) 
1969 The first Double Tree brand hotel opens in Scottsdale 
1970 Hilton enters the gaming sector by purchasing the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas 
1982 Conrad as a luxury hotels and resorts brand is established 
1984 First Embassy Suites opens in Kansas City 
1984 First Hampton Inn opens in Memphis 
1987 Hilton introduces its loyalty programme, Hilton HHonors  
1987 Hilton International is acquired by a British company, Ladbrokes plc. 
1989 First Homewood Suites opens in Omaha 
1990 Hilton Garden Inn is established as a brand 
2002 Hilton Worldwide Resorts is established as a brand 
2006 Hilton Hotels Corporation reacquires Hilton International after 40 years of separation 
2007 Hilton Hotels Corporation is acquired the Blackstone Group 
2009 Hilton Hotels Corporation changes name to Hilton Worldwide 
2013 Hilton returns to the New York Stock exchange under the same HLT symbol as before 
Table 5-2. Timeline of key events in the history of Hilton Hotels Corporation 
Source: Author’s analysis of archival data 
 
 
Since this research focuses on the London Hilton, which was a subsidiary of the 
international division of Hilton Hotels, the development of this division will now be 
discussed. For further information on the domestic operations see Epilogue in 
Chapter 7.  
 
5.3.2. Early developments abroad 
In 1949 Hilton opened his first hotel abroad, the Caribe Hilton in Puerto Rico, which 
led to the creation of the Hilton International division of the company. The 
government of Puerto Rico was looking for businesses to invest in its infrastructure 
and to develop tourism and trade and therefore contacted a number of companies in 
the US. Some sources repeat the legend that members of the Puerto Rican 
government were impressed with Conrad who responded to a letter from them in 
Spanish. However, Curt Strand, a long term employee of Conrad and President of 
Hilton International between 1968 and 1986, claims that Conrad was granted the 
business due to his ground-breaking idea which involved the Puerto Rican 
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Government financing the hotel via bonds and then leasing it to Hilton for a rent. As 
shown in Exhibit 13, the Government agreed to build, furnish and equip the hotel35 
while Hilton was expected to pay back two thirds of the gross operating profit (Bell 
1993).  
 
Exhibit 13. Description of the operating lease model applied in the Caribe Hilton in San Juan
36
 
 
This method of expansion was later to be termed an ‘operating lease’, or ‘profit 
sharing lease’, according to Bell (1993) and would allow Hilton International to 
expand worldwide. The operating lease model allowed for international hotels to 
achieve higher return on investment than domestic hotels because the mode 
involved no investment in real estate37. Strand (1996) believed that by applying and 
popularizing the operating lease model Conrad was able to open hotels from Havana 
to Berlin and therefore to globalise his hotel business. The steady growth of Hilton 
International is clearly visible in Figure 5-2 while Exhibit 14 presents a selection of 
Hilton’s international locations between 1949 and 1969.  
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Exhibit 14. Selection of Hilton International's locations between 1949 and 1969 
Source: Author’s visualisation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
Beginning to face competition from the expanding InterContinental Hotels Group (a 
subsidiary of Pan American Airlines), the management of Hilton International 
decided to expand its operations to other countries. Strand (1996) states that the 
main Hilton International’s development goal was to operate in Europe as this was 
where they saw the greatest potential in terms of both business and leisure travel. 
The busiest year in terms of new hotel openings was 1963 when eight hotels were 
opened in eight different countries, London Hilton on Park Lane being one of them. 
Table 5-3 presents a portfolio of those hotels opened in 1963.  
Hotel Country Number of 
rooms 
The London Hilton United Kingdom 512 
The Athens Hilton Greece  480 
The Rotterdam Hilton Holland 263 
The Cavalieri Hilton, Rome Italy 400 
The Hong Kong Hilton British Colony (in 1963) 867 
The Royal Tehran Hilton Iran 261 
The Tokyo Hilton Japan 478 
The New York Hilton of Rockefeller 
Center
38
 
United States  2153 
Total  5414 
Table 5-3. Portfolio of eight hotels opened in 1963 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
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By the time when the London hotel opened in 1963, Hilton operated 34 hotels in the 
US and a further 21 hotels abroad (see Table 5-4 for details) and by 1966 there were 
more international hotels than domestic. This remained the case until 1969 when a 
rapid increase in hotels in the US meant domestic hotels dominated once again (see 
Figure 5-2). By then there were a further seven hotels in Europe, in addition to 
London: Berlin, Athens, Istanbul, Rotterdam, Rome, Madrid and Amsterdam. 
 Hotels % of hotels Rooms % of rooms 
1963 (the year of the London Hilton opening) 
US 34 62% 29,430 77% 
Europe 8 14% 2,922 8% 
Rest of the World 13 24% 5,561 15% 
Total 55 100% 37,913 100% 
1966 (the year when international hotels outnumbered domestic hotels) 
US 32 49% 29,147 71% 
Europe 10 16% 3,041 8% 
Rest of the World 23 35% 8,527 21% 
Total 65 100% 40,715 100% 
Table 5-4. Comparison of numbers of rooms worldwide in 1963 and 1966 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
However, generally speaking, hotels outside the US were much smaller than the 
domestic ones, ranging from 227 rooms in Istanbul to 480 rooms in Athens (there 
were 512 rooms in the London Hilton). Consequently, as clearly shown in Figure 5-4, 
in terms of room provision, the domestic offering of Hilton Hotels was always much 
larger than Hilton International’s.   
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Figure 5-4. Comparison between domestic and international room provision
39
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
There is, therefore, clear evidence of international expansion in terms of the extent of 
locations, rather than the size of the hotels. Figure 5-5 clearly shows that from the 
early 1960s internationalisation grew in importance and by 1965 international hotels 
constituted 50% of the whole of Hilton’s offering (with room numbers constituting 
30% due to the smaller sizes of international hotels).  
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Figure 5-5. Extent of Hilton's internationalisation 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
It was the company’s management expectation that the International Division would 
target its existing domestic market with the international offerings40. Barron Hilton in 
a letter to his father explained that since the majority of Hilton’s guests abroad were 
Americans, they would be aware of the brand from the domestic operations, which 
constituted an advantage over InterContinental Hotels as they only operated abroad 
at the time (see Exhibit 15 for an excerpt of this letter). Customers would, therefore, 
expect abroad what they were accustomed to at home. It was also noted that 
American tourists when travelling abroad tended to choose hotels with a familiar 
brand and predictable standards41.  
 
Exhibit 15. Excerpt from a letter arguing the competitive advantage of operating a domestic division
42
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In 1965 Conrad Hilton expressed his belief that the majority of economies around the 
world were advancing to the American model and that living standards followed 
these changes (see Exhibit 16).  
 
Exhibit 16. Excerpt from Conrad's "President's Letter to Stakeholders" on 10
th
 March 1965 
 
He expected that this trend would secure the future operations of his company, even 
in the case of political problems in some of the locations, because of geographical 
disparity of the customers. He was therefore willing to penetrate more markets, 
capitalising on these changes and he believed that the company had the momentum, 
the reputation, the personnel and the financial base to do so43. He was also 
confident that the type of hospitality which was to become synonymous with the 
name ‘Hilton’ in the US would be successful in other locations as well. The aim of 
Hilton International was to generate profit but also, like all of Conrad’s undertakings, 
it was to serve a better good. Exhibit 17 presents the statement of Hilton 
International’s philosophy as published in an internal memo from 1959. 
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“The philosophy behind the growth of Hilton International is, of course, to 
develop a world-wide group of hotels that can operate successfully and return 
a satisfactory profit to those having a financial interest in the hotels. In 
addition, Hilton International has been organised to help provide first-class 
hotel accommodations in locations where such facilities are urgently needed 
to further economic development.  
 
In many instances, Hilton International Hotels have become important 
centres of social and business activity in their respective areas – meeting 
places where persons of different creeds and cultures meet and become 
acquainted with one another in comfortable, modern surroundings.  
 
These are true international hotels, combining the best features of modern 
hotel design, construction and operation with the atmosphere, traditions, and 
cultures of the cities and areas where they are located. Hilton International 
Hotels make maximum use of local personnel in their staffing, but at the 
same time call upon key people with outstanding hotel experience and 
abilities from other countries of the world to insure a truly international calibre 
of operation.“ 
 
Exhibit 17. Philosophy of Hilton International from an internal memo dated 1959
44
  
 
5.3.3. Creation of Hilton International  
Hilton International was initially a division of its parent company, Hilton Hotels 
Corporation. However, in 1964 the management recognised that the two would 
generate more profit if operated as separate companies. Conrad believed that an 
international company could not be operated by people focused only on domestic 
operations (Strand 1996). It is also believed that Hilton International was formed at 
the suggestion of some US government officials and that it was supported by 
American ambassadors abroad45. It was therefore decided that Hilton International 
would be separated from Hilton Hotels Corporation and shareholders would be given 
one share in Hilton International to two shares in Hilton Hotels Corporation46. The 
two companies jointly owned Hilton Credit Corporation (trading as Carte Blanche)47 
and Hilton Reservations Services. Hilton Hotels Corporation kept the exclusive right 
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to use the Hilton name in America, while Hilton International had the same right 
internationally (Lester 2011). Separation of the two companies was widely reported 
by the American press, as seen from headlines from Star Bulletin, Wall Street 
Journal, Chicago Tribune and Chicago Sun-Times in Exhibit 18. All articles 
emphasised that the international division was separated because of its excellent 
financial performance. Wall Street Journal reported that in the year preceding the 
spin-off Hilton International had contributed $1,738,888 of net income to the parent 
company’s net of $4,770,356. It further added that Hilton International’s gross 
revenue had been $60,293,972 against a total of $224,577,381 for the parent 
company48. In another edition the Wall Street Journal stressed that Hilton 
International’s assets constituted approximately 10% of the corporation’s total assets 
with value of over $30 million49. The key difference in strategies of the separated 
companies was the fact that Hilton International was not to own real estate but to 
operate using ‘lease agreements’50.  
 
Exhibit 18. Headlines reporting on the separation of Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International, 
1964
51
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Not only did the press recognise the International Division’s positive performance but 
it was also noted in Hilton’s internal documentation. Exhibit 19 presents a graph 
included in an internal report from 1964 clearly illustrating the growing importance of 
this division.  
 
Exhibit 19. Hilton International's Net Profit as presented in an internal report on 14th October 1964 
 
This structural change proved to be very successful for the Domestic and 
International divisions as well as for shareholders. As Pearson reported in “Hotel 
Management Review and Innkeeping” in 1966, Hilton International was the “shooting 
star of the entire hotel world”. Exhibit 20 presents a clipping from this article praising 
the performance of both Hilton companies. Allegedly, after a brief fall, Hilton 
International’s shares brought a healthy return on investment. Pearson credited such 
performance to a number of attributes including:  
 investing in destinations which needed modern hotel facilities and could 
provide cheaper labour than that in the US  
 avoiding presenting an image of an American hotel chain  
 minimising capital risk and cost  
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 attracting young, talented managers.  
 
 
Exhibit 20. Clipping from an article complimenting Hilton's performance
52
 
 
In the beginning, there were only three people working in the New York headquarters 
of Hilton International, and even when the company grew to 35,000 employees 
around the world the headquarters still employed only approximately 200 people. 
The aim was to centralise decision making and prevent the multiplication of layers of 
authority (Strand 1996). It was stated that the company always aimed to place the 
main focus on front-line operations, as opposed to corporate operations, because 
the management came to the conclusion that the headquarters was the only area in 
the business without guests53.  
The ideological objective of the company was and remains “to spread the warmth of 
hospitality” as well as its political goal to serve as a platform against communist 
ruling, both goals resulted in gaining differentiation from other hotel MNCs. Conrad 
did not deny that profit was the key focus of the company, but at the same time he 
insisted on the company having an ideological role. This is expressed in Conrad’s 
comment about the Nile Hilton in 1955: 
“As businessmen, we in the Hilton organisation do not attempt to 
portray that this splendid hotel will be an idealistic operation with no 
thought for financial return. At the same time, to deny any concern for 
                                            
 
52
 Pearson, J. (1966) for “Hotel Management Review and Innkeeping”, August 1966 
53
“Background on Hilton International” memo, November 1973    
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its good-will impact would be equally misleading. (…) In our current 
expansion, Hilton Hotels International views itself as a medium for 
bettering the understanding of peoples by extending the best we have 
to offer in the American enterprise system to other countries.”54 
The literature on Hilton’s history (Wharton 2001) suggests that there were hotels 
which, to some extent, fulfilled Conrad’s ideology. In 1967 Business Week reported:  
“The Berlin Hilton, for example, is owned by the West Berlin and West 
German governments, which decided on a Hilton in the mid-1950s as 
a good way of shoring up the city’s economy and demonstrating the 
Western presence to the surrounding Communist area”55.  
In his cooperation with local investors, Conrad was trying to lead to the achievement 
of his aim. Similarly, in Istanbul, Conrad highlighted the proximity of the Soviet 
Union. Wharton (2001: 35) states:  
“The Istanbul Hilton was part of the bulwark of the Free World against 
the threatened encroachments of communism. It did its work through 
spectacle – not only the panoramic spectacle that it packaged but also 
the cultural spectacle that the hotel itself enacted”.  
The transference of ideology and elements of a ‘special’ corporate culture based on 
religious and political beliefs was at the very heart and focus of the company’s 
international expansion. 
The company successfully established hotels in San Juan, Istanbul, Mexico City and 
Madrid using the ‘operating lease’ model and decided to use the same business 
mode in Havana. However, after the Cuban revolution Fidel Castro took over the 
Habana Hilton leaving the company without the opportunity for negotiation56. Bell 
(1993) believes that this was when Conrad Hilton, John Hauser and Bob Caverly, 
who run Hilton International in 1960, converted the ‘operating lease’ into the 
‘management contract’ model, which was expected to carry less risk. Bell (1993: 28) 
explains that a management contract was an agreement under which “the owners 
took the full risk of operating losses, as well as debt service, and had the ongoing 
responsibility of supplying working capital”. Hilton International was to be paid a base 
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fee of 5% of gross revenues and an incentive fee of 10% of the gross operating profit 
for the use of its name, operations and expertise. It was also reimbursed for all the 
group services, which included the centralised reservation system, marketing and 
the cost of operating regional support offices. Nickson (1997: 187) believes that by 
adopting management contracts Hilton International “attempted to diffuse best 
practice techniques of modern hotel management”. The company was certainly in 
the position to do so because it supplied managerial controls and techniques, 
extensive worldwide advertising, sales promotion and publicity programmes.  
What Hilton International never compromised on was the complete control over 
operations, including the operating budget and its personnel. For this same reason, 
the company held back from using the franchise model57 (with exception of one hotel 
in Hungary) for as long as possible, not adopting this mode until 1965. The 
management believed that it would be impossible to maintain close control of the 
level of service and the standards valued by Hilton around the globe without being 
responsible for the operations themselves (Strand 1996). The company always 
treated the name ‘Hilton’ as, what is now understood as, a ‘brand’ and a valuable 
intangible asset, not wanting to lose control of this at any price. As the internal memo 
presented in Exhibit 21 states, the management knew that one poorly managed hotel 
would have a bad impact on all the other hotels bearing the same name.  
 
Exhibit 21. Example of communication conveying the importance of maintaining the brand standards
58
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When a franchise programme was introduced to the domestic division in September 
1965, under the Statler-Hilton name and logo59 (see Exhibit 22) applications from 
potential franchisees were carefully considered in order to maintain the high quality 
of service provision. Successful franchisees were to gain instant access to the Hilton 
Reservations Service and the Hilton’s expert’s guidance if so they wished60. 
 
Exhibit 22. Logo of the Statler-Hilton franchise properties, 1966
61
 
 
Whilst Hilton Hotels Corporation either purchased or built properties in the US, Hilton 
International never invested in real estate abroad. The only method of operation 
accepted by Hilton International was either a long-term operating lease or 
management contract, with the building being developed and owned by the local 
government, private investor or a combination of the two. This was believed to be the 
key to Hilton International’s success because it allowed for rapid expansion with 
limited requirement for capital investment62.  The company would also only become 
involved in business when large hotels (preferably comprising 500 rooms or more) 
were developed in capital or gateway cities (including hotel adjacent to busy 
airports). The headquarters of Hilton International or Conrad himself would regularly 
receive letters from abroad suggesting investments in various countries, including 
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countries which were under communist government at the time (i.e. Poland and 
USSR). However, all the propositions which required Hilton’s investment in real 
estate or were not located in major cities were always politely rejected63. Exhibit 23 
displays an example of a letter explaining this policy.  
 
Exhibit 23. Response to a hotel investment proposition from 29th February 1956 
 
What Strand (1996) believes to have been the strength of the Hilton organisation 
was the fact that the development division did not constitute a separate entity but 
was geographically dispersed, working closely with people responsible for 
operations. This gave it exceptional product knowledge which only served to improve 
negotiation skills. Being located closer to everyday operations also provided 
advantages of flexibility and the ability to react to opportunities quickly. Hilton 
International developed with speed and, as clearly visible in Figure 5-6, by 1966 
there were more international than domestic hotels in its portfolio. As stated 
previously, because domestic hotels were much larger than those operated 
internationally, the former continued to be the larger division (see Figure 5-4 and 
Figure 5-6).  
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Figure 5-6. Comparison between numbers of Domestic and International hotels 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from American ‘Red Books’ (Appendix 3) 
 
 
 
All international hotels were closely monitored from the company’s headquarters in 
Beverly Hills, with hotel managers required to submit monthly performance reports. 
Allegedly, the aim of this method of communication was to motivate general 
managers by making the results public. The report divided hotels into four divisions: 
honor64, excellent, good and unsatisfactory ranking them in terms of their 
performance. Exhibit 24 presents an excerpt from a report from February 1966 
ranking the London Hilton in the Honor division. The monthly reports submitted from 
subsidiaries to the headquarters were very detailed, Young (2014) stated that they 
even included weather information because in some locations it could have had an 
impact on revenue (Young 2014).  
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Exhibit 24. Excerpt from Hilton International Monthly Report, February 1966 
 
The centralised management was also supposed to enhance communication across 
the Hilton network. For instance, it was highlighted that when one subsidiary of Hilton 
developed a practice which was proved efficient and beneficial to the rest of the 
chain, this practice would also be distributed to other subsidiaries. The excerpt from 
the “Information on Hilton Hotels International” memo from 1960 is presented in 
Exhibit 25 for reference. Decisions as to the communication of such practices were 
taken in the headquarters.  
 
Exhibit 25. Hilton International's statement on organisational learning
65
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5.3.4. American hotels with local flavour  
Hilton International always claimed that it was its aim and policy to create the ‘local 
feel’ in its hotels around the world. This characteristic was also highlighted in the 
company’s promotional material66. Exhibit 26 presents an excerpt from a letter 
discussing the ‘Around the World with Hilton’ promotional campaign planned in 1960.  
 
Exhibit 26. Excerpt from the letter from Kendall-Odom and Associates marketing company discussing 
the 'Around the World with Hilton' promotional campaign 
 
The reason why local ambience was emphasised was partly due to the fact that 
Hilton aimed to encourage local patronage of hotels and restaurants67, despite 
initially focusing mainly on the American traveller. To support this, Exhibit 27 
presents a letter in which Louis del Coma assures one of the London Hilton’s guests 
of the company’s appreciation of local patronage. According to the Hilton 
International’s Shareholders annual report, by 1964 half of the guests at its 
international hotels (excluding Puerto Rico and Hawaii) were said to be non-
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Americans68. As a result of focusing on the local market 40% of Hilton International’s 
revenues in 1973 came from food and beverage operations69.  
 
Exhibit 27. A letter to customer highlighting the appreciation for local patronage
70
 
 
Hilton always attempted to include local design, decoration and materials, while at 
the same time providing the comfort of a modern American hotel with the most ‘up to 
date’ facilities. For example, in Istanbul traditionally designed carpets and other 
decorations were used to convey the feel of the Orient. As argued in Time Magazine 
presented in Exhibit 28, Conrad saw his hotels as a better version of home, which 
one never needed to leave because all services were readily provided. Apart from 
the most modern facilities customers were to receive the highest standards of 
service wherever they went around the world71. 
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Exhibit 28. Clipping from Time Magazine, 12th December 1949 highlighting the range of services 
available in Hilton hotels 
 
The model of adapting local features while providing standardised service is, 
according to the current General Manager of the London Hilton, the one Hilton 
Worldwide applies to this day (Shepherd 2014). The difference now, however, is that 
Hilton Worldwide operates 12 different brands (including full service, luxury, 
‘lifestyle’, focused service and vacation ownership brands (Hilton Worldwide 2014a)), 
as opposed to the 1960s when all international hotels operated under a single brand 
(see Exhibit 29 for a current Hilton Worldwide’s brand portfolio).  
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Exhibit 29. Hilton Worldwide's brand portfolio as of March 2016 (Hilton Worldwide 2016) 
 
 
Despite the attempts to make hotels feel as local as possible, both customers and 
the press felt that Hiltons around the world were highly standardised and that one 
could not tell which city one was in, if not for the view outside the window72. An 
American guest at the Tehran Hilton was reported as saying: “Except for a few 
oriental rugs and the Persian chandeliers, the place could just as easily have been 
Phoenix as Iran”73. Controversially, for some customers this constituted a benefit. 
For example, the predictability of service standards supposedly had a soothing effect 
on a stressed, modern and mainly American traveller, as can be witnessed in this 
piece by Bradshaw for Vogue Magazine in 1965: 
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“We are all the same: the new, the unexpected, the unfamiliar have a 
way of upsetting our stomachs. We blame it on the water. But it’s not 
the water, it’s us. Here is where the network of Hiltons acts as a balm, 
a salve, a glass of Alka-Seltzer.”74 
 American travellers were said to be weary of foreign cultures, languages and 
traditions. Hilton hotels served as a protective bubble in which they could be sure 
they would be understood and served products they knew in the manner they were 
familiar with. Even in a popular television programme “What’s my line?” screened in 
1955 it was joked that when one travels to exotic locations like Puerto Rico or 
Madrid, thanks to Hilton one can be certain to be given the same towel as they would 
get in America (What’s My Line 2013). 
Moreover, as Time magazine (1963) notes, efforts to create a local feel sometimes 
“misfired”. This magazine reported for instance: 
“Spaniards laughed at the peasant-garbed waiters and Madrid’s 
Castellana Hilton right back into tie and tails, and Hilton had to change 
the name of the Opium Den bar in his Hong Kong hotel after the 
Chinese took offence (it is now simply The Den).”75 
Hilton, therefore, had to find the balance between adding local flavour and being too 
patronising or simply misunderstood.  
 
5.3.5. Hilton’s people 
Another aspect which was, arguably, to make the international hotels feel more 
‘local’ was to employ as many indigenous people as possible. Hilton International 
claimed that on average 90% of hotel staff were nationals of the country where the 
hotel was located. On the other hand, every manager, regardless of nationality was 
comprehensively trained on all areas of hotel operation either in the US or in 
Canada76 and there was little room for national diversification at this operational 
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level. It was argued that nationality actually played a secondary role to the ‘Hilton 
identity’ that was inflicted on managers through the comprehensive training. Exhibit 
30 presents Pearson’s commentary on Hilton’s HR practices. The biography of 
Colonel Frank M. Brandstetter provides an example of a hotelman who despite his 
previous experience in managing hotels, had to be trained on Hilton’s own 
procedures before undertaking the management of The Berlin Hilton, and later the 
Havana Hilton (Carlisle and Monetta 1999). 
 
Exhibit 30. Clipping from Pearson's article commenting on Hilton's HR management practices
77
 
 
Senior management were usually selected internally from existing Hilton’s 
employees rather than bringing someone new into the organisation78. In order to 
ensure that company’s standards were maintained in every Hilton hotel, a 
prospective General Manager would have had a minimum of 12 years’ experience in 
Hilton International79. Exhibit 31 and Exhibit 32 present the company’s statements on 
this matter. Area Vice Presidents and Directors who travelled between hotels were 
another measure ensuring consistency of standards80. This practice worked well with 
Conrad’s relaxed way of delegating responsibilities. He was well known for 
presenting only general visionary directions and leaving the delivery entirely to hotel 
managers81.  
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Exhibit 31. Excerpt from the "Background on Hilton International" stating company's policy of 
"promoting from within", November 1973 
 
 
Exhibit 32. Excerpt from the article in Business Week, 1967 di discussing implications of the 
"promoting from within" policy
82
 
 
General Managers would relocate to new hotels approximately a year before the 
planned opening in order to oversee the development, familiarise themselves (at the 
time all General Managers were male) with the local situation and to recruit and train 
staff83. The majority of General Managers of international hotels were not Americans 
(Young 2016) but they were comprehensively trained to represent the company in 
the specific host country. Hilton considered this function to be key and to this extent 
often spouses of perspective General Managers were interviewed alongside their 
husbands to ensure that they both “have poise enough to be gracious in the 
limelight”84. Once the hotel was fully operational, general managers were given a 
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great deal of freedom over running hotels85, assuming they operated within the 
company guidelines. The latter were prescribed in an Operations Manual which 
included all areas of operation86 and to which employees referred to as “The Bible”87. 
On the other hand, the company claimed that it did not wish to standardise its 
properties around the world, each hotel was supposed to develop its own character 
suited to the local community and to the guests patronising it88. Each hotel was 
expected to meet company standards, but achieve these in their own way89. Exhibit 
33 illustrates the company’s statement on how individual subsidiaries were expected 
to deliver Hilton standards. Individual hotels were, at the same time, encouraged to 
share their experiences with the whole chain to improve on the company’s 
performance as a whole.  
 
Exhibit 33. Excerpt from an internal memo explaining the expected individuality of Hilton hotels
90
 
 
Data so far suggests that while Hilton boasted about employing local people to make 
its hotels adjust to the local culture more easily, the management positions were 
filled by people who were comprehensively trained in Hilton’s corporate culture. 
Moreover, local employees were not given much freedom in performance of their 
tasks, but were expected to strictly follow procedure prescribed by the headquarters.  
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5.4. Conclusions 
Chapter 5 introduced the Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International as parent 
companies of the London Hilton and, as depicted in Figure 5-1 as one of the 
contexts in which the London subsidiary was embedded. It is clear that the two 
divisions used different models for expansion. While both primarily adopted organic 
means of growth (with the exception of the take-over of Statler Hotels in 1954), 
Hilton International benefitted from the fact that it did not invest in real estate. Hilton’s 
domestic hotels were owned by the Corporation, but the international properties 
were managed based on lease agreements or management contracts. Such a 
business model was, at the time, considered very innovative. Despite these 
differences and despite the fact that in 1964 the two companies were separated, the 
properties in America and abroad shared great similarities in design, product and 
service style. The company claimed that it avoided standardisation and aimed at 
making each international hotel unique but an analysis of archival data suggests 
otherwise. Not only did hotels abroad visually resemble the properties in America, 
but the majority of Hilton’s practices seemed to be designed so that they ensured 
complete standardisation of hotel services delivery. This particularly applies to the 
selection of staff who managed hotel properties, as well as the close supervision of 
development, operation and performance of each hotel abroad by the American 
headquarters.  
It is clear that Conrad played the key role in the development of his company and in 
shaping its corporate culture. He was considered to be a ‘maverick’ who made 
daring business decisions and who stood strongly by his personal political and 
religious beliefs. Wherever Conrad opened a new hotel, he always highlighted its 
social mission and referred to the values he most believed in, namely faith and 
democracy. He aimed at making his company different despite the threat of not 
being accepted. Conrad not only influenced the strategy of Hilton’s expansion, but 
also helped create its unique heritage which is still cherished by the company today. 
The original mission of “spreading the light and warmth of hospitality” is still the 
official aim of Hilton Worldwide and is visibly displayed in the company’s 
headquarters next to Conrad’s portrait. The company continues to refer to its rich 
heritage and its famous founder in marketing material (Hilton Worldwide 2014b) and 
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promotes its unique legacy through the new history-dedicated website (Hilton 
Worldwide 2015). 
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6. The London Hilton 
6.1. Introduction 
The final section of the case study focuses on the development and early operations 
of the London Hilton. While the previous chapters of this part of thesis discussed the 
context in which the London Hilton was embedded, this focuses on the London 
subsidiary itself (see Figure 6-1). It begins with a review of press reports preceding 
the opening of this property and then moves on to evaluate details of Hilton’s 
decisions concerning its development. The case then focuses on the construction 
and design, operations and marketing strategy of the hotel.  
 
 
Figure 6-1. Multiple-embeddedness of the London Hilton 
Source: Author’s visualisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
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6.2. Controversies surrounding the development project 
The first newspaper article to mention the plans to build a Hilton hotel in London, 
found in the process of this research, dates back to 195191. The Dundee Courier and 
Advertiser announced that the company was planning to develop its London 
subsidiary in partnership with New City Properties, owned by Charles Clore. 
However, it was not until 1957 that regular reports began appearing in the British 
press when the public inquiry into the proposal to build a 35-storey hotel in Park 
Lane opened. The announcement opened a public debate widely reported by press 
including The Times, Manchester Guardian, Daily Mail, Financial Times, Daily 
Telegraph, Evening Standard, The Economist and the New York Times. Exhibit 34 
provides examples of newspaper headlines from 1957 while Exhibit 35 shows a 
clipping from the New York Times referring to the fact that this luxury hotel had 
drawn unprecedented attention to its development. It should be stressed that 
particularly emotive words, such as “utterly inappropriate”, were used by the press to 
describe the hotel.  
 
Exhibit 34. Selection of newspaper clippings commenting on the planned development of the London 
Hilton in November 1957
92
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Exhibit 35. Commentary of the newly-opened London Hilton
93
 
 
The debate about the development of this hotel mainly centred upon the proposed 
height of the tower. The London County Council, following the recommendation of 
the Royal Fine Art Commission, banned the building from being raised as tall as the 
proposed 35-storeys94, one of the controversies being that at this height it would be 
taller than St Paul’s Cathedral. Lord Blackford was reported as saying:  
“To the east we have a lovely structure symbolising the Almighty God, 
to the west a massive structure symbolising the almighty dollar” 
(Wharton 2001: 102). 
A representative of the owner of one of the neighbouring houses commented:  
"If this building is allowed it will represent hereafter a symbol of the 
supremacy in 1957 of a dollar-earning machine over values of greater 
importance and lasting quality”.95 
Another representative of the local community argued that: "Progress did not 
necessarily consist of following the United States in all its actions"96 and that Park 
Lane was not the right location for such a modern hotel. These comments suggest 
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that people feared that Hilton would become a symbol of American influence over 
traditional society and that the height of the building would only make this symbol 
more visible and unforgettable.  
Even the American press noted that traditional British hospitality was, arguably, 
threatened by the modernity brought from America. An example of such an account 
is presented in Exhibit 36 in a clipping from the New York Times.  
 
Exhibit 36. New York Times reporting on the development of American hotels in London, 1953
97
 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the design and location of the proposed 
hotel was the fact that it would allow people to look into the Royal Gardens. 
Allegedly, The Queen ordered additional trees to be planted so that American 
tourists could not look down upon her from the top floor restaurant. Exhibit 37 
presents the commentary on this intrusion on privacy which appeared in the press.  
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Exhibit 37. New York Times and The Daily Telegraph reporting on the intrusion on the Queen's 
privacy
98
 
 
All these fears were, however, rather inexplicable, because Hilton was by no means 
the first American business in London or even the first American hotel. The latter 
was in fact the Westbury which opened just off Old Bond Street in 1955. Before this, 
the Waldorf Hotel was opened in 1908 by an American, William Waldorf Astor (who 
had accepted British Citizenship in 189999). In 1963 there were also a range of other 
American companies conducting business in London and many of these were 
located in Mayfair or in close proximity to this area. American banks100 were located 
here and were one of the reasons why the American Embassy was built in 
Grosvenor Square in 1960. The embassy was designed and constructed in such a 
manner that it made a statement in this traditionally English square. It was meant to 
be large, heavy and overwhelming. The most striking element of its design was (and 
still is) the American eagle which appears to have the ability to watch over the 
square from the top of the building. Locating the Hilton on Park Lane was, therefore 
more than justifiable and placed it directly in the centre of its target market.  
Correspondence between different members of Hilton senior management suggests 
that Park Lane was not the only location considered for the development of its first 
hotel in the city. The other location discussed within the company was the South 
Bank. However, it was considered that Englishmen on business were often 
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accompanied by their wives and that if the hotel was developed on here it would be 
relatively far away from the entertainment and attractions of central London (Young 
2014). 
After many debates, two years of public enquiry and one building permission refusal, 
the London County Council finally approved the plans for the Hilton hotel on 16th 
June 1959. As presented in Exhibit 38, American, as well as British press reported 
on this announcement.   
 
Exhibit 38. New York Times announcing approval of the plans for the first Hilton hotel in London, 
1959
101
 
 
6.3. Development of the London Hilton 
The opening of a hotel in London was seen as a great opportunity for Hilton 
International. Numerous studies conducted before the final decision concluded that 
the economies of Western European countries were very strong and as a result 
attracted much investment from America, which in turn would lead to very favourable 
returns102. London played such an important role amongst these economies that 
opening a hotel in London would mean as much to the International Division, as 
opening a hotel in New York would for the Domestic Division103. A similar 
comparison was made by William Irvin, the Vice President of Hilton International and 
a long-time friend of Conrad’s, who in 1958 recognised the Waldorf Astoria, the 
Plaza and the Palmer House as the most prominent properties for the Hilton Hotels 
Corporation. He then commented that Hilton International needed similarly 
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outstanding hotels in locations such as London and Rome104. Strand expected a very 
high return on investment from a hotel in London (even up to 25%) and equally high 
profits105.  
The business model adopted for the London Hilton was the lease agreement used 
for the majority of Hilton International’s investments abroad at the time. The 
agreement was signed by Conrad Hilton and Charles Clore, President of New City 
Properties Ltd. on 23rd March 1960. The building itself was funded and owned by the 
New City Properties Ltd and rented to Hilton International for 25 years with an option 
to renew for another 25 years at a fair market rent. The exact financial arrangements 
of the lease agreement are presented in Exhibit 39. Hilton was responsible for 
providing all furnishings, equipment and furniture, as well as various consumables 
and working capital. In addition, Hilton was to pay the taxes imposed on the 
occupier. This was a revenue-based lease which would equate to a ‘variable lease’ 
today.  
 
Exhibit 39. Financial arrangements between Hilton Hotels and New City Properties for the 
development of the London Hilton
106
 
 
Apart from managing the hotel, Hilton played a consultancy role in the development 
and opening of the hotel. The company offered a range of services including: 
                                            
 
104
 William R. Irvin to Conrad Hilton on 6
th
 November, 1958 
105
 Curt Strand to Conrad Hilton on 12th January 1960 
106
 ‘London Hilton’ memo, 15
th
 May 1963 
184 
 
 Economic studies of potential profitability 
 Site selection, choice of design 
 Choice of facilities 
 Schematic plans, interior design and decorations 
 Assistance in selecting architects, designers and other key personnel 
 Schematic layout of hotel-specific facilities (laundry, kitchens, air conditioning 
etc.) 
 Choice of specialized equipment 
 Preparation of budget 
 Development project management 
 Training of key personnel 
 Local and international promotion and publicity 
 Organisation of pre-opening events and the opening ceremony107 
 
The main reason why the company was involved in so many different areas was that 
it wanted to maintain the standards associated with Hilton Hotels around the 
world108. Hilton International also secured complete discretion in terms of operating 
policies (including the use of space and facilities), prices, entertainment policies, 
labour policies, wage rates, human resources management and all phases of 
promotion, publicity and advertising109.  
It appears that this agreement involved considerable responsibility on Hilton’s side 
compared with agreements used for other international hotels. In 1960, when the 
agreement was signed, Hilton operated 11 hotels abroad (including three in Europe: 
Madrid, Berlin and Istanbul) (see Appendix 3) and was a relatively skilled 
international operator. Also London, unlike many other locations, was financially and 
politically stable. Such level of involvement on Hilton’s part confirms that the 
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company’s management expected the London Hilton to be a safe and promising 
investment110, a fact which seems to transmit through the corporate correspondence 
discussed earlier. Wharton (2001) argues that unlike the case of other European 
Hilton hotels, in London the company was dealing with an experienced negotiator. It 
was clear that for Charles Clore return on investment was the key concern, while in 
Istanbul or Berlin governments invested in Hiltons for political and status-related 
reasons. Wharton asserts that the London project was strictly focused on profit. 
Indeed, in May 1963, Barron Hilton, in a letter to his father stated that the London 
Hilton was capable of earning as much as $250,000 a month111. Exhibit 40 presents 
a copy of this letter.  
 
Exhibit 40. Letter from Barron Hilton to Conrad discussing performance of the London Hilton 
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Profitability of the London property in its initial years of operation was a result of 
excellent performance as well as income tax benefits. Exhibit 41 displays an excerpt 
from the company’s annual report discussing the key factors leading to the London 
Hilton’s superior performance.  
 
Exhibit 41. Hilton International 1965 Annual Report analysing the London Hilton's performance
112
 
 
Favourable tax regulations were one of the reasons why it was expected that a hotel 
in London would provide Hilton International with prestige from a financial point of 
view because at that time corporate income tax was approximately 50% lower in 
Britain than in the US. Exhibit 42 presents William Irvin’s predictions as to the 
profitability of the London Hilton project.  
 
Exhibit 42. William Irvin commenting on the favourable tax regulations in Britain
113
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6.4. Construction and design 
Before the opening of the London Hilton the company carried out extensive research 
on local customs and consumer expectations. Some customers who patronised 
Hilton hotels in different locations even took a proactive approach and contacted the 
company with a number of suggestions: 
 A regular customer wrote to Conrad Hilton to inform him about the English 
tradition of having a doorman to open the door to customers in hotels of good 
reputation114. 
 The same customer also suggested that Englishmen liked to conduct 
business over a drink before dinner, which was the reason why Hilton should 
have a separate bar dispensing drinks.   
 On another occasion, when plans for the ballroom were being developed, it 
was suggested that escalators would not be a glamorous enough an entrance 
to the ballroom and that stairs and lifts should be utilised instead.  
All these suggestions were taken into consideration and the appropriate 
arrangements were put into place to respond positively to these.   
The controversial tower was designed by an American architect, William B. Tabler 
(serving as a consultant to the Lewis Solomon, Kaye & Partners Company). He had 
worked with Hilton Hotels for many years and had designed the Dallas Hilton and the 
iconic New York Hilton at the Rockefeller Center. The Y-shaped tower rests on a 
rectangular podium which accommodates the lobby, two restaurants, the grand 
ballroom and other public spaces. As a result of its unique shape, the hotel offers 
views over Hyde Park and central London from all of its bedrooms and suites located 
in the tower. The Y-shape also shortens the distance guests have to walk from the 
lifts to their bedrooms115. Exhibit 43 illustrates the original floor plan of the London 
Hilton.  
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Exhibit 43. Original floor plan of the London Hilton from 1963
116
 
 
The plan indicates that the tower was divided into clear sections with guest rooms 
being located on floors 5 to 25 and luxury suites on floors 26 and 27. For the 
complete floor guide see Table 6-1.  
29-30 Plant room for plumbing, mechanical equipment, lift machines, water tanks 
28 Roof restaurant 
26-27 Luxury suites 
5-25 Guest Rooms 
4 Executive offices including General Manager, Banqueting and Food and Beverage 
offices 
3 Banqueting suites 
2 International Restaurant, Patio, 007 Bar, Ballroom 
Mezzanine Accounts and other offices 
Lobby Main entrance and foyer, London Tavern, St. George’s Bar, Scandinavian Sandwich 
Shop, International Arcade 
Lower 
ground 
Trader Vic’s Restaurant, barber and beauty shop, staff cafeteria, staff locker rooms, 
Personnel Office, Housekeeping Office, linen room, laundry, general stores, service 
lifts, cellars, print shop, medical suite 
Basement Parking space for 350 cars, air-conditioning plant, workshops, engineers office 
Table 6-1. The London Hilton floor guide as of 1963
117
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Access to the higher floors was provided by four fully-automated 800ft per minute 
guest lifts, three service lifts and a large-goods lift which could carry up to 
6,000lbs118. Despite the lifts being automatic attendants operated them, surprising 
some of the guests119. Louis del Coma, the first General Manager of the London 
Hilton, explained that lift attendants were there to assist when traffic was particularly 
heavy and they also familiarised customers with this automated service. Exhibit 44 
presents excerpts from a customer’s letter and Louis del Coma’s reply concerning 
the lift attendants.  
 
 
Exhibit 44. Correspondence discussing automatic lifts and staffing arrangements
120
 
 
There were customers, on the other hand, who were not surprised by seeing a lift 
attendant121 and actually suggested that lift attendants should be equipped with more 
knowledge in order to answer customers’ questions. As the first property managed 
by the already famous Hilton company the hotel was considered to be an attraction 
in the London hotel market. Correspondence from early guests to the London Hilton 
suggests that many regular customers of grand hotels stayed in the Hilton simply to 
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‘try it out’. Exhibit 45 presents an example of a letter suggesting that the 
technological advancements of the London Hilton could be used as a marketing 
advantage against local hotels.  
 
Exhibit 45. Example of a letter suggesting using technological advancements as marketing 
differentiator
122
 
 
6.5. Guest rooms 
On floors 5 to 25 there were a range of single, twin and double bedrooms (see 
Exhibit 46 for a floor plan). Most of the rooms were interconnecting allowing for 
maximum flexibility. There were also two lounge rooms (behind and opposite the 
lifts) so that suites could be easily created by connecting them with bedrooms.  
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Exhibit 46. Plans of floors 5-25 and floors 26-27 as of 1963
123
 
 
An innovative type of bedroom introduced by Hilton was a ‘studio room’, both in 
single and double bed sizes. This type of room was without a bed, instead a 
convertible sofa could be converted and served as a bed at night124. The idea behind 
a studio room was that business people could work in a more office-like 
environment. However, some customers complained that such an arrangement was 
not appropriate for the standard represented by Hilton and for the price charged for 
the room125. Exhibit 47 illustrates an extract from such a letter.  
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Exhibit 47. Complaint about the inadequate standard of 'studio rooms'
126
 
 
Floors 26 and 27 were occupied by luxury suites, as seen in the original floor plan in 
Exhibit 46. These rooms were also interconnecting so that suites could be tailored 
according to guest’s requirements. All luxury suites were equipped with king-sized 
beds, living rooms and kitchen appliances.  
The great majority of furnishing, decorations and textiles were British-made and were 
often designed specifically for Hilton127. David Williams, the Decorating Consultant 
and Inge Bech, the Director of Interior Decoration for Hilton International, 
commented in an interview with the ‘The Ambassador’ magazine that: “the colours at 
the London Hilton are the colours of the English countryside. These are what the 
visitor looks for and loves about England”128. As discussed earlier, it was important 
for Conrad to create a local feel in his hotels. The fact that so much British 
workmanship and materials were used in the London Hilton was highlighted in the 
opening speech delivered by him on 17th April 1963129 (see Exhibit 48).  
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Exhibit 48. A passage from Conrad's speech opening the London Hilton on 17th April 1963 
 
There is evidence suggesting that Hilton’s representatives in London carried out 
research on design and décor in other London hotels and compared them with 
Hilton’s plans. Conrad was personally involved in discussions with the consultancy 
team and expected regular reports on progress. In Hilton’s employees’ 
correspondence comparison between the London Hilton and other properties was 
often concluded with a statement that Hilton would represent higher standards than 
its competitors. Exhibit 49 presents an excerpt from one such exchange of 
correspondence between Conrad and David Williams.  
194 
 
 
Exhibit 49. Correspondence about London Hilton's décor
130
  
 
6.6. Food and beverage facilities  
Restaurants and bars located in the newly-opened London Hilton were an essential 
part of the business because, as discussed in Chapter 5.3, Hilton wanted to attract 
local patronage. These outlets were advertised with the local market in mind and 
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were somewhat separated from the room accommodation offering, as seen in Exhibit 
50. 
 
Exhibit 50. Advertisement highlighting food and beverage facilities in the London Hilton
131
 
 
The facility which brought media’s and guests attention the most was the rooftop 
restaurant. This restaurant, located on the 28th floor, offered panoramic views over 
London due to the floor-to-ceiling glass windows. In the year of opening, a fireplace 
was installed as a central island designed to add to the feeling of warmth, as shown 
in Exhibit 51. The main bar was located in front of one of the windows, but in order 
not to obstruct the unique view it was lowered relative to the main floor.  
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Exhibit 51. Rooftop Restaurant with the centrally-located fire place in 1963
132
 
 
The bar and restaurant, or rather the view they offered, were widely talked about. 
Exhibit 52 demonstrates the two-page panoramic photograph published by the 
Illustrated London News. This view over London was considered to be one of the 
unique selling points of the property.  
 
Exhibit 52. Pictures of the Rooftop Restaurant published by the Illustrated London News
133
 
 
The décor of the restaurant, however, was quickly deemed ‘outdated’. In 1967 Hilton 
management conducted a survey amongst customers because they were 
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dissatisfied with the level of patronage. The results of the survey indicated that the 
décor was found to be “too cold and formal”134. The decision to change the 
restaurant came as a surprise to Sir Hugh Casson, the designer responsible for the 
first stage of decoration; he had also decorated rooms at Buckingham Palace, the 
Royal Yacht Britannia and was the Architectural Director for the Festival of Britain135.  
The new interior was designed by the Head of the Hilton Design Team, David 
Williams. He chose a warmer colour scheme for the restaurant and used an apricot, 
aubergine and ruby red colour palette. The main feature of the restaurant became a 
multi-coloured glass screen which when illuminated looked like a jewelled mural136. 
Interestingly, the press reported that Casson had designed the restaurant with 
Americans in mind, while Williams, although being American, had created a space 
which pleased British guests137.  
In the early days of operation, the rooftop restaurant was often a source of guest 
complaints, which could have been one of the reasons for its poor performance in 
the first few years of operation. There is a range of letters in which customers 
complain about staff being disorganised138 and at times even rude139. They also 
complained about service being slow and the fact that food was often served cold. 
They, however, did not blame the individual employees but rather the ineffective 
operations management. Exhibit 53 shows an example of comments received from a 
customer who had an unsatisfactory experience in the Rooftop Restaurant.  
 
Exhibit 53. Example of a complaint regarding unsatisfactory service in the Rooftop Restaurant
140
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The International Restaurant on the second floor, depicted in Exhibit 54, was 
considered the main restaurant of the hotel. It was equipped with furnishing and 
decorations which could be changed on a regular basis to reflect the atmosphere of 
different countries. The idea behind the design was that menus, table decoration and 
staff uniforms could also be altered. However, this operational style was too 
troublesome and was soon changed.   
 
Exhibit 54. International Restaurant in the early 1960s
141
 
 
It was the International Restaurant’s purpose to reflect Hilton International’s 
experience from around the world. Exhibit 55 presents text transcribed from the 
promotional material of The International Restaurant. This highlights the company’s 
aim to be perceived as a chain. By visiting the restaurant in London, guests were 
made to be aware of other Hilton properties.  
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Exhibit 55. Text from the International Restaurant's promotional material
142
 
 
Correspondence to Conrad suggests that guests enjoyed the food served in the 
restaurant and its décor. One customer wrote that “The International Restaurant puts 
everything else in London to shame”143. This hand-written note is presented in 
Exhibit 56 to convey the enthusiasm that some customers expressed towards the 
London Hilton. 
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 Letter to Conrad Hilton on 30
th
 July 1963 
“Hilton Hotels International now operates twenty-one hotels in sixteen countries on five 
continents of the world. Within the next two years twelve more hotels in seven more 
countries will be added to our world-wide group. 
 
In all these countries we have studied and become familiar with the foods and food 
customer, indeed with their ‘Culinary Heritage’. As we have been exposed to these 
heritages our knowledge and interest in this fascinating world of food has grown, and we 
have become increasingly aware of the terminology and recipes of the French classical 
kitchen. With this in mind we felt there was a distinct need in our ‘jet age’, the era of 
world travel and exchanges between countries and cultures at every level, for a 
restaurant which would reflect the many interesting cuisines which exist around the 
world. The direct result of these thought is the ‘International Restaurant’ of the London 
Hilton.  
 
The International Restaurant will periodically transform itself by changing its décor, 
foods, colors, and music, into a restaurant typical of one of the five major culinary 
regions of the world. Geographically these will represent Europe, North America, Central 
and Latin America, the Orient, and the Mediterranean. Each of these regions by reason 
of history, climate, geography and exposure to unifying colonial or other political 
influences, can logically be said to have a recognizable culinary heritage. In order to 
most effectively present each region we will offer not only an authentic menu of its foods, 
but do so against a mood and background that is representative of the character and 
flavour of each. The color, music, arts and crafts, and utensils and accessories of the 
region will be suggested by a change in the murals, lighting, color schemes, and table 
setting of the Restaurant.  
 
Enjoy this adventure in dining and open our ‘menu’ to the world’s cuisines and the 
heritages from which they arise.”  
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Exhibit 56. Example of a letter praising the London Hilton and the International Restaurant 
 
The two stand-alone bars were designed to add to the local feel of London: The 
London Tavern and St. George’s Bar. The latter was designed to resemble a 
traditional Victorian pub, whereas the London Tavern drew inspiration from the old 
architecture of the City of London, but with some modern elements added144. They 
both served traditional English ales and lagers145 and their menus were designed to 
reflect the ambience of traditional English pubs. Exhibit 57 presents the menus from 
these bars.  
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Exhibit 57. Design of menus from St. George's Bar and the London Tavern, 1963
146
 
 
Apart from reflecting the local English atmosphere in the restaurant and other public 
spaces, an exotic feel was added to the hotel by the Trader Vic’s restaurant on the 
ground floor. This is the only restaurant which still operates in the hotel today and in 
an almost unchanged format. The Trader Vic’s chain was very popular in the US 
already in the late 1940s but it was considered innovative in London in 1963. It was 
the first Trader Vic’s to open outside the US (Augustin 2013). Designed in French-
Polynesian style utilising authentic material from the South Sea Island, it serves 
French-Polynesian food. Its main attraction is the traditional Chinese barbecue oven 
which is used to grill meats.   
Hotel guests also had access to 24-hour room service which proved particularly 
popular amongst American customers. Hilton introduced a new system of a key – 
shaped card on which a guest would mark their order for breakfast and place it 
outside the door. This ‘key’ is presented in Exhibit 58.  
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Exhibit 58. Breakfast 'key'
147
  
 
Room service, however, was heavily criticised by customers in their feedback letters 
to Conrad and the management of the hotel. They often complained that it was 
inefficient and that they had to wait for their meals (and especially breakfasts) an 
unusually long time148. Exhibit 59 presents one example of such complaints. A 
number of customers also complained about being served cold food or receiving 
items which they had not ordered. They claimed that such a bad service experience 
added to the London Hilton’s bad reputation in the first few years after opening149. 
One guest thought that it was very “un-British” that a guest had to open the door to 
room service to obtain early morning tea150.  
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Exhibit 59. Example of a complaint about the room service
151
 
 
As previously discussed, the company was very open towards suggestions from 
guests or other members of the local community. Conrad was also often personally 
involved in decisions on the hotels’ offering. An example of his involvement is a 
debate with Mr Tetley about the type of tea served in the hotel. Upon its opening Mr 
Tetley wrote to Conrad to persuade him to serve tea made of teabags rather than 
loose tea in a pot. He highlighted that he was an Englishman and insisted that a 
teabag was the most convenient and hygienic way of having a cup of tea. He posted 
a sample of teabags to Conrad and the latter, treating every area of his business 
extremely seriously, delegated three of his employees (two of them being 
Englishmen) to sample the tea and advise him on the matter. They jointly reached 
the conclusion that the beverage made from a teabag was not as good as would be 
expected from a luxury hotel and made the decision to continue serving loose tea in 
a teapot152. This story reflects how much consideration went into the smallest 
elements of service provision by Conrad himself. An excerpt from this 
communication between Conrad and T.I. Tetley-Jones is presented in Exhibit 60.  
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Exhibit 60. Excerpt from communication between Conrad and T.I. Tetley-Jones concerning tea served 
in the London Hilton 
 
6.7. Technological and operational solutions 
When the London Hilton finally opened, after more than eight years of development, 
one building permission refusal and having been reduced to 28 floors, it introduced a 
number of innovative technological and operational solutions. The evidence from 
Hilton’s correspondence and from archival press suggests that some of these 
innovations proved so successful that they were implemented industry-wide, whilst 
others were not easily accepted by the hotel market in London and subsequently had 
to be altered.   
Among those which had an industry-wide impact were the following:  
 The London Hilton was the first fully air-conditioned hotel in London and this 
was highlighted in hotel promotion and publicity. In the 1960s air-conditioning 
was considered as standard in the US, but there was no hotel in London 
providing air-conditioning in all public spaces and bedrooms. Despite being 
something novel to the London market, the system was heavily criticized by 
customers for being inefficient. Customers usually complained that it was 
impossible to turn the air conditioning off because there were no individual 
205 
 
room regulators. Exhibit 61 presents an example of customer’s complaint 
about air conditioning.  
 
Exhibit 61. Complaint about the air conditioning system
153
 
 
Some guests claimed in their letters that hotel staff were helpless when facing air 
conditioning faults and offered little assistance. One American guest, whose letter is 
shown in Exhibit 62, made a comment that, seemingly, English people were more 
accustomed to inadequate heating, but that Hilton hotels were designed for 
international travellers, with a strong focus on Americans who had different 
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expectations154. In a few cases customers complained about rooms being too hot 
(mainly during the summer), but that the reaction from staff members was similar; 
one letter states that the manager “fixed [the] air conditioning by opening the 
window”. 
 
Exhibit 62. Excerpt from customer's complaint highlighting differences between English and American 
guests' expectations
155
  
 
 Guests could dial their own outside telephone calls (previously customers had 
to use a switchboard). The automatic exchange system had a separate 
charging meter for each room which simplified billing at the end of the guest’s 
stay156.  
 The press praised a range of smaller elements which made the hotel feel 
more modern and advanced. Amongst them were separate iced-water taps in 
bathrooms and TV and radio sets controlled from the bed157. All bathrooms 
were equipped with sockets compatible with English, Continental and 
American plugs158.  
 There were also a number of solutions which were expected to make service 
more efficient. For example, a special shaft was installed through which 
guests could post their letters from any floor without the need for going to the 
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concierge desk (Wharton 2001). The shaft was located next to the lift and run 
across all the floors. A similar solution was implemented to ensure the secure 
disposal of shaver razors (a special container in each bathroom was 
connected with a centralised shaft) and the efficient delivery of laundry159. 
Hilton introduced special shoe cupboards located in the bedroom wardrobes 
as well. A customer would place his or her shoes in the cupboard, these 
would then be retrieved from the outside by a member of staff and cleaned by 
the next morning.  
These are examples of features which might not seem extraordinary today. 
However, in 1963 such technological solutions were highly innovative, hence the 
press writing about them. Not all the practices were so successful and some of the 
criticised elements included: 
 Taped music being played in the lifts and other public spaces160. The press, 
including the Manchester Guardian, (as presented in Exhibit 63), reported that 
it was inappropriate and annoying.  
 
Exhibit 63. Article criticising the London Hilton music system
161
 
 
 The numbering system for floors illustrated how small cultural differences 
mattered in an international business. The American system numbered the 
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ground floor as ‘1’, opposed to it being numbered ‘0’ or ‘ground’ in the UK. 
This feature was quickly adjusted in the London Hilton in order to avoid 
misunderstandings (Wharton 2001).  
 The press also reported on the company’s misinterpretation of local dining 
culture162. For example, it was noted that Hilton International assumed that 
English people drank aperitifs before their meal and iced water with their food, 
much like Americans were known to. However, in reality, English customers 
required the service of alcoholic drinks with their meals, which meant that the 
small dispensing bar inside the kitchen was not able to cope with this demand. 
As a result, the layout of the kitchen and location of the dispensing bar had to 
be adjusted to cater for local preferences (Wharton 2001).  
 There was one element in the recruitment system which, according to 
Augustin (2013), was transferred from America and which had to be adjusted 
to local customs. He claims that it was a standard procedure in America to ask 
job applicants about their position on Communism. In England, where political 
views were seen as something of a more personal nature, this question had to 
be removed.   
Hilton on Park Lane, like all other Hilton – operated domestic and international hotels 
benefitted from the centralised reservation system which, as discussed in Chapter 
5.3, was treated as highly innovative by the company. Other centralised services, as 
presented in Exhibit 64, included inter-hotel promotion and advertising, services of 
the specialised convention and other promotion departments, training programmes, 
credit card service, guest history system and departmental supervision and 
guidance163. Despite their efforts, the management of the London Hilton as well as 
its headquarters relatively regularly received complaints regarding the reservation 
system. On numerous occasions guests would arrive at the hotel to check in, having 
previously received confirmation of their bookings, but only to find that rooms were 
unavailable. 
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Exhibit 64. "Preliminary Understanding for the Development of a Hotel Project in Hyde Park, London" 
from 1953 discussing centralised services available to the London hotel 
 
As the example in Exhibit 65 shows, customers were likely to build their opinion on 
the whole Hilton chain based upon the experience in one of its hotels.  
 
Exhibit 65. Example of a complaint where a customer expresses negative attitude towards the whole 
Hilton chain, having unsatisfactory experience in the London Hilton
164
 
 
Conrad, as presented previously, was perceived to be a great hotelier who knew 
how to please customers and who had wide experience of developing hotels both in 
the US and abroad. The implementation of new practices and innovations, however, 
suggests that even the most experienced company needs time and the criticism 
provided by customers in order to adjust to local expectations. Conrad welcomed 
every opinion received from his guests and for this reason developed a feedback 
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form which was placed in every room for guests to complete. Guests were asked to 
rate every stage of their experience from booking the room to the service they 
received during their stay. The form ensured customers of the company’s mission of 
spreading the warmth of hospitality. As shown in Exhibit 66 it aimed to encourage a 
more personal approach with the last question reading: “Between you and me” which 
was supposed to give the impression that Conrad himself was addressing each 
guest.   
 
Exhibit 66. Last question of the customer feedback form from 1964 
 
6.8. Human Resources 
Hilton International’s HR strategies were discussed briefly Chapter 5.3 of the case 
study. As a reminder, internal documentation and correspondence suggest that the 
company preferred to appoint senior managers from the existing cadre rather than 
bring someone from outside of the company. Employees were moved between 
hotels but often stayed with the company throughout their whole career. Such a 
practice was not unique to Hilton as it was not uncommon in the 1960s to work one’s 
whole life for the same company. As discussed earlier, Hilton would send the general 
manager at an early stage of development of a new hotel, so that he could supervise 
the construction, assist with a range of decisions and have enough time before the 
opening to recruit staff.  
The process was no different in the case of the London Hilton. Louis del Coma, the 
first General Manager of the property moved to London in December 1961165. He 
was responsible for overseeing the whole process of the hotel opening. As 
presented in letter excerpts in Exhibit 67, Conrad asked Louis del Coma when he 
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thought the hotel would be ready to open, which suggests the General Manager was 
considerably independent in his role. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 67. Exchange of information between Conrad and Louis del Coma about the expected 
opening date of the London Hilton
166
 
 
Louis Del Coma, prior to overtaking the management of the London Hilton, served as 
General Manager of two Hilton hotels in Cincinnati, Ohio. He had also served as 
Resident Manager in the Palmer House in Chicago, Illinois, the Mayflower in 
Washington, DC and the Roosevelt Hotel in New York City, all under Hilton167. 
Although a long-term employee of Hilton Hotels, all his previous assignments were 
located in the US. The company’s press release about his appointment (presented in 
Exhibit 68) highlighted that he had served with the US Air Force and fought in Africa, 
Sicily, England, France and Belgium during the war.  
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Exhibit 68. Hilton International's press release announcing the appointment of Louis del Coma as the 
first General Manager of the London Hilton 
 
Louis del Coma remained the General Manager of the London Hilton until 1968 
when his position was overtaken by Louis Blouet. The complete list of all London 
Hilton’s general managers is available in Table 6-2. Other senior managers were 
also long-term employees of Hilton, a great majority of them having worked in North 
America prior to moving to London. Table 6-3 provides details of the other senior 
managers and their backgrounds168.  
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Year of appointment  General Manager  
1963 – 1968 Louis Del Coma 
1968 – 1977 Louis Blouet 
1977 – 1983 Jean-Pierre Piquet 
1983 – 1987 Rupert E Huber 
1987 – 1988 Manfred G Matysik 
1988 – 1990 Tony Potter 
1990 – 1991 Jean Loyer 
1991 – 1993 Michael Schutzendorf 
1993 – 2000 Rudi Jagersbacher 
2000 – 2003 Gianni Riatsch 
2003 – in office at the 
time of writing (2016)  
Michael C Shepherd 
Table 6-2. The London Hilton's General Managers 
Source: Author’s analysis of archival data 
 
Name (age 
in 1963) 
Position in 
the London 
Hilton 
Nationality  Education Career before the London 
Hilton appointment  
Year of 
joining 
Hilton 
Louis del 
Coma (51) 
General 
Manager 
American De Paul University 
in Chicago; School 
of Hotel 
Administration at 
Cornell University 
Long Beach Hilton, Hilton 
hotels in Texas, Los 
Angeles, New York, 
Washington and Chicago, 
The Netherland and 
Terrace Hilton in Cincinnati,  
1939 
H. Ewe-Hin 
Lim (33) 
Executive 
Assistant 
Manager 
(Food and 
Beverage)  
British 
(Singapore)  
St. Nicholas Trade 
School in 
Amsterdam; School 
of Hotel 
Administration at 
Cornell University 
Cathay Hotel in Singapore, 
Hilton hotels in New York, 
Montreal, Sidney and 
Istanbul 
1958 
Douglas S.J. 
Gordon (32) 
Executive 
Assistant 
Manager  
British  Westminster 
School in London; 
Cornell University 
Mount Royal Hotel and 
Grosvenor House in 
London, Royal Hotel 
Scarborough,  
Probably 
1963  
Louis 
Finamore 
(38) 
Banquet 
Manager 
Canadian 
(born in 
Italy) 
Unknown Queen Elizabeth Hotel in 
Montreal , other hotels 
throughout US and Canada 
(no details available) 
1957 
Giuseppe 
Bazzani 
(unknown) 
Executive chef Swiss Lucerne Hotel 
School 
Hotels in Switzerland and 
Europe (no details 
available), Caribe Hilton in 
Puerto Rico, Hilton hotels in 
Istanbul, Berlin and 
Amsterdam 
1955 
Paul 
Archambault 
(31) 
Sales 
manager 
Canadian Montreal University  Bank of Montreal, Queen  
Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal 
1957 
Stuart C. 
Rae-Brown 
(34) 
Purchasing 
manager 
Canadian 
(born in 
Portugal) 
Old Buckenham 
Hall School, 
Haileybury and 
Imperial Service 
College; L’Ecole 
Hoteliere in 
Lausanne; McGill 
University in 
Montreal 
Hotels in North America 
including Montreal, 
Cleveland and Quebec (no 
details available)  
Probably 
1963 
Table 6-3. The senior management of the London Hilton in 1963 and their backgrounds 
Source: Author’s analysis of archival data 
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The management structure in the London Hilton followed a standard Hilton pattern 
with clear levels of responsibility, as shown in Exhibit 69. It was, however, suggested 
that the large numbers of heads of departments was a typically American structure, 
not commonly seen in England169. Arguably, a flat structure with more managers 
responsible for individual business areas, it aimed to minimise layers of decision-
making which was favoured by Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton International.  
 
 
Exhibit 69. Management structure at the London Hilton as of 1963
170
  
 
The hotel employed a wide range of nationalities, which reflected the demographic 
structure of English society after the Second World War. An example of a letter in 
which a guest complained about inadequate language skills of some of the London 
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Hilton’s employees was presented earlier.171. However, there are also examples of 
letters in which guests appreciated foreign employee’s efforts, Exhibit 70 presents 
such a letter.  
 
Exhibit 70. Excerpt from a letter to Conrad praising one of the London Hilton's employees
172
 
 
 
As presented previously in Exhibit 44, within a few months of opening, Conrad 
received letters from customers suggesting that there were too many members of 
staff working in the hotel and that limiting their number could actually reduce the cost 
and consequently lower the room rate173. The replies from both Conrad and Louis 
del Coma suggested more employees were needed in order to familiarise 
themselves with the new hotel building and system of operation. They claimed that, 
with time, the number of employees would be reduced. Indeed, as shown in Exhibit 
71, by June 1963 del Coma in his letter to Conrad reported that he wished to reduce 
the number of employees by approximately 200 people174. He believed that training 
and further familiarisation with the property would enhance productivity enough to 
allow for this reduction.  
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Exhibit 71. Letter from Louis del Coma to Conrad reporting on the developments in the London Hilton 
and plans to reduce staff numbers 
 
Every new employee was given a leaflet, displayed in Exhibit 72, which welcomed 
them to the London Hilton and which stressed that Hilton International was regarded 
as an institution that they should be proud of joining. In the introduction the brochure 
stated that employees could progress in their careers within the company and that 
many senior managers had started out in the same way. Employees were advised 
that they held responsibility for the jobs they were given. Staff were informed to only 
walk on the left-hand side when in the hotel.  
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Exhibit 72. The London Hilton staff welcome book, 1963
175
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Particular focus was placed on staff’s courtesy because the company believed that 
this was “the key to hospitality”. As explained in the staff leaflet in Exhibit 73, this 
applied to both courtesy shown towards guests and to other members of staff and 
was expressed through “The Hilton smile”. There were even special awards for the 
most courteous members of staff. Conrad’s ‘hands-on’ philosophy of treating all 
employees as one big family was transmitted in a picture of his smiling face on the 
cover of the Staff Welcome Book.  
 
Exhibit 73. A note from the London Hilton's courtesy programme, 1963
176
 
 
Every member of staff was entitled to two weeks of paid holiday and one week’s sick 
pay per year upon completion of one year of employment177. Everyone was also 
provided with an appropriate uniform and a locker for personal belongings. The 
design of staff uniforms was, arguably, to resemble those traditionally worn in grand 
English homes178 and they were tailored by a Saville Row fashion icon, Hardy 
Amies. The hotel was equipped with a large staff cafeteria, seen by some as being 
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very much an American feature179. The walls of the cafeteria were decorated with 
pictures of rural North America180. This might suggest that the image presented to 
guests was meant to be traditionally English, while the company itself remained 
American in character.   
 
6.9. Marketing and public relations 
Chapter 5.2 discussed Conrad’s communication and interpersonal skills. It argued 
that Conrad gained the status of a ‘celebrity’ because of his ability to generate 
interest in himself and his company. It could be suggested that these skills 
contributed to the overall success of Hilton Hotels as a business. It appears that 
Conrad also embedded these skills in his company even when it grew to such a size 
that he could no longer personally manage individual properties. All Hilton hotels’ 
openings became major cultural events, attended by personalities from the world of 
film, business and politics. In correspondence to Conrad in 1961 (presented in 
Exhibit 74) Dean Carpenter (Vice President of Hilton International) argued that Hilton 
openings could be considered key events and that it was a chance for the promotion 
of Hilton International. 
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Exhibit 74. Letter from Dean Carpenter to Conrad about hotel openings being a promotional 
opportunity
181
 
 
 Openings were reported on by the press and sometimes celebrated with special 
publications, such as the issuance of a stamp for the Istanbul Hilton (see Chapter 
5.3). It was no different in the case of the London Hilton. The opening of this property 
formed part of the larger ‘Around the World’ tour organised by Hilton on the occasion 
of the opening of eight Hilton hotels stretching from Amsterdam to Tokyo. Each of 
these events was tailored to local customs and traditions. The ‘Around the World’ 
party included over 100 guests who were flown from America on a chartered jet to 
attend the openings in different cities. They included movie stars, journalists and 
television presenters (see Appendix 2 for a list of this trip’s participants). A review of 
the archival press indicates that it was, on many occasions a successful public 
relations technique. The trip was followed by an extensive article182 in the American 
Vogue which detailed the operations of the journey starting in New York’s Waldorf 
Astoria and included coverage of the amenities in the London Hilton and the 
personalities who attended the celebrations. In 1965, Vogue published another 
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article183 about Hilton hotels around the world (including London), where Hilton 
hotels were considered to be “tall glass oases” for American travellers because of 
the familiarity they offered to guests in a foreign environment. Similarly, all major 
English daily newspapers, including the Illustrated London News, The Times, The 
Manchester Guardian, the Daily Mail, The Financial Times, The Daily Telegraph and 
The Evening Standard, reported on the opening of the London Hilton. The Evening 
Standard commissioned the most space and published five different articles on the 
hotel in one edition, including a report by Barbara Griggs who, among other 
journalists, was invited to stay overnight in the newly-opened Hilton hotel184. Exhibit 
75 presents a selection of headings from these accounts. 
 
Exhibit 75. Selection of headings from newspaper and magazine articles published between 1963 and 
1965 
 
According to the Daily Telegraph, the opening of the London Hilton was attended by 
nearly 800 people185 and was widely reported on by the national and international 
press. This event was said to be an occasion for the world’s millionaires to meet and 
the guest list included oil tycoons, politicians and several dukes and duchesses186. 
As shown in Exhibit 76, the black silk ribbon opening the hotel was cut with solid 
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silver scissors by Mrs Maudling, the wife of the Chancellor of Exchequer and guests 
were led to the ballroom to the tune of “Who wants to be a millionaire?”187.  
 
Exhibit 76. Conrad and Mrs Maudling opening the London Hilton hotel on 17th April 1963
188
 
 
A lavish luncheon followed with a menu traditionally written in French, as seen in 
Exhibit 77. The first toast, raised by Conrad, was in honour of Her Majesty the 
Queen and, according to local tradition, guests were asked not to smoke before this 
toast (the Queen was not present at the  opening).  
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Exhibit 77. Menu and reminder from the Opening Luncheon on 17th April 1963
189
  
 
The opening event was by no means the first marketing activity undertaken by the 
newly-opened hotel. As presented in Exhibit 78, the company had advertised the 
hotel using the image of an hour-glass counting down to the time of the opening. In 
the 1960s, a campaign which made the public anticipate the opening of the hotel 
was rather novel. Such promotion was pioneering because it did not actually 
promote the hotel itself but only created an opportunity for the hotel to be talked 
about. 
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Exhibit 78. The London Hilton's promotion prior to the opening in 1963
190
 
 
 
There were numerous events held at the London Hilton which brought extensive 
media coverage. For example, as shown in Exhibit 79, the very first event after the 
opening was the International Reception and Ball for the benefit of UNICEF on the 
18th April 1963. It was attended by Hilton senior managers, their wives, politicians, 
millionaires and other celebrities. Food from all corners of the world was served and 
entertainment was provided by eight different groups and performers. It was Hilton’s 
tradition to involve charity events as part of opening ceremonies (Young 2016), 
whether in the US or abroad.  
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Exhibit 79. Announcement of the International Reception and Ball for UNICEF on 18th April 1963
191
  
 
In the years following the opening the hotel attracted a range of extraordinary events:  
 The Rolling Stones visited the hotel in 1965 and it is believed that this is 
where Keith Richards wrote the famous riff to the song ‘Satisfaction’ (Augustin 
2013). These bands were in the peak of their careers in the 1960s so their 
visits would undoubtedly bring considerable attention to the hotel 
 A lecture by the Indian guru Maharish Mahesh Yogi which was attended by 
the Beatles in 1967 
 Throughout the years the London Hilton has regularly been visited by famous 
individuals including Princess Diana, Dalai Lama, Muhammad Ali and Ray 
Charles as well as heads of states and members of royal families from around 
the world 
Apart from a good relationship with the media, which the London Hilton clearly had, it 
also issued its own in-house magazine. ‘The London Hilton Magazine’ included 
information on shopping, dining and entertainment as well as tourist information. 
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Additionally, it regularly published business – related articles, advice on financial 
investments and commentary on current affairs. This can be seen as a ploy to 
appeal to business customers. The May 1963 edition192 of the Magazine published 
congratulation cables from The Chancellor of Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, the 
Ambassadors of Spain, the Netherlands and the US as well as a welcome message 
from Conrad. In this note Conrad highlights how essential the London Hilton is to the 
whole organisation and how British craftsmanship and workmanship contributed to 
the development of the property. He also referred to London as “one of the truly 
great cities of the world”, but it is worth noting that he used the same term to 
describe Rotterdam during the hotel opening ceremony there and added that 
“Rotterdam is a key city in Europe”193. In August 1963 the London Hilton Magazine 
added another column, “Last month at the London Hilton”, which presented pictures 
from various events taking place at the hotel and photographs of famous guests (the 
title of the column was changed in November 1963 to “Hilton Notebook”). The 
Magazine also published news on “Hilton happenings around the world” which 
promoted other hotels in the chain.  
 
6.10. Business travel advertising  
Between 1963 and 1964 Hilton Hotels introduced a new marketing strategy which 
also involved new forms of advertising (see Chapter 5.3 for a discussion on this 
change). Until that point advertising of Hilton hotels highlighted superior facilities, 
services and locations of properties in the chain, such as in the examples of the 
‘Hilton Hospitality’ campaign from the late 1940s and 1950s presented in Exhibit 80.  
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Exhibit 80. Examples of 'Hilton Hospitality' campaign from the late 1940s and 1950s
194
 
 
Following the new strategy, advertising became much more focused and was more 
directly targeted at business travellers. Promotional material now presented facilities 
appealing to business visitors, including the centralised reservation system. It was 
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also more strategically placed in business magazines and newspapers195. Despite 
the fact that the domestic and international divisions were now separate companies, 
Hilton International’s Annual Report196 stated that it was part of the company’s 
strategy to encourage business executives to use Hilton hotels as locations for 
meetings and conferences. It stated that the company’s PR was geared to the 
objective of maximizing the business potential which would suggest more of a focus 
on business visitors as well as hosting conferences and other related events. This 
suggests that similar marketing strategies were undertaken despite the separation of 
the two divisions.   
The campaign followed the results of a dedicated market research study on 
preferences and requirements of business travellers197. The findings revealed that 
there were two key factors essential for business travellers when choosing 
accommodation: facilitating the conduct of business and replacing the home. The 
features that businessmen were found to appreciate most were: 
 Convenience of location 
 Good telephone services 
 Cleanliness 
 Comfortable room 
 Good service 
 Recreation facilities 
 Good food  
It was highlighted that business people had to rely heavily on hotel staff in terms of 
communication because all information was passed by desk clerks, telephone 
operators and bell boys. The report concluded that what business travellers actually 
required from hotels was not glamour and luxury but reliability of basic services like 
laundry, switchboard operators, room service and a reservations centre.  
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The implications of this research, and the resulting marketing strategy, were clearly 
visible in the promotional material of the London Hilton. The promotional leaflet in 
Exhibit 81 can be seen to directly address business executives and highlights the 
availability of all the facilities deemed essential by business travellers, including 
multilingual switchboard, secretarial staff and “suites which can be used for living as 
well as business purposes”.  
 
Exhibit 81. The London Hilton's marketing targeted at business travellers, 1963
198
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Hilton provided conference and banqueting space which was, at the time, 
unmatched by the London hotel market. It boasted the largest ball room of 126 feet 
by 80 feet, which could accommodate 1,000 dinner covers. The ballroom could also 
be divided into three smaller sections with “disappearing walls”. It was equipped with 
a stage, television facilities, simultaneous translation equipment and a VIP lift 
connecting the ballroom with the garage directly199. Apart from the ballroom, the 
hotel also offered seven rooms which could be booked for private dining or 
conference meetings. Feron (1963) stated in his article that at the time of opening 
Hilton had 500 functions bookings for the first year of operation. Exhibit 82 presents 
an example of an event booking form from 1966.  
 
Exhibit 82. The London Hilton's event order form
200 
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It is clear, therefore, that Hilton was aiming to attract the business sector. Chapter 4, 
which discusses the socio-cultural and economic environment of the 1960s London 
as well as the American influence on it, demonstrates how timely this marketing 
strategy was.  
 
6.11. The state of the London hotel scene in the 1960s  
When the London Hilton opened in 1963 it had to face a number of established 
London hotels. The actual competitors for Hilton are, however, open to discussion 
because of the modern style of the hotel and its then target market. The 
Economist201 divided London hotels in 1963 into three categories: 
 Luxury 
 First class 
 Second class  
The ‘luxury’ category included the Savoy, Claridge’s, Dorchester, Grosvenor House 
and Ritz. These were the traditional grand hotels which had been operating since as 
far as the 19th century (the Savoy), had survived the Second World War and were 
well established on the London hotel scene. Their ‘luxury’ status came not only from 
the extravagant décor but also from the standard of service they provided. The 
standard of service was, however, a direct result of the staff to guest ratio, which in 
these hotels was believed to be 3-1202. The traditional approach to hotel-keeping in 
these institutions determined also the style of service and, for example, forbade them 
from having retail units in their lobbies. Wharton (2001: 102) comments on the 
unique style of the traditional luxury hotels:  
“Though hotels like the Savoy and the Dorchester still suffered in the 
1950s from shortages of material for refurbishing and still resisted 
such modernizations as showers and in-room radios (much less ice-
water spigots in every bathroom), they still offered unsurpassable 
personal service, generously scaled rooms and English tradition”.  
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This quotation suggests that the traditional setting was treated as equally important 
as technological innovations.  
On the day of the opening of the London Hilton, the Financial Times published an 
article on the hotel and its potential impact on other hotels in London203. It stated that 
managers of other luxury hotels appeared ‘unconcerned’ about this new arrival 
because they could not imagine their guests choosing to stay in the utterly modern 
Hilton instead of their carefully crafted and traditional establishments. It appears that 
the Financial Times positioned Hilton in the same competitive grouping as these 
luxury hotels, at least according to the price range it operated. The Hilton was 
cheaper than Claridge’s, the Savoy and the Dorchester, but more expensive than the 
Hyde Park and the Ritz. However, all these hotels operated in the same upper-class 
range. Hilton, according to Financial Times (1963), was different from these hotels 
due to certain aspects including the usage of space, smaller bedrooms, more space 
dedicated to selling goods, and its centralised operations system. In comparison, in 
the Dorchester there was a team of staff dedicated to each floor, while in the Hilton a 
guest “may never see the same waiter’s face twice”204. The article concluded that the 
success of the Hilton hotel would purely depend on customers’ preference as to 
whether to stay in a traditional hotel environment or a modern setting.  
The Economist205, on the other hand, placed Hilton in the same group as the Carlton 
Tower, which it labelled ‘first class’ hotels. These were the hotels which targeted the 
“upper middle class market”, but represented a different style compared to luxury, 
traditional hotels. The Carlton Tower, for example, was the first skyscraper hotel in 
London (although this status was subsequently granted to Hilton). It was 18 storeys 
high and was modern in design and décor. It was another hotel, after the Westbury, 
managed by American operators; owned by Edgar Investments Ltd, it was leased 
from 1961 for 90 years to the Hotel Corporation of America (Sheppardson 1991). 
Sheppardson (1991) believes that the Carlton Tower was the first hotel to install 
American management methods and clearly targeted American travellers. He does 
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not, however, discuss the exact methods applied by the Hotel Corporation of 
America to manage this property. The difference between the Carlton Tower and the 
Hilton lies mainly in the fact that the former was not a recognisable member of a 
branded chain, similar to other chain hotels operating in London at the time. The 
‘Hilton’ brand was, on the other hand, already widely recognisable in America and 
Europe. The Economist noted that, as opposed to luxury hotels, the Hilton dedicated 
much space in the lobby to retail units. It stated that ‘first class’ hotels generated the 
majority of profit from selling bedrooms while a large proportion of luxury hotels’ 
income came from banqueting and the hiring of ballrooms. In a later edition of the 
Economist (1963) it was, however, claimed that the Hilton put particular focus on 
functions and meetings facilities because “private guests are not the way to keep 
expensive hotels running these days”206. Some analysts feared that, with the 
expansion of hotel provision, London would follow America in being oversupplied207. 
Most importantly, however, the Financial Times highlighted the fact that the Hilton 
supplied incomparable business and conference facilities which were not available in 
any other hotel in London at the time. These facilities could accommodate as many 
as 1,000 delegates and the Hilton’s sales team was in contact with 1,500 
international trade and professional associations all of which were potential 
customers208. This appears to be in line with Hilton’s strategy which was transformed 
in 1963 and 1964 in order to attract more local custom and to appeal to the 
conference or event market (see Chapter 5.3). The Financial Times, moreover, 
argued that by doing this Hilton could potentially generate more business to other 
London hotels because such large events would require more accommodation than 
Hilton could offer alone. This, and the analysis of the case study suggest that Hilton 
placed more focus on conferences and functions than other hotels from the ‘first 
class’ category, in which it followed the example of luxury hotels. The London Hilton 
was yet another example of making the most of available space, a skill which 
allowed Conrad to develop his business in the first place.  
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When discussing the hotels belonging to the ‘first class’ category (as categorised by 
the Economist 1963), one cannot omit the Westbury, which was essentially the first 
American hotel to open in London. Upon its opening in 1955, the ‘Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper’ dedicated a special report to its design and the services provided. 
Exhibit 83 presents the first page of this report. Besides this article there seemed to 
be little publicity on the Westbury and it rarely appears in the literature about London 
hotels. Sheppardson (1991: 84) claims that the Westbury “never fulfilled its 
potential”, and indeed, despite its high standard of service it is rarely listed along 
other London hotels. The building on the corner of Old Bond and Conduit Street was 
owned by the Pearl Assurance Co. and was leased to Knott Hotels Company for a 
period of 90 years. Its design was meant to resemble its counterpart in America with 
the Polo Bar directly modelled on the bar at the New York Westbury. It consisted of 
220 en-suite bedrooms, all equipped with radios and wired for television. All public 
spaces including restaurants were air-conditioned. The hotel was clearly aimed at 
the American market. The ‘Caterer and Hotelkeeper’ notes that bathrooms were 
equipped with adapters for American shavers, but it does not mention any provision 
for continental equipment209.  
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Exhibit 83. Special report on the opening of the Westbury Hotel in 'Caterer and Hotelkeeper’ (1955)
210
 
 
The third type of hotels discussed by the Economist were so-called ‘second class’ 
hotels and included boarding houses whose prices and service standards were 
considerably lower and which did not seemingly constitute competition to the hotels 
discussed above.  
 
6.12. London hotels’ reactions to the London Hilton opening  
Despite the fact that the Economist (1963) claimed that managers of the London 
hotels appeared ‘unconcerned’ about the London Hilton opening, some of the 
existing hotels went through a range of redecorations and changes around that time. 
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that these redevelopments were a direct 
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result of the threat from the newly-opened Hilton and more focused archival data is 
needed to comment on this. All that can be stated is that New York Times211 
reported the following in 1963: 
 the Dorchester was redecorating its front hall and main lounge,  
 the Westbury was redesigning its bedrooms,  
 the Carlton Tower was extending the ballroom and 
 the Mayfair was planning to add another 30 bedrooms.  
Earlier, in 1955, the Waldorf and the Grosvenor House also underwent refurbishment 
and opened additional bars212.  
The New York Times213 commented that the Savoy, the Connaught, the Ritz and the 
Claridge’s seemed undisturbed by the opening of the Hilton because they were 
confident about their own status on the London market and the fact that an American 
tourist coming to London “should stay in a good English hotel”214. They appeared not 
to consider that guests would want to stay in the Hilton because of its novelty and 
simply to experience the brand. It appeared unaware of the modern type of traveller 
the Hilton aimed to attract: the wealthy American businessman felt uneasy in the 
extravagant interiors of ‘luxury’ hotels and instead appreciated the familiarity of Hilton 
(Wharton 2001).  
The discussion on the London hotel scene in the 1960s suggests that when the 
London Hilton opened, it found itself in competition not only with specific hotels, but 
actually with the hotel-keeping style which was well established and widely practiced 
in London. The hotels which were considered to be in the ‘luxury’ category 
represented the traditional English style both in décor and in service provision. 
Decades of heritage constituted their competitive advantage. As a result of this, 
Hilton had to find its own niche and convince customers that an utterly modern hotel 
like the Hilton could be a substitute for traditional grand hotels such as the Savoy or 
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Dorchester. On the other hand, when entering London, Hilton already had its 
established hotel management concept which was developed through the 
experience in the international hotel market. Therefore, it could be suggested that 
the London Hilton positioned itself between the traditional ‘luxury’ hotels and the 
modern ‘first’ class hotels, such as the Carlton Tower.  
 
6.13. Conclusions 
Analysis of archival data suggests that the development of the London Hilton 
followed the same pathway as other Hilton International’s hotels. Despite the claims 
of adjusting the hotel to local culture and the expectations of the local clientele, the 
hotel closely resembled other hotels in the chain. It was built and decorated using 
British material and workmanship but the overall feel and style of the building 
followed the Hilton pattern. The standardised operational practices were also 
prescribed by the headquarters in America and their delivery was ensured by the 
strict training of staff and the involvement of an expatriate management team. 
Furthermore, Conrad personally supervised the development of the property and 
was actively involved in monitoring its performance in the first few years of operation.  
The London Hilton was not expected to play any major political role compared to the 
Istanbul or the Berlin hotels, nevertheless, its construction was a reason for many 
disputes in London’s society. The London Hilton was initially unwelcome and after 
the opening was often compared to some of the London grand hotels. In this 
comparison Hilton stood out as a modern, standardised hotel which aimed to attract 
business travellers and tourists who were not looking for grandness and flamboyant 
décor but rather for efficiency and comfort. It was expected by the parent company 
that Hilton’s recognisable brand would be the key appealing factor. Indeed, the 
analysis of correspondence from customers illustrates that many customers were 
familiar with this chain and were holders of its loyalty card.  
Despite being different from the existing hotels, it appears that the Hilton was not 
perceived to be a threat to the existing London hotel market in 1963. A number of 
hotels updated their offering, but they did not change the décor or style of service 
delivery. It was suggested that the London Hilton, by offering exceptionally large 
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conference facilities actually contributed to creating more demand for other hotels 
and the two decades after the opening of this property saw rapid influx of similar 
modern, mid-market hotels.  
Since its opening, the London Hilton has operated with few alterations to the core 
design. Restaurants have changed management and décor, but have remained 
largely in the same form as initially designed (with Trader Vic’s not changing at all). 
With the development of technology, various solutions including lifts and air 
conditioning have also been improving. The ownership of the building has changed a 
number of times but since 1963 the hotel has remained under the operation of the 
Hilton brand. The ownership of Hilton International has gone through a number of 
transformations, but this has arguably had little effect on the London Hilton because 
of the long-term lease agreement signed back in 1960 and because of the relative 
independence of Hilton International even when owned by other companies.  
Together with the increasing internationalisation of many industries, more American 
branded hotels have appeared on the London hotel market, with the InterContinental 
opening in very close proximity in 1975. In 1986 Hilton International took over the 
management of the Langham215 (although it has since lost this management 
contract) and, as of 2015, it operates 38 properties216 in London. The first time Her 
Majesty the Queen visited the Hilton on Park Lane was in 2002 (Augustin 2013) 
when she participated in a charity event.  
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7. Epilogue   
In 1967, three years after the international operations were separated from Hilton 
Hotels Corporation and four years after the opening of the London Hilton, Hilton 
International was bought for $85 million by Trans World Airlines (TWA). Table 7-1 
presents the timeline of key events in which the International division has been 
involved.  
1967 TWA acquires Hilton International 
1985 Allegis buys Hilton International from TWA 
1987 Hilton International is acquired by the Ladbroke Group Plc.  
1999 The Ladbroke Group changes its name to Hilton Group Plc. 
2006 Hilton Hotels Corporation reacquires hotel interests from Hilton Group Plc. 
2007 Hilton Hotels Corporation is acquired by the Blackstone Group  
2009 Hilton Hotels Corporation changes its name and logo to Hilton Worldwide  
2013 Hilton Worldwide returns to the New York Stock Exchange under the HLT ticker symbol  
Table 7-1. Timeline of key changes in Hilton International's ownership (Hilton Worldwide 2014a) 
Source: Author’s analysis of archival data 
Hilton International was to become a subsidiary of TWA but at the same time it was 
to operate as a separate entity, under essentially the same management and the 
same operating policies217. As presented in Exhibit 84, Conrad referred to this 
transaction as a merger and not an acquisition. As shown in Exhibit 85, at the time of 
this transaction there were 40 properties in the Hilton International’s portfolio. 
 
Exhibit 84. Conrad's announcement of the planned merger with TWA in his letter to shareholders
218
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TWA was not the only airline to have invested in a hotel division. Pan American 
Airlines had launched InterContinental hotels in 1946. The idea behind such 
investments was the integration between the hotel and the airline businesses219, 
however Strand (1996) heavily criticises this justification. He states that there were 
some mutual advantages to this acquisition but the idea of benefitting from the 
synergies between markets was overestimated. He argues that the markets of the 
two companies overlapped only slightly, because economy-class fliers, who 
constituted 95% of all TWA’s passengers, would not stay in five-star Hilton 
International’s hotels. Moreover, he claims that the geographical distribution of 
Hilton’s hotels and TWA’s flight destinations did not complement each other enough 
to benefit from a shared network.  
 
Exhibit 85. Hotels under Hilton International's management at the time of merger with TWA 
. 
Lester (2011) believes that it was Barron Hilton who encouraged his father, the 
holder of the majority of shares in Hilton International, to sell out to TWA. Instead of 
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gaining value, however, the TWA shares halved in value (Grant 2004) and Hilton 
International was sold to TWA the same year. The $85 million paid by TWA for the 
company constituted a very good return on the $300,000 invested into the company 
20 years earlier (Strand 1996). However, both Curt Strand and Conrad later claimed 
that selling out was a mistake. A year after the acquisition TWA began suffering 
substantial losses whilst Hilton International performed well. As a result, Hilton 
International’s earnings covered the airline’s losses (Strand 1996). It is believed that 
Conrad admitted in conversation with Curt Strand to having made three major 
mistakes in his life: “selling Hilton International, not acquiring the Plaza Hotel in New 
York permanently and marrying Zsa Zsa Gabor” Turkel (2009: 147). This is clearly 
an anecdotal quote and one can possibly never know the truth about Conrad’s 
feelings on these matters. It, nevertheless, highlights that selling Hilton International 
was an important moment both for the business and for Conrad personally.  
18 years after the acquisition, TWA was broken into four holding companies and 
Hilton International, as the most attractive of these companies, was bought by United 
Airlines (operating as Allegis at the time). United Airlines was, however, itself broken 
up shortly afterwards and in 1987 Hilton International was acquired by the British 
betting conglomerate, Ladbrokes (Ladbrokes 2015). Quek (2007) states that the 
internationally known Hilton’s brand was one of the main motives for this acquisition. 
Ladbroke hoped that Hilton International would help it transform the image of being a 
betting shop chain to a hotel conglomerate group. Consequently in 1999 the 
Ladbroke Group changed its name to Hilton Group Plc. It is important to note that the 
rights to use the name ‘Hilton’ were still divided between Hilton Hotels Corporation in 
America and Hilton Group Plc in Europe (see Chapter 5.3 for discussion on 
separation of Hilton International from Hilton Hotels Corporation). Hilton Group Plc 
had the right to use the ‘Hilton’ name in the international (non-American) market 
while Hilton Hotels Corporation had the same right in the US.  
Back in America in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, Barron Hilton, now the 
President of Hilton Hotels Corporation, focused on the gaming industry, which in 
1985 provided 40% of the company’s operating income (Grant 2004). Meanwhile 
other hotel groups such as Marriott and Hyatt were investing in luxury hotels which 
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encouraged Barron to pledge $1.4 billion to renovate the older properties in order to 
keep pace with competitors.  
Hilton Hotels Corporation (the American arm of the company) entered the 
international market with the Conrad Hotels brand in 1982 and later with Hilton 
Garden Inn in 1996. Finally, in 2005 Hilton Hotels Corporation reunited the company 
by purchasing the hotel interests of Hilton Group Plc. All Hilton brands operated, 
again, under the same management and Hilton Hotels Corporation became one of 
the most geographically dispersed hospitality groups in the world. Two years later, 
Hilton Hotels Corporation was acquired by a private equity investment bank, 
Blackstone, renaming it Hilton Worldwide in 2009 (Hilton Worldwide 2014a). This 
transaction made Blackstone, at the time, the largest hotel owner in the world (Lester 
2011)220. In May 2015 Blackstone sold 90 million shares of Hilton Worldwide through 
Initial Public Offering, reducing its stake to less than 50% (Bloomberg Business 
2015) and consequently transforming Hilton Worldwide into a public company. The 
company boasts 4,661 hotels offering 764,748 rooms across 102 countries and 
territories (Hilton Worldwide 2016) and continues to expand.  
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Part 3 – Contributions of the research to international business  
The third and final part of the thesis analyses the case constructed in Part 2. It draws 
on the review of previous research and the conceptual framework designed in Part 1. 
This part synthesises historical data with theories of international business, offers a 
discussion of findings and forwards the conclusions derived from the study.  
 
8. Internationalisation through knowledge transference 
8.1. Introduction 
The review of previous research arrived at the framework whose aim is to drive the 
analysis of the process of internationalisation and the transference of knowledge 
from the Hilton’s headquarters to its London subsidiary. Following the model 
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and the procedure explained in the 
Methodology, interpretive coding was applied to the case study in order to discuss 
findings in reference to the study’s theoretical underpinning. Figure 8-1 depicts the 
elements of the framework together with the umbrella concepts from which these 
elements conceptually originate. This framework also presents the relationships 
between the individual concepts observed by this study. This chapter discusses how 
the relationships were derived.  
The chapter follows the themes identified through the interpretive coding and 
discusses the processes of Hilton’s internationalisation and knowledge transference. 
It considers the three key groups of players involved in this transference, namely its 
founder, employees and customers. It then discusses the consequences of multiple-
embeddedness and the range of pressures resulting from multiple-embeddedness. 
Finally, the chapter focuses on liability of foreignness faced by the London Hilton 
hotel.  
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Figure 8-1. Framework highlighting the relationship between theoretical concepts 
Source: Author’s visualisation base of review of previous research 
 
8.2. The process of internationalisation  
MNCs are companies which operate in multiple countries by transferring abroad their 
asset-based and institutional ownership advantages while maintaining control over 
these advantages (Dunning and Lundan 2008). MNCs decide to undertake an 
internationalisation strategy for a variety of reasons (i.e. seeking natural resources, 
market, efficiency or strategic capabilities) and adopt various modes in order to do 
so. An analysis of the process of Hilton’s development abroad indicates that Hilton is 
representative of the concept of a MNC with its key elements of transferring 
knowledge and expertise and maintaining control over invested resources. It is 
evident that Hilton used its experience and knowledge to control assets which it did 
not own, such as local decoration material, workmanship and design. This allowed 
for fast and successful organic growth facilitated by the transference of knowledge 
instead of the movement of tangible resources. The network perspective seems to 
be best suited to explain the structure and nature of the company (Johanson and 
Vahlne 2009). Hilton International, being essentially a management company (with a 
high degree of consultancy services provided), can therefore be considered a 
knowledge-based network (Dunning and Lundan 2008, Ferraris 2014).  
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MNCs are largely motivated to increase their extent of internationalisation in the 
interest of their shareholders, as opposed to the interest of the wider community of 
which they are a part (Dunning and Lundan 2008). This is supported by Hilton’s 
stated intentions:  
“The philosophy behind the growth of Hilton International is, of course, 
to develop a world-wide group of hotels that can operate successfully 
and return a satisfactory profit to those having a financial interest in 
the hotels. In addition Hilton International has been organised to help 
provide first-class hotel accommodation in locations where such 
facilities are urgently needed to further economic development”.221  
This statement suggests that while Conrad had ambitious political and economic 
aims to develop his company, the utmost priority was to satisfy Hilton’s owners and 
shareholders222 and ensure sustainable growth for the company.  
The most desirable hotel FDI arrangements from the perspective of both the investor 
and the host nation are believed to be lease agreements and management contracts 
(Dave 1984). The reason for the popularity of these two methods is that they create 
balance between risk and control for the investor and between skills transference 
and controlling power for the host nation. An analysis of the internationalisation 
process of Hilton hotels suggests that Hilton wanted to have a high level of control 
over its investments, which is evident in its involvement in all decisions from building 
design to staff training. On the other hand, it was committed to lowering the risk of 
investment, especially after losing the Havana Hilton in 1959. Due to the adoption of 
the operating lease model in Havana “the loss to the corporation was a limited one, 
the absorption of which did not impair its financial health or impede its continued 
growth”223. Following this incident, in the early 1960s Hilton diversified its business 
model and used the operating lease only in established major cities including London 
and Paris, while in less established locations it applied the management contract 
agreements (Strand 1996). Under this type of agreement it was the owner of the 
hotel rather than Hilton who was responsible for any potential operating losses. The 
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company was also committed to maintaining close control over its subsidiaries, a 
reason why it refused to adopt the franchise model in both its domestic and 
international operations (at least until 1965). The practice of applying such business 
models was developed through continuous experience in the US and abroad and 
was a practice directly transferred from headquarters to new subsidiaries. Hilton 
maintained responsibility for delivering all the services connected with running a 
hotel and additionally offered consultancy advice to investors in terms of building 
design and construction. Essentially, the contract between Hilton Hotels and New 
City Properties gave Hilton complete control over the London hotel’s design and 
ambience.  
When analysing the case of the London Hilton from the perspective of current hotel 
management practices, it is clear that the 50-year lease agreement cannot be 
treated as an asset-light model. Even at the time of its opening, this agreement 
required more financial commitment, responsibility and risk from Hilton than its other 
hotels operated under management contracts. However, the expectation was that 
London was a relatively secure destination in terms of investment. The operating 
lease gave Hilton the required level of control with relatively low level of risk. Indeed, 
shortly after the opening of the London subsidiary it became the best performing 
hotel in Hilton’s international portfolio224. 
Despite the divided structure of Hilton Hotels and Hilton International, for customers 
there was no difference between the two divisions as hotels in the US and elsewhere 
were branded and operated in exactly the same way. Conrad remained the ‘face’ of 
both divisions and people associated Hilton hotels with him, which is reflected by the 
number of letters sent to him. Using this model Hilton International became a 
company which operated as a network and a system of knowledge. The essence of 
Hilton’s internationalisation became the transference of knowledge and expertise 
gained through previous operations, as opposed to the transference of material 
resources. This is consistent with findings by Meyer et al. (2011), Johanson and 
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Vahlne (2009) and Ferraris (2014) who found that it is the very essence of MNCs to 
transfer knowledge across their networks.  
There is a case to be made that the operating lease model adopted by the London 
Hilton gave the company an optimal level of knowledge transference. Whilst the 
operating lease was a method of gaining insidership (Johanson and Vahlne 2009, 
Almodovar and Rugman 2015) it allowed for a high level of control over key 
resources (Mahoney and Pandian 1997, Dunning and Lundan 2008). All this was 
done on a corporate level so that the image presented to customers was seamlessly 
consistent. It seems to have been Hilton’s strategic choice to transfer its business 
model to international locations while maintaining its American image. This 
contradicts Hilton’s claims that it adjusted to local settings and suggests that Hilton 
adopted an ethnocentric approach (Perlmutter 1969) to knowledge transference. It is 
necessary to stress that the term ‘ethnocentric’ refers to the fact that Hilton did not 
appear to intend to adapt to local hotel-keeping practices but, instead, transferred its 
practices from the home country in an almost unchanged format. This is consistent 
with Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (2002) description of the international model of 
organisations in which headquarters play a central controlling and decision-making 
role. The case of the London Hilton particularly represents Bartlett and Ghoshal’s 
(2002) finding that organisations adopting the international model imply a willingness 
to delegate responsibility, while in reality maintaining close control through 
sophisticated management systems. In such an organisation, a local subsidiary is 
free to make minor local adaptations, but the overall ideology and knowledge is 
transferred from the headquarters. Entering partnerships with local investors was, 
consequently, not only the technique of securing capital but also creating a channel 
through which Hilton’s strategic and operational knowledge could be transferred. 
This confirms Khojastehpour and Johns’ (2014) claim that internationalisation offers 
opportunities for knowledge transference through access to foreign stakeholders, 
institutions and resources.  
The modern hotel business environment is radically different from the one 
investigated in this study. From the mid-1940s international hotel companies have 
been gradually turning to asset-light business models moving from operating leases, 
through management contracts to franchising (Roper 2015). Real estate is currently 
249 
 
rarely owned by the global hotel management companies and individual operational 
areas, such as catering or security, are often outsourced from third parties. However, 
despite such “vertical disintegration” (Roper 2015), these hotels boast high levels of 
brand recognition. Effective knowledge transference, clearly, plays a crucial role in 
such a business model where numerous organisations are involved in delivering 
branded services. The case study of Hilton illustrates the early signs of the shift 
towards the knowledge-based approach to the hotel-keeping business. It also 
emphasises the role of knowledge transference in the development of an 
internationally recognisable brand  
 
8.3. Knowledge transference  
The majority of previous research focuses on technical knowledge being transferred 
within a company and not on knowledge embedded in people and their experience 
and expertise. However, tacit knowledge is also subject to transference in the 
process of internationalisation, particularly when Hilton is considered to be a ‘pool of 
resources’, a perspective advocated by Penrose (1959). It appears that three key 
groups of actors contributed to the transference of knowledge in Hilton International: 
its founder, employees and customers.  
a. The role of the founder 
It is clear that in terms of seeking strategic assets, Hilton International did not own 
the real estate assets abroad, but by signing lease agreements with local owners it 
expanded the company’s portfolio and increased its presence and visibility in 
international markets. In such a case, Dunning and Lundan (2008) claim that 
investment in knowledge capital and management expertise plays as important a 
role as financial investment. Furthermore, it is important to focus on understanding 
the transference of tacit knowledge, which Dunning and Lundan (2008) refer to as 
institutional ownership advantage, in order to understand the evolution of the global 
economy. Amongst these institutional ownership advantages they list goals and 
motivations underlying firm’s behaviour. The theory of MNC’s internationalisation 
does not specifically list founder’s personal goals as one of the institutional 
ownership advantages but the case study clearly suggests that this was one of the 
factors driving the company’s expansion. The theory on IB (Nickson 1997) is clear on 
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the fact that founders and other key figures play an essential role in shaping the 
corporate culture which ultimately drives its strategic decisions. The case of Conrad 
and his company indicates that corporate strategy and decision making cannot be 
purely limited to theoretically-based analytics. Transaction cost economics theory 
highlights that companies are influenced by the bounded rationality of their 
employees. What this means is that humans cannot always be entirely rational in 
their decisions even if they wish to be (Douma and Schreuder 2013). The reason for 
this, what some academics consider to be a limitation, is that they can never have 
complete and unbiased knowledge of their business’s situation. The example of 
Conrad takes this argument a stage further and illustrates that some decisions are 
based on entrepreneur’s beliefs, preferences or even dreams, rather than on 
analytical and rational calculations. Some of Conrad’s decisions, including the 
purchase of Waldorf Astoria, appear to have been made purely because of Conrad’s 
own will. Furthermore, especially the decisions taken in the early days of Conrad’s 
career depended on chance and Conrad’s desire to develop own business. It would 
be difficult and probably unnecessary to try to analyse all Conrad’s decisions in a 
theoretical way. As the case study has shown, he was known as a maverick driving 
his company the way he wanted it to go. Anecdotally, a popular American TV series 
‘Mad Men’ which is believed to be one of the most historically accurate TV shows 
ever created, portrays Conrad as a ‘Hilton mission’-driven eccentric (Mad Men 
2009).  
Conrad’s clear sense of a mission was reflected in the notion to “spread the light and 
warmth of hospitality”. Being a founder and an active member of the management 
team until his death in 1979, he was responsible not only for setting the culture of his 
company but also for enforcing its values on daily operations. His influence was 
characteristic of the mechanism observed by Nickson (1997) and Kostova (1999), 
namely that the strong influence of founders or other key figures results in 
internalisation of behaviours to the extent that they become tacit. Considering the 
nature of Conrad’s mission, to provide homes away from home for American 
travellers and to spread American values of democracy internationally, it is hardly 
surprising that Hilton expanded with low level of local adaptation. Adjusting to each 
host country’s institutional settings simply would not meet Conrad’s requirements for 
development. On the contrary, Conrad specifically wanted his hotels to stand out 
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from the local settings, something most visibly reflected in the design of hotels in 
Istanbul, Athens and London.  
There is lack of research into the process of internationalisation driven by leaders or 
founders. However, it is clear that ‘top to bottom’ enforcement of decisions is also an 
example of tacit knowledge transference. Conrad claimed that his general managers 
enjoyed a high level of autonomy in their appointments, but an analysis of 
correspondence between himself and other employees, as well as customers, 
suggests that he monitored closely the standards delivered across the chain. More 
importantly, members of the management team were so familiar with Conrad and his 
vision that they acted in line with it even without consulting him. Consequently, there 
is a case to be made that Conrad’s vision, which is considered to be tacit knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander 1997) and an institutional ownership advantage (Dunning and 
Lundan 2008) was effectively transferred across the chain in the process of Hilton’s 
internationalisation. This is not to say that his vision made the company successful, 
but to highlight the observation that the early international hotels followed Conrad’s 
vision for the expansion of his company. The following section focuses on the role of 
employees in the transference of tacit knowledge.  
 
b. The role of employees 
Kostova (1999), when discussing transference of corporate practices, highlights that 
in order to be successfully transferred, practices need to be internalised by the 
receiving party to the extent that these seem to be their own. This was the case 
observed in Hilton in that its employees delivered Conrad’s vision in various 
locations around the world. It appears that the company applied two key methods of 
ensuring that employees would internalise tacit knowledge; comprehensive training 
and the employment of expatriates to manage international hotels.  
Hilton invested greatly in tutoring ensuring that all employees behaved and 
conducted their work in ‘the Hilton style’. Foreign employees were trained in hotels in 
the US and Canada and were provided with operation manuals, referred to by staff 
as ‘the Bible’, which prescribed all operation procedures from advertising to the 
treatment of guests with dogs. This resulted in Hilton being perceived as a chain of 
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standardised hotels where guest could expect the same kind of service regardless of 
location. However, it appears that comprehensive training was not only a way of 
ensuring that individual practices followed specific guidelines but, more importantly, it 
communicated tacit knowledge in the form of Conrad’s vision and Hilton’s corporate 
culture. This is particularly visible in the case of senior management who were 
encouraged to progress within the company and were delegated to international 
assignments. Interestingly enough, amongst all the heads of London hotel’s 
departments only Louis del Coma was American. There is no data to explain 
whether employing an international cadre of management was Hilton’s policy, but the 
case study suggests that the company was open towards cultural diversity. It is 
therefore, questionable whether the London Hilton hotel could be representative of 
American culture in general. It seems more appropriate to conclude that it was 
representative of the unique Hilton culture instead. Similar results were found by 
Roper, Doherty, Brookes and Hampton (2001) in their study on a large hotel MNC in 
the 1990s. They observed that general managers of hotels in this chain were usually 
‘company men’ whose national cultures were secondary to their acquired corporate 
cultures. These managers were often required to travel abroad and to easily adjust 
to new conditions. Being influenced by their company they also became cultural 
‘products’ of it. As a result, when they took new posts they transferred characteristics 
of corporate culture rather than their national cultures. In the same way, despite the 
fact that senior managers in the London Hilton came from Singapore, Switzerland, 
Britain and Canada, they were expected to contribute to the standardised Hilton 
culture. Such employees who become ‘company men’ could, therefore, be 
considered to be the key carriers of tacit knowledge because they have internalised 
that knowledge. Such point, where people begin treating corporate values and 
beliefs as their own is the point where knowledge transference is considered to have 
been successful (Kostova 1999). It is also the stage when studying tacit knowledge 
becomes most challenging, because it is often taken for granted and not realised by 
individuals.  
Expatriates can be seen as a link between individual contexts in multiply-embedded 
companies. They are the ones who communicate knowledge from the HQ to the 
subsidiary and vice versa and are, to a large extent, responsible for effective 
communication between the two (Fang et al. 2010). Their ability to detect institutional 
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and cultural differences and consequently suggest appropriate amendments in the 
overall strategy plays a major role in the subsidiary’s negotiation of legitimacy. This 
was particularly visible in the process of design and construction of the London 
Hilton when members of the senior management team debated over individual 
elements of the hotel and their suitability for the local cultural context. Expatriates are 
also the ones who directly communicate with local people employed in the hotel. 
They are therefore facilitators for the transference of knowledge in a MNC despite 
the fact that they are subject to influence from both home and host countries alike 
(Delios and Bjorkman 2000, Goerzen and Beamish 2007, Fang et al. 2010). 
Consequently, the deeper they internalise corporate knowledge, the more likely they 
are to faithfully communicate that knowledge in host locations and to contribute to 
the ethnocentric approach to knowledge transference discussed above. Hilton’s 
managers worked in subsidiaries around the world learning not only about the 
company’s strategy and operations but also about how it can best fit in foreign 
environments and in which areas it was required to adapt in order to better fit local 
conditions. In other words, expatriates are the communicators of knowledge gained 
through the previous experience of operating internationally (Delios and Bjorkman 
2000, Goerzen and Beamish 2007, Fang et al. 2010). This is what is observed in the 
case of the London Hilton hotel. As Table 6-3 (Chapter 6.8) illustrated, the General 
Manager and the majority of heads of departments had previously worked in other 
Hilton properties. Other members of staff had a wide experience gained from other 
hotels around the world. They carried a wealth of expertise with them and had 
experience in working in and adapting to foreign countries, which could be 
transferred to the London subsidiary.  
Complex and centralised training implemented by Hilton in its hotels worldwide as 
well as the enforcement of standard operating procedures were clearly means of 
mitigating the issue explained by agency theory, namely the threat of opportunism. A 
great deal of trust was placed in local general managers’ decisions, including Louis 
del Coma. Hilton stated that “Once the hotel is up on its feet, the local manager is 
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pretty much on his own, so long as it operates within company guidelines”225.  
Following agency theory (Hoenen and Kostova 2015), one could expect that by 
doing so Hilton HQ might lose control over their performance, the reason being that 
local managers could pursue their personal goals instead of genuinely contributing to 
the corporate objectives. As internationalisation of the company depended strongly 
on tacit knowledge, any loss of that knowledge would be detrimental to the process. 
However, comprehensive training seems to have been utilised as a measure to 
mitigate this challenge and ensure effective transference of knowledge abroad. The 
expected result of the training was that it would make employees internalise 
corporate values so that they became aligned with their personal ones.  
This discussion clearly suggests that Hilton’s employees were the means of 
communicating knowledge from the parent company to its subsidiary in London with 
few adjustments, which represented an ethnocentric approach (Perlmutter 1969), or 
international model of organisation (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2002). The fact that Hilton 
managers were trained to be ‘company men’ demonstrates that the ‘Hilton’ culture 
was to be transferred abroad and replace the dominance of employees’ national 
cultures. Furthermore, it appears that people are at the very core of company’s 
ability to internationalise because they are the carriers of tacit knowledge. While 
specific procedures and regulations can be easily communicated, institutional 
ownership advantages, such as corporate culture or vision, can only be transferred 
through people who have internalised these values and for whom, as advocated by 
Kostova (1999) they became an ‘extended self’. This study does not have the tools 
to investigate whether Hilton’s employees actually internalised company’s values to 
such an extent. A focused research utilising oral histories could endeavour to explore 
this area. What this research does is develop the theoretical linkage between the 
process of internationalisation and the transference of tacit knowledge.  
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c. The role of customers 
While Hilton sought new markets it also followed the movement of existing 
customers, this becoming a further motivation for FDI involvement. This concept, 
discussed in the light of the development of international banks who follow their 
corporate and individual customers abroad (Seth, Nolle and Mohanty 1998) is less 
evaluated in relation to hotel companies. A prime example of ‘following existing 
customers’ in the hotel industry is InterContinental which was developed by Pan 
American airlines specifically with the aim to operate hotels in destinations served by 
the airline (Potter 1996). There is a degree of ‘following customers’ in the case of 
Hilton International also. For example, in his letter to Conrad, Barron Hilton stated 
that the ‘Hilton’ brand which was well known in the US would be a great advantage in 
the development of hotels abroad, due to customers instantly recognising it. This 
suggests that the company was targeting American customers who travelled abroad, 
or customers of other nationalities who were familiar with the American hotel market. 
Also Conrad’s numerous suggestions that he wanted to create ‘homes away from 
home’ for American travellers leads one to conclude that Hilton sought not only new 
markets, but also moved to destinations to follow its existing US customers. Indeed, 
the number of American travellers visiting Britain in the 1960s considerably 
increased, both in terms of business and leisure visits (Slattery 2009). Figure 4-2, 
presented in Chapter 4.2.3 illustrates that the number of all visits to the UK rose 
between 1961 and 1970, with visits from North America doubling in numbers over 
this period. This was a result of technological advancements and the development of 
transatlantic flights as well as by the increased ease of obtaining visas to Britain 
(Slattery 2009). A strong contributor to this trend was also the increased American 
FDI connected with the implementation of the Marshall Plan.  
Already the early developments of hotel industries in the US and the UK suggested 
that customers played a crucial role in the transference of practices and 
expectations. The discussion in Chapter 4 suggested that the early American grand 
hotels mirrored English stately homes and palaces visited by the wealthy travellers. 
Similarly, London hotels updated their level of service under the pressures from 
American customers who were disappointed with standards of the English hotels. It 
is, therefore, clear that customers play a crucial role in the development of hotel 
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industries as well as individual companies because they carry certain expectations 
wherever they travel.   
Investigating the process of internationalisation from the perspective of following 
customers can effectively explore the role played by knowledge transference. Hilton 
was familiar with its domestic customers’ requirements and the management team 
clearly expected that Americans would be willing to patronise Hilton hotels during 
their international travels. This supports Shane’s (2000) and Johanson and Vahlne’s 
(2009) observations that when looking for development opportunities, companies 
actually focus on their internal resources rather than on the conditions of the external 
environment (knowledge of customer’s preferences is considered to be an internal 
resource). This results from the resource-based point of view, in that a company’s 
knowledge of external conditions cannot be as comprehensive as the knowledge of 
its internal resources (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). However, it seems 
understandable that if Hilton was to attract American customers abroad, it had to 
reproduce the services known from America in foreign countries. Consequently, 
Hilton offered local adjustments to make its hotels seem more attractive and 
interesting, but it had to transfer the core of its hotel keeping practices in order to 
provide the level of comfort so valued in American hotels. However, Hilton did not 
aim to cater solely for American travellers, the expectation being that other nations 
would also welcome the American style of hotel-keeping. This was certainly 
Conrad’s belief but the historical discussion of social trends in Europe in the 1950s 
and 1960s suggests that Europe was indeed enthusiastic towards modernity coming 
from across the Atlantic. Consequently, it appears that following Hilton’s customers 
abroad contributed greatly to the fact that this company transferred its operational 
model with few adjustments.  
Finally, the ‘following customers’ motivation for internationalisation adds a further 
dimension to Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) Uppsala model. It highlights the 
distinctive nature of hotel companies in that they do not primarily aim to serve the 
local clientele but mainly the incoming travellers. Institutional distance in this case is 
therefore not as restrictive a factor as in other industries, as long as customers are 
familiar with the institutional dynamics driving the particular hotel company. The 
popularity of Hilton’s Carte Blanche suggests that its customers were not only 
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familiar but also accustomed to this company’s practices of hotel-keeping. Hotel 
MNCs are thus more likely to adopt the ‘octopus-like’ process of expansion 
(Abdelzaher 2012) where they do not necessarily progress in a linear way starting 
from the most institutionally similar countries. Furthermore, hotel companies are 
different from firms operating in other industries in that they have to be physically 
located where their customers are in order to provide services. Following from this, it 
can be concluded that existing customers are a means of knowledge transference 
and, thus, make an important contribution to the expansion of hotel companies. This 
is reflected in modern hotel-management where a strong brand with an established 
and loyal clientele is highlighted as one of the greatest advantages of branded hotel-
management companies.  
 
8.4. The role of multiple-embeddedness  
What is characteristic for MNCs when they enter foreign countries is their multiple-
embeddedness (Figueiredo 2011, Peng and Meyer 2011, Ferraris 2014): the result 
of a range of forces or pressures which are inflicted on a MNC’s subsidiary from 
various contexts (Meyer et al. 2011). Such a way of perceiving a company and its 
environment is underpinned by the institutional paradigm whose main assumption is 
that institutions affect businesses and individuals in various ways. Such pressures, 
which a subsidiary needs to balance, come from both its internal and external 
environments, hence the term ‘institutional duality’ used in reference to multiple-
embeddedness (Morgan and Kristensen 2006). Internal pressures in Hilton came 
through the requirement for faithful transference of practices and consequently the 
standardisation of services. As discussed so far, it was the company’s decision to 
provide consistent service and project a uniform image of the company around the 
world. Individual subsidiaries had to adhere to this centrally-made decision, which is 
representative of international organisations in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (2002) 
framework.  
The main pressure from the external environment, on the other hand, is the pressure 
to become legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Institutionalists traditionally 
asserted that legitimacy is negotiated by becoming similar to the local companies 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991) but this study supports Roth and Kostova’s (2008) claim 
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that this is not always necessarily the case. MNCs can use their ownership 
advantages, previous international experience and political relationships to 
counterbalance the external pressure for legitimacy. These MNCs still need to adjust 
in some areas, especially in terms of regulative forces (i.e. legal requirements) but 
can negotiate their position in others (Roth and Kostova 2008). This is also 
supported by the findings from the study of the London Hilton. While the company 
had to adjust in some areas including adapting to the building restriction placed on 
them from The London County Council and the entry mode choice negotiated with 
Charles Clore, it maintained control over service standards and the types of products 
offered. The hotel addressed some local cultural requirements, but in the great 
majority it enforced its own methods of hotel-keeping.  
Another kind of pressure which a company such as Hilton ought to consider is that 
originating from customers. Without achieving legitimacy amongst customers 
businesses cannot perform. However, Roper et al. (2001: 28) found that because of 
the fact that hotels often serve foreign rather than local customers, they are likely to 
“do things in the way that the rest of the world does them”, rather than in the locally 
accepted way. By doing so, they expand their networks of practices and 
consequently their brand visibility. This mechanism, it can be argued, leads to 
isomorphism but through a different path than asserted by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991). Companies become similar to one another not because they imitate their 
predecessors but because the environment becomes convinced and attracted by the 
innovative practices. Consequently, it is the more established or the local businesses 
that begin to imitate the newcomers and their ways of doing business rather than the 
other way round. Today, even the oldest grand hotels including the Savoy and The 
Langham are managed by international hotel companies and are subject to a range 
of standardised procedures.  
Finally, the pressure for legitimacy comes from the wider public. The case study 
clearly illustrates that hotel industries in the US and UK developed from a similar 
starting point but, due to contrasting historical conditions, were at different levels in 
the middle of the Twentieth Century. The countries’ institutional contexts were similar 
because both the US and the UK used the same language and shared at an extent a 
similar cultural heritage. The hotel industry in the US, however, was far more 
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advanced and provided modern services on the level which was not matched in 
London. At the time of opening Hilton provided the kind of service that neither 
resembled the offering of London grand hotels, nor fitted amongst the mid-class 
hotels. It seems that Hilton benefitted from the opportunity of bridging this gap when 
visitors to ‘Swinging London’ most required it. Hilton entered the London market at 
the time when people had learnt about American ways of life from the media and 
advertising. Its arrival also coincided with the influx of other American brands and 
companies, which contributed to the greater receptiveness of American standards. It 
appears, therefore, that Hilton benefitted from being a ‘first mover’ but also faced the 
challenge of liability of foreignness, discussed in more detail in the following section.  
The analysis of the case within its wider historical context confirms Kostova et al.’s 
(2008) notion that legitimacy can be negotiated, rather than gained. Such negotiation 
depends on the exchange of knowledge and interaction between the foreign 
company and its host institutional context. This suggests that subsidiaries of 
multinational companies can, with time, establish such affiliations which enhance 
acceptance of practices which are initially seen as foreign. This is supported not only 
by the findings from the analysis of the internationalisation of Hilton, but also from 
the review of early developments of American and English hotel industries and the 
relationships between them.  
As analysis from the case study and the discussion on the external context suggest, 
knowledge gained in the US and in Britain could be considered “near market 
knowledge” (Mitra and Golder 2002). It has been noted before, that there were 
considerable similarities between these countries in regulatory, normative and 
cognitive domains. There were therefore elements of knowledge which could be 
directly transferred based on these similarities. One of the most visible elements was 
the language spoken in the company. This is often one of the major obstacles in 
communication and understanding between a parent company and a subsidiary 
(Evangelista 2009). Even when a company employs expatriates and bilingual staff, 
there is a risk that some messages may be miscommunicated. This has an influence 
not only on explicit practices, rules and information but also has a destructive impact 
on trust and commitment. Using the same language was a great benefit for Hilton 
when opening its hotel in London. Similarly, other institutions including legal, political 
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and economic systems contributed to a better understanding between offices in the 
US and Britain and between the executive and management staff. It should be 
stressed, however, that despite the fact that IB theory, particularly the Uppsala Stage 
model (Petersen et al. 2003), suggests that MNCs often begin the process of 
internationalisation by expanding into the most similar countries, this was not the 
case of Hilton. The first hotel overseas was in Puerto Rico, and before investing in 
the property in London, it had developed in Istanbul, Cairo, Madrid and Berlin. It 
appears that Hilton was not discouraged by institutional differences in host locations 
and did not seek to use the location advantages of countries with similar institutional 
settings. This can be explained by the strength of company’s ownership advantages 
and its strategy of following existing customers. The case study suggests that the 
company felt strongly about its development goals and had confidence in its 
institutional advantages.  The theory of internationalisation of firms asserts that the 
stronger the ownership advantages of a firm, the more likely it is to engage in foreign 
production especially if there are considerable location advantages in the host 
country (Dunning and Lundan 2008). There is evidence to suggest that there were 
some tax advantages for Hilton in Britain because income tax was not collected until 
1967226. This eased the early development of the hotel but did not have a substantial 
influence on its overall success. It appears that the cost of wages could not be 
considered an incentive either, because wages in London were higher than those in 
Cairo or Istanbul. The main advantage of London as an investment location seems 
to be its favourable market conditions. This involved not only American customers 
travelling abroad but also favourable developments in the British economy and the 
rise of service industries in the decades after the War. In these conditions Hilton was 
able to exploit its firm-specific knowledge and its ownership advantages. These 
included its knowledge of the target market, expertise in managing hotels around the 
world and, perhaps most importantly, its recognisable brand. This shows that the 
London Hilton utilised the company’s ownership advantages to balance the range of 
pressures resulting from its multiple-embeddedness and to negotiate its legitimacy.  
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8.5. The liability of foreignness  
Hilton offered standardised service in its domestic and international hotels. Whether 
in terms of practices adopted, staff training or the management structure, the 
essence driving Hilton’s internationalisation was one of standardisation. Wharton 
(2001) found in her research that in the early years of Hilton’s expansion (1950s and 
1960s) the company was responsible for exporting broadly understood ‘modernity’. 
By this she does not only mean modern architectural forms but also the political and 
social role of this American company in the time of the Cold War. Whether in 
Istanbul, Athens or London, Hilton hotels occupied prime locations in city centres 
and were structured in a way to stand out from these cities’ traditional architecture. 
They were all designed in a similar way, despite the claims that the buildings aimed 
to reflect the local cultures. Hilton also claimed that its aim was to include local 
elements of decoration or service. This could be pieces of art, staff uniforms or, as in 
the case of London, the English style of bars as well as local decoration material and 
workmanship. However, despite Hilton’s claims of differentiation, it actually applied 
more standardisation in its international expansion. This was as a result to a large 
extent of Conrad’s vision. Similar conclusions were reached by Roper et al. (2001) in 
their research on another hotel MNC, finding that despite the claims to “provide 
international standards together with local flavour” and to follow a geocentric 
approach to internationalisation, the company was actually mainly ethnocentric in its 
approach. This company, similarly to Hilton, made adjustments to marginal elements 
of their services, with the more crucial ones remaining centrally directed. Ironically, 
all Hilton subsidiaries were meant to be ‘different’ in exactly the same way: visible 
from afar; clearly branded as American hotels.  It was concluded that they had to be 
‘consistently different’ if they were to appeal to Americans away from home. There 
are sources indicating that standardisation was Hilton’s advantage because its 
guests enjoyed predictability and familiarity (Bradshaw for Vogue 1965). The fact 
that the company transferred its American model abroad suggests that Hilton felt 
strongly about its ownership advantages, especially institutional ownership 
advantages. It appears that Hilton did not look at the host environment to mimic 
practices used there, but rather preserved its character and methods of operation 
regardless of the level of location advantages. These findings tend to contradict 
theory which asserts that MNCs must adjust to new environments (Di Maggio and 
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Powell 1991) and confirm Kostova’s observation that legitimacy can be negotiated 
without mimicking local practices.  
There is an argument to be made that in the 1960s the London Hilton was 
representative of the gap between hotel industries in America and Britain. Chapter 4 
concluded that despite the apparent similarities between American and British 
heritage and culture, these industries developed in different directions. The American 
hotel market was familiar with chains, including Hilton Hotels, Statler and Holiday Inn 
while in London practices of standardisation and uniformity had not previously been 
adopted. The London grand hotels were traditionally meant to for the upper classes 
while American hotel market offered, alongside grand iconic hotels, a modern style 
of service which would today be referred to as ‘affordable luxury’. The London Hilton 
was meant to represent the democratic approach to hotel-keeping which evolved 
from the concept of ‘palaces of the people’. Furthermore, Hilton with its centralised 
training and operation manuals seems to have imported the industrialised approach 
to hotel-keeping.  
What becomes clear is that Hilton managed to propagate its branded, standardised 
hotel services through the effective transference of knowledge. All elements 
discussed in this chapter including design, human resource management practices 
and centrally-planned operations were essentially the means of knowledge 
transference. This suggests that despite the fact that hotel companies are not usually 
considered to be knowledge-based firms, as opposed to consultancy or insurance 
specialists, the key to their internationalisation is the transference of knowledge. 
Hilton appears to be one of the hotel companies which focused on investing 
expertise and experience rather than capital. This supports the assumptions of the 
resource-based view of the firm inasmuch that internationalisation depends on the 
ability to transfer resources without losing control over them (Dunning and Lundan 
2008).  In the case of hotel MNCs such as Hilton, these resources are mainly 
knowledge-based.  
Consequently, transference of Hilton’s corporate culture and its standardised hotel-
keeping practices were the factors which were most foreign on the London hotel 
market in 1963.  International business theory asserts that foreignness poses a 
challenge when entering new markets however this research suggests that under 
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certain circumstances it can become an asset and this is observed in case of the 
London Hilton.  
The discussion so far has concluded that Hilton approached internationalisation in 
mostly an ethnocentric way, despite claims that it wanted to adjust to local 
standards. This approach was mainly observable in that Hilton did not seek to 
achieve legitimacy in its host countries, but rather aimed to transfer its corporate 
culture with the hope that it would positively influence local economies and societies. 
By doing so, Hilton developed the image of being an American company and its 
subsidiaries being symbols of American modernity (this was mainly applicable in the 
years of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s when America was on the forefront of 
capitalism and when there was much less international hotel presence than after the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain). Behaving in this way Hilton highlighted its foreignness. 
Being foreign in a new market is traditionally seen as an obstacle for MNCs’ 
subsidiaries and as a feature which makes achieving legitimacy more difficult 
(Kostova and Zaheer 1999). This is mainly caused by the differences between 
MNC’s, the host and corporate cultures as well as by its practices which might not 
match the local expectations. 
The London Hilton, when it opened in 1963 was distinctly different from other London 
hotels. Analysis of the case however suggests that it did not seek to become 
legitimate in the sense of becoming similar to local hotels. It advertised itself as a 
luxury hotel, but it did not provide the grandness of traditional London luxury hotels. 
Luxury in Hilton was carefully measured and operationalised and was provided in the 
same way as in all other Hilton hotels. Such an approach was highly innovative at 
the time and in order to understand why it became accepted in London one should 
consider London’s institutional location advantages. These include social, cultural 
and economic factors rather than asset-based advantages such as a favourable tax 
system. The 1960s was clearly a decade of change, particularly visible in London. 
British society moved from the harsh post-War years to the times of much greater 
prosperity. Chapter 4 clearly discussed how the transition into the ‘welfare state’ 
contributed to the feeling of security and affluence. Access to free healthcare, 
education and credit made people more inclined to explore various possibilities and 
live beyond their means. The new tastes and desires were increasingly driven by the 
264 
 
media and advertising. British people were exposed to lifestyles not previously 
available in their country (Kroes 2007, Bonin and de Goey 2009, Gassert 2012). 
Furthermore, the social landscape of Britain and particularly London was affected by 
the trend towards less social class division than previously known. The blurring 
boundaries between members of the working and middle classes made people 
experiment with leisure and entertainment possibilities. In an environment such as 
this, Hilton’s goal to make hotel services available to all, regardless of their social 
background, was timely. Standardised service was a method of ensuring potential 
guests that they would not be unpleasantly surprised or challenged in their 
interactions with the hotel and its staff.  
Similarly, Hilton’s objective to create space for people to meet worked well in light of 
the development of the service economy in Britain at the time. There was increasing 
demand for conference and event space as a result of increased business travel 
(Slattery 2009). Hilton not only met this demand by providing the largest conference 
space in London at the time but also addressed this need by employing a marketing 
strategy which focused specifically on business travellers. The business-targeted 
advertising highlighted services required by business visitors and was consistent 
with the marketing strategy used in the US around the same period. Hilton 
differentiated itself from the grand London hotels which were not traditionally 
perceived as spaces for conducting business. These hotels still had a level of ‘royal 
feel’ about them which did not complement the social changes of the ‘Swinging 
Sixties’. The London Hilton, on the other hand, was modern, welcoming and brought 
the flavour of American success with it. These characteristics would explain why the 
London Hilton was the only hotel marked on the Time Magazine’s ‘Swinging London’ 
map.  
It was the underlying aim to internationalise Hilton in the form it operated in the US 
rather than mould it according to local standards. Also, Hilton’s political power 
developed through previous expansion and through links with members of the 
American government and their international representatives put the company in a 
position where it could negotiate its preferred form of FDI even in countries with 
different national cultures and institutional settings. Finally, one cannot omit the 
influence of Conrad on making the decisions about business expansion. It was 
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previously suggested that his decisions could often be considered as daring and 
brave and this potentially played an important role in the company’s ability to 
negotiate legitimacy in foreign locations.  
The key differentiator of Hilton’s image was the application of centralised operations 
and a standardised brand. Employees were not assigned to particular rooms or 
floors as responsibilities were all delegated from one central point. Guests could be 
served by various employees and it was possible not to see the same member of 
staff twice. Furthermore, the team followed the standardised operating procedures 
so there was little individualisation in encounters with guests. These elements greatly 
added to the feeling of automation and anonymity in the hotel. Those guests 
anticipating a more personalised service complained because they expected to be 
escorted to their room by a member of staff or were not prepared to open doors for 
room service attendants. Such personalisation was the epitome of service at 
Claridge’s or the Savoy at the time. However, such automated and depersonalised 
services were well suited for the customers who were not necessarily comfortable 
with the grand style of hotel-keeping. It was Hilton’s aim to cater for the needs of 
business travellers, mainly Americans, and to provide standardised, efficient service 
to people from across social classes and backgrounds. Hilton provided comfort and 
efficiency but not ‘grandness’ and individualisation. This was consistent with the 
company’s culture and marketing strategy and was meant to communicate a clearly 
differentiated image amongst local people and travellers having not yet stayed at a 
Hilton hotel. It is clear that by transferring knowledge in such a way that Hilton 
offered standardised service across the chain, the company distinguished itself from 
the traditional London hotel market.  
Initially, the image conveyed by Hilton did not appear to be accepted in the London 
hotel market. It was suggested that “Hilton would be the symbol of dollar supremacy” 
or a “symbol of almighty dollar”227. Further analysis of the case study, however, 
suggests that the points which were initially treated as curiosity often became the 
differentiating factors. Correspondence to Conrad shows that some customers 
                                            
 
227
 The Times, 13
th
 November 1957, p. 2 
266 
 
stayed at the London Hilton just to ‘see what it was like’. People who were familiar 
with the brand came to London to experience the newest hotel in the Hilton chain. 
Clearly this hotel was present on the cultural and social map of ‘Swinging London’ 
and the company’s marketing strategy was suited to the evolving pop culture. 
Conrad’s strategy of transforming opening ceremonies into social events was a 
precursory approach to marketing and public relations. The guests he flew from the 
US and who included movie stars, businessmen as well as fashion icons provided 
what is termed today as ‘celebrity endorsement’. In the decade where people 
admired, or in certain cases worshiped, idols such as the Beatles, this celebrity 
endorsement certainly enhanced the company’s legitimacy in the London market.  
It appears that the Hilton brand was well known in London even before the opening 
on Park Lane and its modern character was hugely anticipated. Hilton withstood the 
initial criticism and used publicity to spread the news about its brand. It educated its 
customers so that they began to appreciate the standardised service and hotel 
ambience. It provided services to business customers whose needs were neglected 
by grand hotels. All these features, which made Hilton foreign in the environment of 
1960s London, constructed the image of Hilton as it is known today, over 50 years 
later. It should be stressed that the early 1960s was probably the most optimal time 
to open a subsidiary in London. If it had opened earlier, it could have struggled with 
cultural differences between America and post-War Britain. Similarly, if it opened a 
few years later, there is a possibility that American modernism would no longer 
appear as exciting as it did in 1963. Finally, the London Hilton was built a few years 
before the introduction of the Hotel Development Incentive Scheme which almost 
saturated the London hotel market with new supply.  
Hilton’s activities represent the mechanism of negotiation of legitimacy discussed by 
Kostova et al. (2008) and Amenta and Ramsey (2010). Its extensive marketing and 
public relations campaigns were an example of “a political process of interaction, 
communication and exchange, which creates a perception about the organisation 
without it necessarily having to implement certain models and practices” (Kostova et 
al. 2008: 1001). In other words, Hilton not only transferred its knowledge in the form 
of practices but also applied it in communication with the external environment to 
promote its recognisable brand. This knowledge was enriched by the fact that Hilton 
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had already ‘tested’ its model of hotel-keeping in America and found loyal customers 
for it. This balanced knowledge and confidence in its own institutional ownership 
advantages led to the situation where the foreignness of Hilton’s practices became to 
be seen as a differentiator.  This finding extends Joardar’s et al. (2014) observation 
that foreignness is an asset because it develops organisational capabilities. It 
contributes to Alvarez’s et al. (2005) theory of ‘optimal distinctiveness’ which asserts 
that companies need to be different enough to compete against their rivals. An 
accurate level of distinctiveness does not prevent a company from becoming 
legitimate, but actually makes it interesting and noteworthy, which is particularly 
crucial in customer-facing firms. Despite the fact that the term ‘optimal 
distinctiveness’ was coined by Alvarez et al. (2005) in reference to the film industry, it 
seems to accurately describe the state achieved by the London Hilton.  
 
8.6. Summary of key findings 
The discussion focused on four key conceptual areas: the internationalisation of an 
MNC, transference of knowledge, subsidiary’s multiple-embeddedness and its 
foreignness. It benefitted from the review of previous literature in Chapter 2 and used 
the case study in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 as narrative for analysis. As depicted in Figure 
8-1 it employed the framework which revealed relationships between the individual 
theoretical areas. This discussion has concluded that Hilton utilised its knowledge to 
balance the pressures resulting from multiple-embeddedness and to negotiate 
legitimacy in a foreign environment. By doing so, it maintained control over its 
network and internationalised with a relatively low level of local adaptation. A number 
of factors contributed to this type of internationalisation: 
 The process of Hilton’s internationalisation was heavily influenced by its 
founder’s sense of mission which envisaged transference of beliefs that 
Conrad valued the most. Whilst companies’ international expansion is often 
analysed from a strategic point of view, this case suggests that there might be 
other forces driving such processes as well.  
 The company adopted the operating lease model which gave it an ultimate 
balance between control over its operations and the requirement for 
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investment. There is a case to be made that this choice of entry modes 
contributed to the rapid internationalisation of Hilton. 
 Hilton may be seen as a knowledge-based company whose rapid expansion 
is attributed to effective knowledge transference. Such knowledge 
transference was ensured by a number of practices, including centralised 
training and relaying on expatriates for the management of international 
subsidiaries.  
 Hilton followed its existing customers abroad. Such a strategy has previously 
been discussed in reference to banking but not the hotel industry. It was 
Hilton’s aim to provide ‘homes away from home’ for American travellers which 
makes it imminent that the international hotels had to provide similar service 
to those at home.  
 The London Hilton achieved the level of ‘optimal distinctiveness’ by 
negotiating legitimacy of its foreign practices. This was, however, facilitated by 
the favourable location advantages in London of the 1960s and the match 
between the company’s institutional ownership advantages and the 
expectations of its multiple external environments. It is argued that the London 
Hilton’s foreignness has, with time, become its differentiator.  
The implications of these findings on the development of theory and consequently 
this research’s contribution to knowledge are examined in the Conclusions in the 
following chapter.  
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9. Conclusions 
9.1. Introduction 
This research set out to explore the link between the transference of knowledge 
within Hilton and the process of its internationalisation, using the case of the London 
Hilton in 1963. It sought to achieve the aim by constructing, and later analysing, an 
in-depth embedded case study on the London Hilton hotel and its parent company. 
The case was analysed from the perspectives of transference of knowledge and 
multiple-embeddedness, using the theoretical framework constructed through the 
review of previous research. A three-staged coding was adopted in order to find 
relationships between individual elements of data. The third stage of pattern coding, 
applied simultaneously with writing up of the discussion is the one which revealed 
the nuanced relationships between angles of the theoretical underpinning, as 
presented in the revised framework in Figure 8-1. These very relationships constitute 
the key findings of this research as well as its contributions to knowledge. The final 
chapter discusses how objectives of this research were achieved and led to the 
contributions to knowledge. It evaluates the research process and comments on its 
limitations and, lastly, makes recommendations as to potential future research.  
 
9.2. Contributions to knowledge through the achievement of objectives 
The Discussion chapter concluded with the key themes emerging from the analysis 
of the London Hilton case study. They are mainly concerned with the 
internationalisation process, transference of knowledge, foreignness and multiple-
embeddedness. As emphasised in the Methodology chapter, knowledge 
development in business history research does not necessarily follow a linear path, 
and so it was realised in the process of this research that an investigation into the 
transference of knowledge in the process of MNC’s internationalisation bridges the 
boundaries between the concepts of institutionalism, the resource-based view and 
transaction cost theory. Extended research into these theoretical areas proved very 
much necessary.  
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The first two objectives of this study referred to the review of previous research and 
the construction of the case study. In order to achieve the third objective of analysing 
the case study from the perspective of knowledge transference within a MNC, 
concepts underpinning the transference of knowledge were explored. Corporate 
knowledge itself had to be defined and Dunning and Lundan’s (2008) concept of 
institutional ownership advantage appeared to be the one which described the tacit 
knowledge observed in Hilton. It focused the research on institutional advantages as 
opposed to asset-based advantages and found that knowledge is the critical factor in 
the internationalisation of service-focused companies such as Hilton. What facilitated 
such development of argument was the choice of the London Hilton as the case for 
this research. Studies in the fields of international business and business history 
traditionally focus on companies as a whole. This study, on the other hand, was 
subsidiary-driven and worked from the micro-level to explore the macro-processes 
taking place in the company. Such an approach required in-depth understanding of 
the institutional contexts surrounding the case, hence rich descriptions of historical 
and social settings as well as details as to the early developments of the company 
and career progression of its founder. This approach, consequently, serves as a 
methodological contribution because it proved to be an effective way of studying 
knowledge transference.  
The ability of MNCs to internationalise depends upon their ability to transfer 
knowledge. Hotel MNCs are not traditionally considered to be knowledge-based 
companies, as opposed to consultancy or insurance firms, probably stemming from 
the fact that they have been associated more with a real estate or property business. 
However, the shift towards the asset-light model of hotel-keeping, evident since the 
1960s and which has a stronger presence in the industry today (Roper 2015) 
inevitably implies that the core ownership advantages of these MNCs are in fact 
knowledge, expertise and experience. This has considerable theoretical and 
managerial implications. There is currently a lack of research into the transference of 
tacit knowledge within MNCs. Whilst scholars have investigated the transference of 
explicit knowledge, in the light of findings from this research, hotel MNCs’ managers 
should be more concerned with how elements of organisational culture are 
transferred across borders and how they eventually influence local subsidiaries. This 
is particularly crucial to multinationals operating in the globalised world where there 
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is little to differentiate companies. In the era where companies around the world have 
access to similar resources or asset-based advantages, effective transference of 
tacit knowledge is the factor distinguishing companies in the international 
marketplace.    
The study found that the key role in tacit knowledge transference is played by 
participating actors. It is common to consider employees when discussing knowledge 
transference in companies, however, this research concluded that a similarly 
important role was played by customers and key influencers, in this case its founder. 
This is the area of knowledge which was not evident through the review of previous 
research but only emerged in the process of analysing the case study. The 
discussion concluded that the London Hilton achieved an optimal level of control 
over its institutional ownership advantages. In other words, it was in a position to 
implement decisions made in the headquarters with little adaptation at the subsidiary 
level. This ultimately means that barriers to knowledge transference were minimised 
so that knowledge could freely flow from the headquarters to the subsidiary and 
back. This is an important managerial contribution because it draws attention to the 
fact that hotel MNCs rely on tacit knowledge embedded in its people. This, arguably, 
applies even more so to the modern hotel MNCs which tend to be asset-light and 
depend purely on expertise and knowledge of their people. Such a finding should be 
considered from two perspectives: transference of knowledge within a company and 
outside of it. It is characteristic of the modern hotel-keeping industry that employees 
move extensively between companies, taking the embedded knowledge with them. 
Also customers, who often show limited loyalty towards hotel brands, transfer their 
expectations and experiences across organisations and borders. As such, this 
conclusion offers a range of opportunities for further research discussed in the 
following section.  
A similar development of knowledge took place in the achievement of the fourth 
objective; to assess the role of multiple-embeddedness in the development of the 
London Hilton. From the outset this study sought to analyse the process of 
internationalisation in the multiple contexts surrounding the Hilton’s London 
subsidiary, but it appeared that the concept of globalisation played a crucial role in 
understanding this process. Because of globalisation, firms which operate in 
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international markets find themselves surrounded by multiple settings. This study 
emphasised that this relationship is of a dual nature and that MNCs, by the very 
nature of their international activities, reinforce the process of globalisation. This 
directly addresses Jones’ (2012) call for more business history research into the 
concept of globalisation.   
This study is a confirmation of Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) suggestion that 
multiple-embeddedness should be studied as an enabling, rather than restricting 
factor. It appears that multiple-embeddedness is a natural state for MNCs and offers 
an opportunity for learning and consequently maximising MNC’s network expansion. 
It allows knowledge transference and differentiation of services in foreign markets. 
Multiple embeddedness results from the institutional pressures on the company and 
it depends on company’s ownership advantages how it will react to these pressures. 
This emphasises the relationship between institutional and resource-based views 
and suggests that businesses should treat institutionalism as the ‘third leg of 
strategy’ as advocated by Peng (2002).  
The constructed model of the London subsidiary’s multiple-embeddedness proved to 
be an invaluable tool in guiding the process of this research. It depicted the various 
levels of institutional influence on this subsidiary but also guided the research 
process itself. Composing the model allowed for methodological collection and 
analysis of data, and was particularly useful in the construction of the case study. 
The model does not aim to represent multiple-embeddedness of subsidiaries in 
general but it can serve as a template for future adaptations and applications to other 
companies. The greatest contribution of the multiple-embeddedness model in this 
study lies in the fact that it revealed how the London Hilton utilised its knowledge to 
balance the wide range of pressures coming from the internal and external contexts. 
Consequently, it also assisted in creating the conceptual link between the paradigms 
of institutionalism and the resource-based view, in that it showed how institutional 
ownership advantages are utilised in negotiation of legitimacy in foreign 
environments.  
The study of internationalisation, knowledge transference and multiple-
embeddedness led to the exploration of another area; the concept of foreignness as 
a differentiator. It was clear from the beginning that the negotiation of legitimacy 
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meant overcoming the liability of foreignness, but only in the course of the case 
study analysis did it appear that foreignness could constitute a differentiating asset 
for the incoming company. Such a notion was previously discussed by Joardar et al. 
(2014) who argued that foreignness can be an asset when it means overcoming 
entry barriers and negotiating legitimacy in other countries. This research found that 
foreignness can also offer benefits of appeal and differentiation. Not only is this 
caused by legitimacy spillover of a well-known brand, but even more so by the image 
of foreign practices which attract attention or even curiosity. This study revealed that 
the London Hilton was representative of a case of using foreignness as differentiator. 
This is not to say that it was the company’s strategic aim to do so, but it is clear that 
such mechanism can be observed in the case of this subsidiary. Further research 
could explore whether such processes are also present in other companies.  
It is not the aim of this research to generalise from the case study of the London 
Hilton, because it is strongly set in the specific historical setting of London and the 
US of the 1960s. Investigation of this historical context revealed that Hilton faced 
favourable conditions for its preferred form of expansion, but such a finding cannot 
be extended to other locations, times or companies.  It can, however be stressed 
that there is lack of business history research which includes corporate or national 
culture as a variable in the study (Lipartito 1995, Hansen 2012, Jones et al. 2012). 
According to Hansen (2012) this stems from the fact that culture is a difficult concept 
to encapsulate, but it is nevertheless essential in the understanding of MNC’s 
internationalisation processes, especially in the globalised world.  
The relationship between knowledge transference and negotiation of legitimacy of 
standardised practices emerged as a theme addressing the fifth objective of this 
study. Hilton appears to have achieved its goal of providing standardised service as 
a result of the effective management of knowledge transference and control over its 
institutional ownership advantages. This emerges conceptually from both the 
resource-based view and the institutional paradigm and implies that knowledge 
played a fundamental role in negotiation of legitimacy of the London Hilton. 
Establishing the relationships between the individual concepts, as presented in 
Figure 8-1, is considered to be a significant contribution to knowledge because such 
linkage was not explored in previous literature.  
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Finally, this research serves as a contribution to the increasing pool of business 
history inquiries. This area of research has been marginalised by businesses for 
many years. However, there is a growing trend amongst companies to draw attention 
to their heritage. Hilton Worldwide and InterContinental Hotel Group both use 
archival images in their marketing and invest in commemorative books and 
exhibitions. Retailers including Marks and Spencer and WH Smith cooperate with 
research institutions (University of Leeds and University of Reading respectively) to 
make their archives available to researchers and the general public. Observation of 
the current hotel market suggests that heritage strengthens companies’ brands 
especially where these brands are associated with a family name. Descendants of 
Conrad Hilton are generally considered to be heirs to the Hilton’s legacy even though 
the family is not involved in its management and Marriott is still perceived to be a 
‘family business’ (Marriott 2013). Business history is clearly significant in maintaining 
such an image. Following from Dunning and Lundan’s (2008) suggestion that in the 
globalised world where companies have access to similar assets, the institutional 
advantages can be the ones which will create competitive advantage, a strong 
historical legacy is certainly one such advantage which is not easy to imitate. 
Business history research is crucial for analysing this competitive positioning.  
In conclusion, the objectives established for this study sought to evaluate the 
relationship between the concepts of knowledge transference and the process of 
MNC’s internationalisation. The process of this research, however, revealed that 
there are more issues concerned with these theories which need to be explored. 
Consequently, the five objectives set for this study have been achieved, but also the 
wider selection of theories related to international business was expanded. 
Summarising, the key contributions made by this research remain to be the 
following:  
 The establishment of the conceptual link between knowledge transference, 
multiple-embeddedness and negotiation of legitimacy. This connection 
illustrates how the paradigms of institutionalism, resource-based view and 
transaction costs economy reinforce each other in the study of 
internationalisation.  
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 The finding that despite the changing models of hotel MNCs’ operations and 
expansions, effective hotel management relies on the social fabric of people 
and their knowledge.  
 Extension of the theory of foreignness and negotiation of legitimacy inasmuch 
that foreignness can be considered as a differentiator.  
 Methodological contribution of a subsidiary-driven embedded case study 
research.  
 Engagement in business history research through the subject area of 
hospitality management.  
 
9.3. Limitations of the research  
There are researchers who include the discussion on limitations of research in their 
methodology, focusing on the methodological weaknesses. It seems reasonable, 
however, to reflect on the process of research and its results at the end, when all the 
limitations are clearly apparent. This is also because methodological faults are 
usually revealed when the chosen methods fail to bring the expected results in terms 
of addressing the specific research objectives. Consequently, Chapter 3 explored a 
range of limitations associated with a qualitative and historical enquiry, commenting 
on the methods adopted to ensure maximum possible authenticity, credibility and 
transferability. The following paragraphs, on the other hand, serve as a reflection on 
the entire research process and comment on challenges encountered in the course 
of the study.   
This research reveals limitations in a number of areas: 
 Being a single case study, the research was restricted in terms of the access 
to data. Naturally, the majority of material was available from the company 
itself, specifically, in the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives 
at University of Houston. It needs to therefore be considered that the 
company itself made the decision as to what data was available to 
researchers and the wider interested public. This challenge reflects Hansen’s 
(2012: 701) argument that history is a very powerful tool, because “an 
organisation’s history can be reframed by remembering some things and 
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forgetting others”. This is not to say that business history research is 
unreliable, but only to emphasise that business historians can hardly rely on 
any ‘facts’ and has to depend on the material available as well as on the 
selection and interpretation of this material. Hansen (2012) is sceptical of the 
idea of bias altogether because he does not agree with the assumption that 
objectivity is a legitimate concept. He argues that business history, especially 
when concerned with culture, is focused on the construction of meanings 
rather than on the truth. It is therefore not the aim to generalise from this case 
study and it is suggested that further research, including the evaluation of 
multiple cases, should be conducted before any generalisations are made. 
Similarly, it is not the aim of business history research to offer managerial 
recommendation because findings from historical research are not always 
directly transferable to modern companies. However, the development of 
knowledge allows for making certain recommendations as to the areas of 
potential managerial interest and these are highlighted. 
 This research utilised archival documentation press to create the case study. 
Previous research (see example: Earl, Martin, MCCarthy and Soule 2004, 
Quek 2007) advocates caution when using such sources because of their 
bias. This bias lies mainly in the editor’s selection as to what to report as well 
as in the description of the reported events. Newspapers are also recognised 
as having certain political preconceptions (Oliver 2013). It is admitted by Earl 
et al. (2004) that usually “hard news” (i.e. the facts surrounding the events 
such as ‘who’ and ‘when’) are not subject to prejudice but only possible 
omissions. The “soft news”, on the other hand, includes impressions and 
comments, and as such is subject to multiple sources of bias including 
personal views and goals as well as a political outlook. The nature of this 
study, however, allows for mitigation of the influence of these kinds of bias. As 
argued in the Methodology, newspaper accounts were only used to outline the 
external context in which Hilton Hotels internationalised. They were analysed 
using the hermeneutics approach, which means that they were studied 
holistically (Bryman 2008). In other words, newspaper articles were used to 
illustrate and represent the attitude of the press, or the wider society, towards 
the company and/or towards Conrad. For example, when the press reported 
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negatively on the plans for the development of the London Hilton and its 
design, the conclusion made was not that the design of the hotel was 
inadequate, but only that the society seemed to be hostile towards the 
proposition. Similarly, when the American press praised Conrad as an 
entrepreneur, it was concluded that Conrad seemed to hold a favourable 
position and be a well-known figure in America at the time, rather than the fact 
that he was a successful businessman.  
 This study aimed to interpret the available material in a particular historical 
context. It used empirical data to represent theoretical concepts (Yin 2014) 
but it did not construct and test hypothesis which is advocated by de Jong et 
al. (2015). However, following Hansen (2012) it is assumed that the research 
method depends greatly on the question being asked. Having reviewed the 
research process, its limitations and achievements it is concluded that the 
methods chosen were the appropriate ones.  
 Finally, Bello and Kostova (2012) argue that the multidisciplinarity of 
international business is one of its greatest challenges. Theoretical concepts 
concerned with IB are so broad and interlinked that it is difficult to study one of 
them without reference to the others. As a result, according to these authors, 
researchers often skim the surface of theory, without analysing it in greater 
depth. This is consistent with Jones’ (2012) critique of business history stating 
that the discipline fails to study particular theoretical concepts in detail. 
Multidisciplinarity is considered to be both a strength and a limitation of this 
research because it made it difficult to focus on any one of the elements of the 
MNC’s internationalisation. The overall aim of the study was to explore the 
conceptual link between the process of internationalisation and knowledge 
transference. However, in the process, it occurred that this relationship cannot 
be explored without the inclusion of the concepts of institutionalism, the 
resource-based view and transaction cost theory. To some extent, this study 
produced more questions than it originally set to answer but this is why it also 
offers recommendations for further research. The review of previous research 
was concluded by the statement that this study seeks to become the basis for 
further investigations, and this aim was achieved.  
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9.4. Recommendations for further research 
The areas which are subject to further research have to some extent already been 
signalled. However, it is essential to also address the methodological discourse 
present in the business history circles in the past few years. Chapter 3.2 emphasised 
the fact that despite being rich in theoretical underpinning, business history as a 
discipline has a low ‘impact factor’ due to the general disregard for its methodology. 
Consequently, Jones et al (2012) advocate for more critical analysis of historical 
data. He sees the greatest opportunity in hypothesis testing, whilst maintaining the 
view that the case study is still the key analytical tool in business history. This study 
did not aim to test hypothesis because it took an exploratory approach rather than 
seeking to create and test theory. As such, it created the background for future 
research which should apply the suggested quantitative analysis methods. This 
study can be considered the first “feedback loop” (de Jong et al. 2015) which can be 
utilised in further theory building and testing. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
following areas have the potential to be studied further: 
 This research found that effective knowledge transference plays a 
fundamental role in the internationalisation of knowledge-based companies, 
such as Hilton International. Moreover, it is the tacit knowledge which 
particularly influences a company’s ability to standardise its offering. It was 
previously suggested that this makes a managerial contribution as it draws 
the managers’ attention to the transference of elements which are least visible 
and most difficult to communicate within a company. However, more robust 
empirical testing is needed to provide decision-makers with concrete advice 
on how to transfer tacit knowledge in an accurate manner. Such an empirical 
study could explore the methods of knowledge transference as well as factors 
which restrain it. It is suggested that such a study focuses particularly on 
multinational hotel companies due to the unique nature of their offering.  
 The area of tacit knowledge lends itself particularly to the adaptation of oral 
histories. If knowledge responsible for negotiation of legitimacy is embedded 
in people, then it is clearly these individuals that research should focus on. 
This applies equally to founders, employees and customers involved in 
knowledge transference. Such oral history research could effectively explore 
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the relationships between these groups of people and seek to understand the 
mechanisms driving knowledge transference.  
 This study extended Joardar’s et al. (2014) research on foreignness 
potentially being an asset in the process of internationalisation. It suggested 
that foreignness can have a marketing value in that it serves as a 
differentiator from local companies. Further research should explore the 
extent of factors which contribute to the overall foreignness, evaluating those 
elements which play a negative role and become a liability as well as those 
acting beneficially to the entering company. This area lends itself to the 
hypothesis testing method using multiple case studies which will allow for 
wider generalisation. Interestingly, this is one of the few areas which business 
historians can particularly contribute to, the reason being that the impact of 
foreignness on the process of internationalisation and on the ability to 
negotiate legitimacy can only be judged from the perspective of time.  
 Findings from this research have suggested that approaching MNCs from a 
network perspective allows understanding how knowledge flows across the 
network and impacts learning of the whole organisation. It is also likely that 
network analysis could assist in testing hypotheses relating to corporate 
learning. Such analysis would require large, and more importantly consistent, 
sets of data on each of the subsidiaries. Access to historical data is not 
always available but, nevertheless, this lies in the realms of possible future 
research.  
 Research on the role of knowledge transference in the process of 
internationalisation, as well as impact of foreignness on a company’s ability to 
negotiate legitimacy should be studied in the context of modern companies. 
Clearly, the institutional setting of the 1960s cannot be compared with current 
markets and so findings from this research cannot be directly transferred to 
contemporary business environment. Modern hotel companies are vertically 
disintegrated and becoming increasingly specialised thanks to the adoption of 
franchising and outsourcing (Roper 2015). The requirement for knowledge 
transference, however, remains crucial or possibly is even more relevant in 
these more disintegrated business structures.  
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 Finally, it seems vital that in the current competitive hotel market, companies 
protect tacit knowledge from spillover. Customers and employees can easily 
transfer knowledge to competitors and thus diminish the value of institutional 
ownership advantages. Knowledge must also be protected from being 
transferred to hotel owners who enter management contracts and franchise 
agreements with branded multinationals. Future research should thus 
consider not only internal transference of knowledge but also mechanisms of 
preventing the unwanted outward transference. It is anticipated that this study 
can serve as a framework for further exploration of these research areas.  
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Appendix 2: List of guest travelling on a hired jet for the London Hilton Opening 
accessed in the Hilton Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, 
University of Houston. 
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Appendix 3: List of Hilton hotels, domestic and international, between 1949 and 
1969 (number of rooms available from 1956).  
Source: based on analysis of archival editions of ‘Red Books’ available in the Hilton 
Collection at the Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, University of Houston 
Year  Hilton Hotels (Domestic) Hilton Hotels (International) 
1949-1950 
(year of 
opening of 
first 
internation
al hotel) 
The Town House, Los Angeles 
The Mayflower, Washington 
Palmer House, Chicago 
The Stevens, Chicago 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The Plaza, New York   
Roosevelt Hotel, New York 
Dayton-Biltmore Hotel, Dayton 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Lubbock 
  
The Bermudiana, Hamilton 
St George Hotel, St George’s 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua  
1950-1951 The Town House, Los Angeles 
The Mayflower, Washington 
Palmer House, Chicago 
The Stevens, Chicago 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The Plaza, New York   
Roosevelt Hotel, New York 
Dayton-Biltmore Hotel, Dayton 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Lubbock 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan 
1951-1952 The Town House, Los Angeles 
Arrowhead Springs Hotel, San Bernardinio 
The Mayflower, Washington 
Palmer House, Chicago 
The Stevens, Chicago 
The Jefferson, St Louis 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The Plaza, New York   
Roosevelt Hotel, New York 
The Waldorf Astoria, New York 
Dayton-Biltmore Hotel, Dayton 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Lubbock 
 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan 
1952-1953 The Town House, Los Angeles 
Arrowhead Springs Hotel, San Bernardinio 
The Mayflower, Washington 
Palmer House, Chicago 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago 
The Jefferson, St Louis 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The Plaza, New York   
Roosevelt Hotel, New York 
The Waldorf Astoria, New York 
Dayton-Biltmore Hotel, Dayton 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Lubbock 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan 
1953-1954 The Town House, Los Angeles 
Arrowhead Springs Hotel, San Bernardinio 
The Mayflower, Washington 
Palmer House, Chicago 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago 
The Jefferson, St Louis 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid 
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The Plaza, New York   
Roosevelt Hotel, New York 
The Waldorf Astoria, New York 
Deshler Hilton Hotel, Columbus 
Dayton-Biltmore Hotel, Dayton 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth 
 
1954-1955 The Town House, Los Angeles 
Arrowhead Springs Hotel, San Bernardinio 
The Mayflower, Washington 
Palmer House, Chicago 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago 
The Jefferson, St Louis 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The New Yorker, New York 
The Plaza, New York   
Roosevelt Hotel, New York 
The Waldorf Astoria, New York 
Deshler Hilton Hotel, Columbus 
Dayton-Biltmore Hotel, Dayton 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth 
 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul 
 
1955-1956 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills 
The Statler, Los Angeles 
The Statler, Hartford 
The Mayflower, Washington 
The Statler, Washington 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago 
The Palmer House, Chicago 
The Statler, Boston 
The Statler, Detroit 
The Jefferson, St. Louis 
The Statler, St. Louis 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque 
The Statler, Buffalo 
The New Yorker, New York 
The Plaza, New York 
The Roosevelt, New York 
The Statler, New York 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York 
The Statler, Cleveland 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston 
 
 
The Palacio Hilton Hotel, Chihuahua 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul 
1956 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (450) 
The Statler, Los Angeles, (1300) 
The Statler, Hartford (455) 
The Statler, Washington, (850) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2268) 
The Statler, Boston (1300) 
The Statler, Ditroit (1000) 
The Statler, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (200) 
The Statler, Buffalo (1100) 
The Plaza, New York (1060) 
The Statler, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Palacio Hilton, Chihuahua (126) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (300) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (320) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (300) 
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The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400) 
The Statler, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (1000) 
The Dayton-Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001) 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (350) 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth (300) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Hotel, San Antonio (500) 
 
1957 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (450) 
The Statler, Los Angeles, (1300) 
The Statler, Hartford (455) 
The Statler, Washington, (850) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2268) 
The Statler, Boston (1300) 
The Statler, Ditroit (1000) 
The Statler, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (200) 
The Statler, Buffalo (1100) 
The Plaza, New York (1000) 
The Savoy-Plaza, New York (1000) 
The Statler, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400) 
The Statler, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (1000) 
The Dayton-Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001) 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (350) 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth (300) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Hotel, San Antonio (500) 
 
The Palacio Hilton, Chihuahua (126) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (400) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (300) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (320) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (300) 
1958 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (450) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1275) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (850) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2268) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1300) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (167) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1100) 
The Plaza, New York (1017) 
The Savoy Hilton, New York (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (889) 
The Dayton-Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001) 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (300) 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth (300) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Hotel, San Antonio (500) 
 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1216) 
The Habana Hilton , Havana (630) 
The Palacio Hilton, Chihuahua (126) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (400) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama City (300) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (330) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (300) 
 
1959 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (450) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1275) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (850) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
The Habana Hilton, Havana (630) 
The Palacio Hilton, Chihuahua (126) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (400) 
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The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2268) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (300) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1300) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (200) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1100) 
The Plaza, New York (1000) 
The Savoy Hilton, New York (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (1000) 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001) 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (350) 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth (268) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Hotel, San Antonio (500) 
Hilton Inn, San Antonio (50) 
  
 
El Panama Hilton, Panama City (300) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
Berlin Hilton Hotel, Berlin (350) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (330) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (300) 
Nile Hilton Hotel, Cairo (400)  
1960 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (450) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1300) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (302) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (884) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (850) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (310) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2268) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (300) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1300) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (200) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1100) 
The Savoy Hilton, New York (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (1000) 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (804) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001) 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (350) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth (268) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Hotel, San Antonio (500) 
Hilton Inn, San Antonio (50) 
 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
The Habana Hilton, Havana (630) 
Las Brisas, Acapulco (150) 
The Palacio Hilton, Chihuahua (126) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (400) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama City (300) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
Berlin Hilton Hotel, Berlin (350) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (330) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (440) 
Nile Hilton Hotel, Cairo (400)  
1961 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (500) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1275) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (302) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (884) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (1000) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (308) 
The Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1100) 
Hilton Inn, Aurora (300) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
Las Brisas Hilton, Acapulco (156) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (407) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama City (300) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, San Thomas (200) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (400) 
Berlin Hilton Hotel, Berlin (350) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (340) 
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The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2250) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (310) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1300) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (167) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1100) 
The Savoy Hilton, New York (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (200) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400)  
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (889) 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (800) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001)  
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (350) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
Hilton Hotel, Fort Worth (300) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150) 
 
 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (300) 
Nile Hilton Hotel, Cairo (400)  
1962 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (500) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1275) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (302) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (884) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (308) 
The Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1015) 
Hilton Inn, Aurora (275) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2250) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (310) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1300) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (1000) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas (189) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (650) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (200) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1100) 
The Savoy Hilton, New York (1000) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (2000) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400)  
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (1000) 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (800) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001)  
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (350) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (1100) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150) 
 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1216) 
Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (156) 
Las Brisas Hilton, Acapulco (156) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (410) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama City (300) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, San Thomas (200) 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (260) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (400) 
Berlin Hilton Hotel, Berlin (350) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (300) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (340) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (440) 
Nile Hilton Hotel, Cairo (400) 
 
Associated hotels in Australia: 
 
Chevron Hilton, Melbourne (200) 
Chevron Hilton, Sydney (220) 
1963 The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (449) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1300) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (300) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (880) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1216) 
The Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (250) 
Las Brisas Hilton, Acapulco (151) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (400) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama  City (269) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (460)  
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Hilton Inn, Atlanta (308) 
The Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1020) 
Hilton Inn, Aurora (278) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (2500) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2230)  
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (300) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1214) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (933) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas (189) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (603) 
The Statler Hilton Buffalo (1100) 
The New York Hilton of Rockefeller Center, New York 
(2153) 
The Savoy Hilton, New York (886) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2200) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1900) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (400)  
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (880) 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton (435) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (800) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (1001) 
Hilton Hotel, El Paso (300) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (787) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150) 
 
 
Virgin Isle Hilton, San Thomas (184) 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (260) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (365) 
The London Hilton, London (512) 
Berlin Hilton, Berlin (350)  
The Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (300) 
The Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (263) 
The Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (400) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (340) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (277) 
The Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (867) 
The Royal Tehran Hilton, Tehran (261) 
The Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (478) 
Nile Hilton Hobntel, Cairo (400)   
 
Associated hotels in Australia: 
 
Chevron Hilton, Sydney (220) 
1964 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Beverly Hilton, Beverly Hills (449) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1258) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (299) 
The San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco (1200) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (874) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (301) 
The Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1021) 
The Kahala Hilton, Honolulu (300) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2230)  
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (307) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1222) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (933) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas City (189) 
The Statler Hilton, St. Louis (603) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1065) 
The New York Hilton of Rockefeller Center, New York 
(2150) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2033) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1779) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (350) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Deshler Hilton, Columbus (897) 
The Dayton Biltmore, Dayton (435) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (803) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (984) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (789) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150) 
Hilton Inn, Milwaukee (181) 
 
Vancouver Hotel, Vancouver (560) 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton, Dorval (288) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1216) 
The Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (250) 
The Guadalajara Hilton, Guadalajara 
(220) 
The Continental Hilton, Mexico City (407) 
The Jamaica Hilton, Ocho Rios (176) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama City (300) 
The Dorada Hilton, Dorada (222) 
The Mayaguez Hilton, Mayaguez (150) 
The Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
The Virgin Isle Hilton, San Thomas (200) 
The Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (261) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (400) 
The London Hilton, London (512) 
The Berlin Hilton, Berlin (350) 
The Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
The Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (275) 
The Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (275) 
The Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (400) 
The Castellana Hilton, Madrid (338) 
The Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (440) 
The Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (900) 
The Royal Tehran Hilton, Tehran (300) 
The Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (506) 
The Nile Hilton, Cairo (400) 
 
 
310 
 
1965 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Beverly Hills Hilton, Los Angeles (449) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1258) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (299) 
San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco (1200)  
The Denver Hilton, Denver (874) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
Washington Hilton, Washington (1200) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (301) 
Hilton Hawaiian, Honolulu (1021) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2230) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (307) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1222) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (933) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas City (189) 
The Statler Hilton, St Louis (603) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1065) 
New York Hilton at Rockefeller Center, New York 
(2150) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2033) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1779) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
The Netherland Hotel, Cincinnati (800) (operated by 
HHC but not under the Hilton name) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (350) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (803) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (984) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (789) 
The Granada Hotel, San Antonio (430) (operated by 
HHC but not under the Hilton name) 
The Granada Inn, San Antonio (50) (operated by HHC 
but not under the Hilton name) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150)  
Hilton Inn, Milwaukee (181) 
 
Listed in Red Book as Hilton International 
Co for the first time 
 
All hotels appear without ‘The’ 
 
Vancouver Hotel, Vancouver (560) 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton, Dorval (288) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1216) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (400) 
Nile Hilton, Cairo (400) 
London Hilton, London (512) 
Orly Hilton, Paris (266) 
Berlin Hilton, Berlin (350) 
Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
The Kahala Hilton, Honolulu (300) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (275) 
Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (270) 
Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (850) 
Royal Tehran Hotel, Tehran (300) 
Tel Aviv Hilton, Tel Aviv (424) 
Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (400) 
Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (506) 
Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (250) 
Guadalajara Hilton, Guadalajara (220) 
Continental Hilton, Mexico City (400) 
Dorado Hilton, Dorado (222) 
Mayaguez Hilton, Mayaguez (150) 
Caribe Hilton, San Juan (450) 
San Jeronimo Hilton, San Juan (350) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama (300) 
Castellana Hilton, Madrid (338) 
Tunis Hilton, Tunis (250)  
Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (440) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, St Thomas (200) 
Jamaica Hilton, Ocho Rios (176) 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (261)  
 
1966 The Beverly Hilton, Los Angeles (449) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1258) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (410) 
San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco (1200) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (874) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
Washington Hilton, Washington (1200) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (301) 
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1064) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2230) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (300) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1222) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (933) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas City (189) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1065) 
New York Hilton at Rockefeller Center, New York 
(2150) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2033) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1779) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204)  
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (350) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (803) 
Vancouver Hotel, Vancouver (562) 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton, Dorval (288) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (364) 
Nile Hilton, Cairo (400) 
London Hilton, London (510) 
Orly Hilton, Paris (274) 
Paris Hilton, Paris (493) 
Berlin Hilton, Berlin (347) 
Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
Kahala Hilton, Honolulu (300) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (276) 
Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (263) 
Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (836) 
Royal Tehran Hilton, Tehran (261) 
Tel Aviv Hilton, Tel Aviv (428) 
Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (398) 
Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (478) 
Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (260) 
Guadalajara Hilton, Guadalajara (222) 
Continental Hilton, Mexico City (403) 
Dorado Hilton, Dorado (222) 
Mayaguez Hilton, Mayaguez (150) 
Caribe Hilton, San Juan (461) 
Can Jeronimo Hilton, San Juan (350) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama (269) 
Castellana Hilton, Madrid (322) 
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The Statler Hilton, Dallas (984) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (789) 
The Granada Hotel, San Antonio (430) 
The Granada Inn, San Antonio (50) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150)  
 
Rama Hotel, Bangkok (180) 
Tunis Hilton, Tunis (245)  
Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (417) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, San Thomas (211) 
Jamaica Hilton, Ocho Rios (176) 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (261) 
  
1967 The Beverly Hilton, Los Angeles (700) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1258) 
Hilton Inn, San Diego (200) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (410) 
San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco (1200) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (874) 
The Statler Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
The Washington Hilton, Washington (1200) 
Cape Kennedy Hilton, Cape Canaveral (200) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (301) 
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1064) 
Hilton Hale Kaanapali, Maui (252) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2230) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (300) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1222) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (933) 
Saint Paul Hilton, St Paul (500) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas City (189) 
Hilton Inn, St Louis (219) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1065) 
New York Hilton at Rockefeller Center, New York 
(2150) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2033) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1779) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (350) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (1000) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (803) 
Hilton Inn, Dallas (406) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (984) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (789) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150) 
 
 
Barbados Hilton, Bridge Town (158) 
Brussels Hilton, Brussels (301) 
Hotel Vancouver, Vancouver (562) 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton, Dorval (288) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (364) 
Cyprus Hilton, Nicosia (150) 
Nile Hilton, Cairo (400) 
London Hilton, London (510) 
Orly Hilton, Paris (274) 
Paris Hilton, Paris (493) 
Berlin Hilton, Berlin (347) 
Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
Kahala Hilton, Honolulu (300) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (276) 
Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (263) 
Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (836) 
Royal Tehran Hilton, Tehran (261) 
Tel Aviv Hilton, Tel Aviv (428) 
Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (398) 
Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (478) 
Malta Hilton, St. Julians (200) 
Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (260) 
Guadalajara Hilton, Guadalajara (222) 
Continental Hilton, Mexico City (403) 
Rabat Hilton, Rabat (259) 
Manila Hilton, Manila (390) 
Dorado Hilton, Dorado (222) 
Mayaguez Hilton, Mayaguez (150) 
Caribe Hilton, San Juan (474) 
San Jeronimo Hilton, San Juan (338) 
El Panama Hilton, Panama (269) 
Castellana Hilton, Madrid (322) 
Rama Hotel, Bangkok (180) 
Tunis Hilton, Tunis (245) 
Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (417) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, St Thomas (211) 
Curacao Hilton, Willemstad (224) 
Jamaica Hilton, Ocho Rios (176) 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (261) 
 
1968 The Beverly Hilton, Los Angeles (700) 
The Statler Hilton, Los Angeles (1258) 
Hilton Inn, San Diego (200) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (410) 
San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco (1200) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (874) 
The Hartford Hilton, Hartford (455) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (825) 
The Washington Hilton, Washington (1200) 
Cape Kennedy Hilton, Cape Canaveral (200) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (301) 
DeSoto Hilton , Savannah (250) 
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1064) 
The Kona Hilton, Kona (200) 
Maui Hilton, Maui (Kaanapali) (252) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (3000) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2230) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (300) 
Barbados Hilton, Bridge Town (158) 
Brussels Hilton, Brussels (301) 
Hotel Vancouver, Vancouver (562) 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton, Dorval (288) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
Hotel Carrera, Santiago (364) 
Cyprus Hilton, Nicosia (150) 
Nile Hilton, Cairo (400) 
London Hilton, London (510) 
Orly Hilton, Paris (274) 
Paris Hilton, Paris (493) 
Berlin Hilton, Berlin (347) 
Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
Kahala Hilton, Honolulu (300) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (276) 
Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (263) 
Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (836) 
Royal Tehran Hilton, Tehran (261) 
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The Statler Hilton, Boston (1222) 
The Statler Hilton, Detroit (933) 
The Saint Paul Hilton, St Paul (500) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas City (189) 
Hilton Inn, St Louis (219) 
Hilton Hotel, Albuquerque (164) 
The Statler Hilton, Buffalo (1065) 
New York Hilton at Rockefeller Center, New York 
(2150) 
The Statler Hilton, New York (2033) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1779) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (800) 
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (350) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (500) 
The Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (803) 
Hilton Inn, Dallas (406) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (984) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (789) 
Hilton Palacio del Rio, San Antonio (500) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (150) 
 
Tel Aviv Hilton, Tel Aviv (428) 
Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (398) 
Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (478) 
Malta Hilton, St. Julians (200) 
Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (260) 
Guadalajara Hilton, Guadalajara (222) 
Continental Hilton, Mexico City (403) 
Rabat Hilton, Rabat (259) 
Manila Hilton, Manila (390) 
Dorado Hilton, Dorado (222) 
Mayaguez Hilton, Mayaguez (150) 
Caribe Hilton, San Juan (474) 
San Jeronimo Hilton, San Juan (338) 
Castellana Hilton, Madrid (322) 
Rama Hotel, Bangkok (180) 
Tunis Hilton, Tunis (245) 
Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (417) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, St Thomas (211) 
Curacao Hilton, Willemstad (224) 
Jamaica Hilton, Ocho Rios (176) 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (261) 
1969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hilton North Inn, Akron (230) 
Hilton West Inn, Akron (153) 
Hilton Hotel Albuquerque (162) 
Hilton Inn, Ann Arbor (120) 
Hilton Inn,  Annapolis (142) 
Hilton Inn, Atlanta (344) 
The Baltimore Hilton, Baltimore (350) 
Hilton Inn, Benton Harbor (120) 
The Statler Hilton, Boston (1144) 
Colonial Hilton Inn, Boston (130) 
The Statler Hilton Buffalo (1028) 
Cape Kennedy Hilton, Cape Canaveral (200) 
The Palmer House, Chicago (2160) 
The Conrad Hilton, Chicago (2341) 
The Netherland Hilton, Cincinnati (701)  
The Terrace Hilton, Cincinnati (350) 
Hilton Inn, Clearwater (120) 
The Statler Hilton, Cleveland (900) 
The Statler Hilton, Dallas (968) 
Hilton Inn, Dallas (400)  
Hilton Inn, Dayton (250) 
The Denver Hilton, Denver (868) 
The Detroit Hilton, Detroit (905) 
Hilton Inn, Durham (145) 
Hilton Inn, El Paso (150) 
The Hilton, Fort Lauderdale (226) 
Hilton Inn, Greensboro (232) 
The Hartford Hilton, Hartford (443) 
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu (1761) 
The Shamrock Hilton, Houston (784) 
Hilton Inn, Indianapolis (110) 
Indianapolis Hilton, Indianapolis (430) (under 
construction) 
Hilton Inn, Kansas City (189) 
Kona Hilton, Kona (318) 
The Los Angeles Hilton, Los Angeles (1236) 
The Beverly Hilton, Los Angeles (634) 
Maui Hilton, Maui (239) 
Hilton Plaza, Miami Beach (500) 
Hilton Inn, Nashville (160) 
Hilton Inn, New Orleans (294) 
The New York Hilton, New York (2139) 
The Waldorf-Astoria, New York (1798) 
Barbados Hilton, Bridge Town (158) 
Brussels Hilton, Brussels (301) 
Hotel Vancouver, Vancouver (562) 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton, Dorval (288) 
The Queen Elizabeth, Montreal (1200) 
Cyprus Hilton, Nicosia (150) 
Nile Hilton, Cairo (400) 
London Hilton, London (510) 
Addis Ababa Hilton, Addis Ababa (250) 
Orly Hilton, Paris (274) 
Paris Hilton, Paris (493) 
Berlin Hilton, Berlin (347) 
Mainz Hilton, Mainz (251) 
Athens Hilton, Athens (480) 
Kahala Hilton, Honolulu (300) 
Amsterdam Hilton, Amsterdam (276) 
Rotterdam Hilton, Rotterdam (263) 
Hong Kong Hilton, Hong Kong (836) 
Royal Tehran Hilton, Tehran (261) 
Tel Aviv Hilton, Tel Aviv (428) 
Cavalieri Hilton, Rome (398) 
Tokyo Hilton, Tokyo (478) 
New Stanley Hotel, Nairobi (231) 
Kuwait Hilton, Kuwait (250) 
Malta Hilton, St. Julians (200) 
Acapulco Hilton, Acapulco (260) 
Guadalajara Hilton, Guadalajara (222) 
Continental Hilton, Mexico City (403) 
Rabat Hilton, Rabat (259) 
Manila Hilton, Manila (390) 
Dorado Hilton, Dorado (222) 
Mayaguez Hilton, Mayaguez (150) 
Caribe Hilton, San Juan (474) 
San Jeronimo Hilton, San Juan (338) 
Castellana Hilton, Madrid (322) 
Marbella Hilton, Marbella (270) 
Rama Hotel, Bangkok (180) 
Tunis Hilton, Tunis (245) 
Istanbul Hilton, Istanbul (417) 
Caracas Hilton, Caracas (430) 
Virgin Isle Hilton, St Thomas (211) 
Curacao Hilton, Willemstad (224) 
Jamaica Hilton, Ocho Rios (176) 
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The Statler Hilton, New York (1909) 
Hilton Inn, New York (Kennedy Airport) (112) 
Colonial Hilton Inn, Northampton (131) 
Hilton Inn , Oakland (300) (under construction) 
Omaha Hilton, Omaha (465) (under construction) 
Hilton Inn, Orlando (250) 
El Mirador Hilton, Palm Springs (283) 
Pittsburgh Hilton, Pittsburgh (806) 
The Portland Hilton, Portland (466) 
Hilton Inn, Raleigh (195) 
Saint Paul Hilton, Saint Paul (494) 
Hilton Inn, Salina (150) 
Hilton Palacio del Rio, San Antonio (491) 
Hilton Inn, San Diego (318) 
Hilton Inn, San Francisco (408) 
San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco (1141) 
Hilton Inn, Sarasota (103) 
The DeSoto Hilton, Savannah (252) 
Hilton Inn, Seattle (146) 
Hilton Inn, St Louis (216) 
Hilton Inn, Tarrytown (204) 
Hilton Inn, Tucson (210) 
The Statler Hilton, Washington (815) 
The Washington Hilton, Washington (1179) 
Hilton Inn, Williamsburg (136) 
Hilton Inn, Winston-Salem (175) 
 
Trinidad Hilton, Port-of-Spain (261) 
 
 
